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The concept "protection of pharmaceutical data" is a result of pharmaceutical registering 
system or procedure; 1 as its language this principle implicitly calls for some kind of legal 
protection to the data, or at least the non-disclosure of the data. In most jurisdictions, the 
health agency requires that, for safety concerns, pharmaceutical companies submit 
preclinical and clinical test data in order to obtain a marketing approval? For instance, in 
the United States, the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) requires an originator to 
submit pharmaceutical data, before new medicines enter the market. The submitted data 
should provide sufficient information to prove the safety and effectiveness of drugs. This 
procedure, which is established by the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act (FDCA) of 
1938, 3 is known as New Drug Application (NDA).4 The data submitted to the FDA will 
become a part of governmental records, even though the data is owned by the applicant. 
If there is no exception applied, as a part of public record, these pharmaceutical data 
should be disclosed to the public in accordance with Freedom of Information Act 
(FIOA).5 However, since the data contains commercial value and secrecy on it, the 
question arises as to whether the FDA can disclose the pharmaceutical and have them be 
1 Press Release, World Trade Organization [hereinafter WHO], Data Exclusivity And Other "TRIPS-
PLUS" Measures, at 3, Briefing Note Access to Medicines (Mar. 2006). 
2 CPTECH, Pharmaceutical Test Data Protection, available at http://www.cptech.org/ip/health/data/ (last 
visited Feb. 10,2009). 
3 Milestones in U.S. Food and Drug Law History, FDA Backgrounder, May 3, 1999, Updated August 2005, 
(http://www.fcla.gov/opacom/backgrounders/miles.html, last visited on February 17,2007). 
4 Milestones in U.S. Food and Drug Law History, FDA Backgrounder, May 3, 1999, Updated August 
2005, (http://www.fda.gov/opacomlbackgrounders/miles.html, last visited on February 17,2007). 
5 McGarity & Shapiro, The Trade Secret Status of Health and Safety Testing Information: Reforming 
Agency Disclosure Policies, 93 Harvard Law Review 837, at 837 (1980). 
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used by second entrants. In 1984 the US launched the protection of pharmaceutical data 
by the adoption of the Hatch-Waxman Act. One clear attempt of this Act is to advance 
the entry of generic medicines. Perhaps another reason is that the FDA decided to settle 
the issue as to whether pharmaceutical data should be disclosed to the public. The form of 
protection to the data since then is finalized in the US but this new form of protections of 
pharmaceutical innovations has not been accepted widely among the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) members. 
The HIV-AIDS outbreaks brought the international community's attention to the issue of 
access to medicines. Suddenly,. the protection of pharmaceutical innovation draws the 
attention of international community, because many developing countries argued that the . . 
implementation of intellectual property impedes the access to medicines and made the 
essential medicines unaffordable for them.6 
Traditionally legal researchers have largely focused on the impact of pharmaceutical 
patents on the access to medicines, but this trend has slightly changed. It is true that the 
more complicated pharmaceutical registering scheme grows the safer the medicines 
become. Nevertheless, this also means that cost of clinical trials will skyrocket. 7 
Inevitably, this cost will be reflected on the price of medicines. The emergence of the 
generic drugs industry brings cheaper medicines to consumers because generic medicines 
6 Carlos M. Correa, Unfair Competition Under the TRIPS Agreement: Protection of Data Submitted for the 
Registration of Pharmaceuticals, 3 Chi. J. Int'l L. 69, 70-7l. 
7 Globalization, TRIPS and access to pharmaceuticals, WHO Policy Perspective on Medicine, No.3 March 
200 1 ,World Health Organization, also available on Whttp://www.who.intlhiv/amds/regulationsl.pdf. 
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do not have the high developing cost incumbent.s This benefits all consumers. However, 
in the long run, generics would eat all the profits that originator can make. Most 
importantly, it would discourage pharmaceutical firms from investing in and developing 
new drugs. In a survey, pharmaceutical companies confessed that more than 60% of new 
drugs were not developed and more than 65% of new drugs were not introduced to 
market if there are no protections for pharmaceutical innovation.9 Not only patent the 
pharmaceutical companies now also rely on data exclusivity to exclude the generic 
medicines out of the market in order to manipulate the industry and control the price. lo 
Many researchers have indicated that the price of generic medicines one year after the 
patent expired will be 65 % lower than the average price of the brand version. II Thus, it 
is an unexpressed goal for research and developed oriented pharmaceutical industry to 
retain its profits by maintaining a monopoly status. 
The globalization of international trade made it difficult to protect pharmaceutical data 
outside the US. In many jurisdictions, the health agencies rely on test data registered by 
brand-name drug firms to approve generic drugs; thus the local generic manufacturers are 
not required to submit the data to prove their generic medicines safe. 12 By doing so, these 
. 
8 Shanker A. Singham, Competition Policy and the Stimulation ofInnovation: TRIPS and the Interface 
Between Competition and Patent Protection in the Pharmaceutical Industry, 26 Brook. J. Int'l L. 363, 363 
(2000). 
9 Ronald J. Vogel, Pharmaceutical Economics and Public Policy, page 59-60 (2007). 
10 Brook K. Baker, Arthritic Flexibilities for Accessing Medicines: Analysis of WTO Action Regarding 
Paragraph 6 of The Doha declaration On the TRIPS Agreement And Public Health, 14 IND. INT'L & COMPo 
L. REV. 613, 708-709 (2004). 
11 Schweitzer, Pharmaceutical Economics and Policy, page 150-151 (2nd ed., 2007). 
12 Cecilia Oh & Sisule Musungu, The Use of Flexibilities in TRIPS by Developing Countries: Can They 
Promote Access to Medicines? Commission on Intellectual Property Rights, Innovation and Public Health 
3 
~ .. -------------------------------
generic drug manufacturers could save costly expenditures in drug tests,13 so no wonder 
they can provide medicines at lower price. Naturally, this price competition caused by 
generic drug makers led originator to lose profit; therefore, they argued that the new 
medicines should get a full scale of protection and should also be free from the generic 
competition within a period of time in order to compensate their high research and 
developing cost. 14 These objectives will reach not only accounts for the pharmaceutical 
patents but also the protection of data submitted for the registration of a new drug. IS 
Consequently, they suggested that all governments, besides patent, should grant "market 
exclusivity" 16 or what is called "data exclusivity" 17 to stimulate pharmaceutical 
innovation. Developing countries, human right advocates, and even the World Health 
Organization (WHO) challeriged such a position. IS In 2001, this controversial issue has 
(CIPIH), Study 4c, vii, World Health Organization, August 2005, 
htIp://www.who.intiintellectllalproperty/stlldies/TRlPSFLEXT.pdf, last visited Feb 20, 2007. 
13 The cost of a new drug is around 800 million. See PHARMACEUTICAL RESEARCHERS AND 
MANUFACTURERS OF AMERICA (PHRMA), INDUSTRY PROFILEEEE 2003, ch. 1, at 2 ("The 
average cost to develop a new drug has grown from $138 million in 1975 to $802 million in 2000."), at 
http:// www.phrma.org/publications/publications/profile02/2003%20CHAPTER% 20 l.pdf (last visited Feb. 
15,2007). 
14 Singham, supra note 9, at 481-483. 
151d. 
16 The terms "marketing exclusivity," "market exclusivity," "new drug product exclusivity," "Hatch-
Waxman exclusivity," "sui generic protection," "data exclusivity," and "data protection" are all found in 
the U.S. and/or E.U. legal literature. See Valerie Junod, Drug Marketing Exclusivity Under United States 
and European Union Law, 59 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 479, nt. 2 (2004). 
17 1d. See also the report of Commission on Intellectual Property Rights, Innovation and Public Health 
provides a definition for Data protection: an obligation imposed on third parties to protect test data (e.g. the 
results of clinical trials) - usually collected in order to comply with government regulations on the safety, 
efficacy and quality of a broad range of products (e.g. drugs, pesticides, medical devices). For example, 
TRIPS provides for the protection of such data against unfair commercial use. 
18 Network for Monitoring the Impact of Globalization and TRIPS on Access to Medicines, Meeting 
Report, 19-21 February 2001, Chulalongkorn University Bangkok, Thailand, Introduction page, 




also been brought to discussion at World Trade Organization (WTO) Doha Ministerial 
Conference as a trade related issue, though the essence of this issue, arguably, lies with 
both trade law and human rights law. 19 
The controversy over data protection in the academic field began with a question as to 
whether the pharmaceutical data is a subject matter of intellectual property law. Most 
supporters-protectionists think protection of test data would secure profits of investors 
and attract them to invest in the pharmaceutical industry, thereby developing more new 
drugs for the good mankind.2o In contrast, opinions opposed this viewpoint, are based on 
the underlying purpose of intellectual property. Opponents, basically, see intellectual 
property as a system to reward innovation and not to promote investment. Under such 
logic, the protection of test data cannot be rationalized on the basis of securing 
investments.21 
Regardless of the academic confrontation between these two views, intemationallaw has 
recognized that the test data is protectable item. Article 39.322 of the Agreement on 
19 The Ministerial Conference is the highest forum in the structure of the WTO. The Ministerial Conference 
is composed of representatives of all the WTO Members and meets at least once every two years. Since the 
establishment of the WTO, the Ministerial Conference has been held five times: Singapore (December 
1996), Geneva (May 1998), Seattle (November - December 1999), Doha (November 200 I), and Cancun 
(September 2003). 
20 J unod, supra note 14, at 481-486. 
21 Id. 
22 Article 39.3:Members, when requiring, as a condition of approving the marketing of pharmaceutical or of 
agricultural chemical products which utilize new chemical entities, the submission of undisclosed test or 
other data, the origination of which involves a considerable effort, shall protect such data against unfair 
commercial use. In addition, Members shall protect such data against disclosure, except where necessary to 
protect the public, or unless steps are taken to ensure that the data are protected against unfair commercial 
use. 
5 
Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) 23 recogmzes that 
pharmaceutical data submitted for marketing approval is protectable subject matter. 
However, whether the protection of this subject would be limited under the concern of 
public health, or human rights is still controversial issue in internationallaw.24 
To clarify the relationship between public health, human rights and intellectual property, 
member states scheduled a WTO ministerial conference in Doha and adopted a 
Declaration on the TRIPS in 2001. Paragraph 4 of the Doha declaration states: 
"We agree that the TRIPS Agreement does not and should not prevent 
members from taking measures to protect public health. Accordingly, while 
reiterating our commitment to the TRIPS Agreement, we affirm that the 
Agreement can and should be interpreted and implemented in a manner 
supportive of WTO members' right to protect public health and, in particular, 
to promote access to medicines for all. In this connection, we reaffirm the 
right of WTO members to use, to the full, the provisions in the TRIPS 
Agreement, which provide flexibility for this purpose.,,25 
The language in this context has expressed the flexible use in TRIPS to increase access to 
medicines.26 It states the importance of public health and the access to medicines, but it 
does not clarify what is the relationship between states' obligation to protect intellectual 
23 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects ofIntellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh 
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization [hereinafter WTO Agreement], Annex lC, Legal 
Instruments - Results of the Uruguay Round vol. 31, 33 I.L.M. 81 (1994) [hereinafter TRIPS Agreement], 
available at http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legate/27-trips.pdf. 
24 Carios, M. Correa, Implications of the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS agreement and public health, 
June, 2003, WHO, (WHO/EDMIPARl2002.3). 
hrtp://www.who.intlmedicines/areas/policy/WHO_EDM]AR_2002.3.pdf 
25 WTO Ministerial Conference, Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, WT/MIN 
(01)/DEC/2 (Nov. 20, 2001), 411.L.M. 755 (2002) [hereinafter Doha Declaration], available at 
http://www.wto.orgienglishithewto_e/minist_e/minOl_e/mindecl_trips_e.htm. 
26 




property and obligation to ensure the right to access medicines or the right to health. 
Should the right to access medicines as a fundamental human, take priority over 
intellectual property? The text did not answer our question. This ambiguous position 
created by Doha Declaration in 2001 may lead member states to adopt different positions, 
some of which could, somehow, inadvertently, impede access to medicines. 
Pragmatically speaking, due to political and economical reasons, the use of flexibility in 
TRIPS has its difficulties. For example, how in a flexible way a member state can 
implement the TRIPS, and what kind of measures is adopted is left open to member 
states, so their various implementation strategies would bring different results. Therefore, 
issues still remained to be settled in the international system of data protection. , .-
1.1 From Drug Safety to Data Protection 
1.1.1 The Concept of Drug Safety and NDA Procedures 
Because of the development of new drugs, many human lives have been saved from 
infectious diseases. However, the events of exposure to the unsafe medicines are still 
reported everyday. 27 The quality and safety of food and medicines are always a concern 
of public welfare for every country, especially when the incidents of adverse drug 
reactions occur. To deal with the sanitation crisis in the beginning of 20th Century,28 the 
US Congress passed Pure Food and Drug Act (PFDA) in 1906.29 The PFDA created the 
27 Milestones in US. Food and Drug Law History, FDA Backgrounder, May 3, 1999, Updated August 
2005, (http://www.fda.gov/opacom/backgrounders/miles.html. last visited on February 17,2007). 
28 Jeffrey E. Shuren, Essay: The Modem Regulatory Administrative State: A Response to Changing 
Circumstances, 38 Harv. 1. on Legis 291, 299-301, Summer, 2001. 
29 
Pure Food and Drug Act of 1906, Pub. L. No. 59-384 Stat. 768 (repealed 1938). 
7 
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Bureau of Chemistry in the Development of Agriculture, which was the predecessor of 
FDA.30 Compared with today's FDA, the PFDA had different tasks. Regarding the 
regulation of drugs, the PFDA was mainly to intervene against the sale of fraudulent 
drugs, but not to protect the public health by intervening in the approval of drugs.3 ! 
Latter, two drug incidents changed the US's policy regarding the regulation of drugs: one 
was Sulfanilamide tragedy, and the other was Thalidomide calamity.32 To fill up the gaps 
in the regulations of drugs, Congress formed a prototype of the modern drug approval 
system. At first, it created the FDA and formed the drug pre-market notification system. 
Latter, the FDA annulled the drug pre-market notification system and fortified the 
function of FDA by formation of new drug regulations. 33 
The Sulfanilamide tragedy was a significant incident in the history of public health 
because it led to the formation of the FDA. In 1937, the first time Elixir Sulfanilamide 
was introduced to treat certain types of bacterial infections, especially in the use of 
sulfanilamide for streptococcal infections.34 Latter, this new sulfa antimicrobial medicine, 
Elixir Sulfanilamide, killed 107 persons, many of whom were children, and has proved to 
30 Richard A. Merrill, The Architecture of Government Regulation of Medical Products, 82 Va. L. Rev 
1753,1761-1766,1996. 
31 Shuren, supra note 26. 
32 Joseph P. Reid, A Generic Drug Price Scandal: Too Bitter A Pill for the Drug Price Competition and 
Patent Term Restoration Act to Swallow? 75 Notre Dam L. Rev 300,312-313, Oct. 1999. 
33 Merrill, supra note at 28. 
34 Wax, Paul M., Elixirs, Diluents, and the Passage of the 1938 Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, J 
Ann Intern Med, V 122, N 6, P 456-461, March 15, 1995, also available on 
http://www.annals.orglcgi/content/abstract/122/6/456. See also Taste of Raspberries, Taste of Death, The 
1937 Elixir Sulfanilamide Incident, FDA Consumer magazine, June 1981 Issue, also available on 
http://www . fda.gov / oclhistory / elixir.html. 
8 
be one of the most consequential mass poisonings of the 20th century.35 At the time when 
this incident occurred, drug safety testing before marketing was not required under the 
existing drug regulations. In reaction to this tragedy, Congress passed the 1938 Federal 
Food Drug and Cosmetic Act,36 which required a New Drug Application to be filled and 
proved safe before marketing.37 
Thalidomide tragedy38 had another significant impact on the evolution of drug approving 
legislation in the US; it reformed pr-market notification system for drug approval. 
Thalidomide first went on sale in West Germany in 1956, and was marketed as a 
medicine to treat vomiting during pregnancy and as a tranquillizer to help sleep. After 
Thalidomide was widely distributed in Europe, the cases of birth defect were increasingly 
, .' 
reported after 1959 and around four hundred and seventy-seven cases were reported in 
1961.39 Moreover, about 10,000 infants were harmed in all over the world in 1960s' due 
to the use of Thalidomide. The FDA did not approve the marketing of thalidomide, but 
this medicine had been distributed to more than 1,200 physicians in the US for clinical 
testing. This wide usage harmed a great deal of infants in the US, and as mentioned, this 
35 Milestones in U.S. Food and Drug Law History, supra note 25. 
36 Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 1938, ch. 675, 52 Sat. 1040 (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. 
§§ 301-395(2000)). 
37 Carolyn H. Asbury, Orphan Drugs: Medical versus Market Value, D.C. Heath and Firm/Lexington, 12-
41,1985. 
38 Nancy E. Pirt, Regulation of the Export of Pharmaceuticals to Developing Countries, 25 Duq. L. Rev. 
255. 
39 
Jd., see also ASBURY, supra note 35. 
9 
incident triggered the action of Congress. As a result, the amendment to the 1938 Act -
also known as the Kefauver-Harris 1962 amendments- was introduced.40 
The Act of 1938 put the burden of proof on the FDA; consequently, if the FDA failed to 
demonstrate that a drug is not safe to market 180 days after an applicant has submitted a 
New Drug Application, and then the new medicine is automatically approved.41 This kind 
of approval system is also called a pre-market notification system42 or automatic approval 
system.43 In spite of the speedy and simple drug approval procedure, the pre-market 
notification system was debated for years after the FDA adopted it. First, the Act of 1938 
did not require the FDA to take serious measures to review the data, which was submitted 
for drug approva1.44 In addition, under an automatic approval system, if the FDA cannot 
review or cannot provide any reason to reject the application within 180 days, an 
applicant can market the drugs in the US. 45 This system created a drug approval 
procedure that acted like a notification with the data submission procedure as a notice. 
40 Act of Oct. 10, 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-781,76 Stat. 780 (codified in scattered sections of21 U.S.C.). 
Senator Estes Kefauver (E-Tenn.), then chairman of the Senate subcommittee on Antitrust and Monopoly, 
originally began his investigation into the pharmaceutical industry in 1959 for the purpose of reviewing the 
alleged monopolistic pricing practices of the industry. After the thalidomide incident, drug safety was 
included in the Amendments. Campbell and Smith, Profitability and the Pharmaceutical Industry, in THE 
PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY 105, 108-09 (C.M. Lindsay ed. 1978). The co-sponsor of the 
Amendments was Representative Orren Harris (E-Ark.), Chairman of the House Committee on Interstate 
and Foreign Commerce. 
41 Shuren, supra note 26, at 13. 
42 Merrill, supra note 28. 
43 
ASBURY, supra note 35. 
44 Merrill, supra note 28. 
45 Id. 
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Ultimately, the Thalidomide tragedy speeded up the reform of the automatic approval 
system. 
This Thalidomide tragedy, disclosed in 1962, precipitated the 1962 amendments of the 
FDCA, also known as the 1962- Kefayver-Harris Amendments (1962 Amendment). The 
1962 Amendments restructured features of approving a new drug in the US. 46 Several 
significant reforms in the 1962 Amendments were included. They abolished pre-market 
notification system by default; provided specified labeling, package insert and advertising 
requirements; established certain quality control measures and record keeping measures; 
and required proof of efficacy for all drugs.47 With regard to drug approval system, the 
1962 Amendment changed the 180-day feature that a manufacturer can sell in the market . " 
if the FDA did not object to its application within 180 days.48 As a result, the Amendment 
shifted the burden of proof from FDA to the manufacturer.49 Congress noted that the 
structure of the modern New Drug Approval system is constructed on the basis of 1962 
Amendment. 
1.1.2 Freedom of Information Act and FDA's Disclosure Policy 
The 1962 Amendment to the FDCA requires that all new drugs shall not be marketed in 
the US, unless an approval of an application is effectively filed with the FDA.5o The 
46 
ASBURY, supra note 35, at 2l. 
47 Id, at 12-4l. 
48 New Drug Application (NDA) Profess, http://www.fda.gov/cder/regulatory/applicationsINDA.htm 
49 
Shuren, supra note 26, at 293. 
50 21 U.S.C § 355 (a)(1976). 
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statute requires the applicant to submit substantial evidence to prove that the drug is both 
safe and effective. In addition, the statute requires drug sponsors or manufactures to 
submit to the FDA a copy of "full reports of investigations which have been made to 
show whether or not such drug is safe for use and whether such drug is effective in use." 
51 According to the FDA's explanation, full reports include all the records produced 
during each clinical trial of a drug. 52 Therefore, after the FDA received the applicant 
reports, it is clear the reports would be viewed as a part of the FDA's record, which is 
subject to the Federal Freedom oflnformation Act (FOIA) of 1966.53 
The FOIA establishes a disclosure system for the government.54 It requires that a federal 
agency must disclose records unless they are withheld pursuant to one of the nine 
• 0' 
, 
enumerated exemptions listed in § 552(b).55 The basic purpose of the FOIA is to ensure 
an informed citizenry, to check against corruption of government, and to hold the 
government accountable to the governed, all of which are vital to a functioning 
democratic society. 56 In addition, the aim of the nine exemptions is to protect some 
51 § 505(b)(l)(A), 21 U.S.C. § 355 (b) (l)(A). 
52 Merrill, supra note 30, at 1783. 
53 5 U.S.c.A. § 552 (2002). 
54 Martin E. Halstuk and Bill F. Chamberlin, The Freedom ofInformation Act 1966-2006: A Retrospective 
on the Rise of Privacy Protection Over the Public Interest In Knowing What the Government's up to, 11 
COMM. L. & POL'y 511, 2006. 
55 5 U.S.C.A. § 552 (b) (2002). The nine exemptions of records include: 1. National defense or foreign 
policy matters 2. International Personnel Rules and Practices 3.Matters Specially Exempted from disclosure 
by Statures 4. Trade secrets and Commercial or Financial Information 5. Inter-Agency or Intra Agency 
Memoranda or Letters 6. Personnel, Medical and Similar Files 7. Records of Information compiled for law 
enforcement purposed 8. regulation or supervision of financial institutions 9.Geological or geophysical 
information. 
56 Westchester General Hospital, Inc. v. Department of Health, Ed. & WELFARE and Blue Cross of 
Florida, Inc., 464 F.Supp. 236 
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legitimate governmental and private interests from releasing certain types of 
'.c: t' 57 1ll10rma lOn. 
Under the FOIA, the public has a right to request any record held by the FDA, if record 
does not fall within one of the nine exemptions of disclosure.58 However, only exemption 
4 of section 552 (b) is related to the disclosure of health and test data submitted by 
private sectors, which deal with trade secrets or confidential commercial information. 59 
The development of the disclosure policy of the FDA regarding the pharmaceutical data 
for the drug approval procedure demonstrated that not only the general requirements, but 
also exemptions of the FOIA have great impact on the disclosure policy. The most 
significant influence is that the FDA issued its FOIA procedures in 1974, which are . ,-
~ 
called "Public Information Regulations. ,,60 
The purpose of the Public Information Regulations is to disclose all pharmaceutical data 
to the public, if the law permits, but the data for all new human use drugs is not subject to 
disclosure.61 At this point, the FDA explained that the data should be protected under the 
exemption of commercial information, because the investment of obtaining the 
pharmaceutical data is huge and competitive harms occur when the data is released.62 
57 FBI v. Abramson, 456 U.S. 615, 621, 102 S.Ct. 2054, 2059, 72 L.Ed.2d 376 (1982); see also CIA v. Sims, 
471 U.S. 159,167,105 S.Ct. 1881, 1883,85 L.Ed.2d 173 (1985). 
58 See 5 U.S.C.A. § 552 (b) (1)- (9). 
59 See 5 U.S.C.A. § 552 (b) (4) (2002). 
60 39 Fed. Reg. 44, 602 (1974). 
61 Robert M. Halperin, FDA Disclosure of Safety and Effectiveness Data: A Legal and Policy Analysis, 11 
DUKE L. J. 286, at 302-310, 1979. 
62 !d. 
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However, the FDA does not view this exemption as an absolute protection, under some 
circumstances, the FDA can disclose the data, such when the NDA application has been 
abandoned, rejected, or the new drug has been withdrawn from the market or founded not 
to be new.63 Moreover, all early litigation history shows that the FDA's policy favored 
applicants to protect their data,64 such as in the case of Public Citizen Health Research 
Group v. FDA. 65 
In Public Citizen Health Research Group, the Federal Court of Appeals recognized the 
information submitted to the FDA by a commercial entity qualifies for protection under 
Exemption 4, if the information is shown to be (1) commercial or financial, (2) obtained 
from a person, and (3) privileged or confidential. 66 The court did not confine the 
commercial information provision of Exemption 4 to records that actually reveal basic 
commercial operations, such as sales statistics, profits and losses, and inventories, or 
relate to the income-producing aspects of a business. Instead, the court construed terms 
"commercial" and ''jinancial'' in the Exemption should be given their ordinary meanings. 
Thus, the court held that a noncommercial scientist's research design was an item of 
commercial information, because it recognized "an individual . . . engaged in profit-
oriented research ... could conceivably be shown to have a commercial or trade interest 
63 Halperin, supar note 59. 
64 James T. O'Reilly, Article: Knowledge Is Power: Legislative Control of Drug Industry Trade Secrets, 54 
U. CIN. L. REv. 1,21-22, 1985. 
65 See Public Citizen Health Research Group v. FDA, 704 F.2d 1280, 1291. 
66 Jd. at 1291. 
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in his research design. ,,67 In other word, regarding the documentation of the health and 
safety experience of the new product will be instrumental in gaining marketing approval 
for new products; the manufacturers of new products have a commercial interest in the 
requested information. Therefore, the safety and efficacy testing information that is 
submitted to the FDA for approval to market falls within the scope of confidential 
commercial information under the FOIA's protection. 68 Of course, the public and 
consumer protection groups opposed this policy, because they think the FDA's policy 
infringes on consumers' right to knoW.69 
1.1.3 The Arguments for and Against Disclosure 
For years, the FDA's disclosure policy was disputed and some aspects continued to be . .. 
debated until today.7o Although the policy underlying the FOIA supports the disclosure of 
the data for drug approval, the FDA's policy insisted that testing data is protected under 
exemption 4 of section 552 (b).71 This action favored the pioneer submitter, but the right 
of the patient holder is impaired. 
The argument to support the FDA's non-disclosure is based on the idea of fostering 
research and innovation.72 The 1962 Amendment adopted more complicated procedure to 
67 Id. at 1290. 
68 O'Reilly, supra note 62. 
69 McGarity and Shapiro, supra note 5, 844-847 (1980). 
70 O'Reilly, supra note 62, at 14-21. 
71 Id at 15. 
72 McGarity and Shapiro, supar note 5, at 849-856. 
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review the new drug application,73 but this Amendment also increased the pioneer 
applicant's cost for developing a new drug, because more detailed testing requirements 
should meet and the FDA's review period has been elongated.74 Obviously, the potential 
harms to a pioneer applicant from disclosure of testing data are well-founded. Therefore, 
pioneer applicants against the disclosure of testing data provided their arguments.75 They 
argued that the testing data fall within exemption 4/6 and were protected under the Trade 
Secret Act,77 and the Confidentiality Provisions of the FDCA,78 so this data should not be 
disclosed to the public79. In contrast, the arguments against the FDA's non-disclosure 
have several goals. First, data disclosure would make the FDA's decision more 
transparent, and achieve the gmil of the FOIA; an open government makes information 
available to the public and oUtside experts. Second, data disclosure may help the FDA to 
make better decisions. The third argument in favor of the disclosure of test data is on the 
basis of cost saving, since the disclosure of data would avoid the cost of duplicating the 
testing. Fourth, data disclosure would stimulate competition in the marketing of generic 
drugs. This competition would lower prices for consumers. As a final point, investments 
in pharmaceutical research should be protected under the patent system, rather than a 
policy of trade secrecy practiced by the FDA. From the perspective of generic firms, the 
73 
Asbury, supra note 35. 
74 R 'd el ,supra note 30. 
75 Halperin, supra note 59. 
76 See 5 U.S.C.A. § 552 (b) (4) (2002) 
77 18 U.S.C § 1905 (1976). 
78 21 U.S.c. § 331 U)(1976). 
79 Halperin, supra note 59, at 311. 
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FDA should disclose all pharmaceutical data or Congress should pass law to allow them 
to use data without testing. Of course, if the firms can produce and sale generic drugs 
successfully, the price of drugs would be lowered. Yet, from the perspective of the 
promotion of pharmaceutical innovation, the harms of pioneer drug makers should be 
considered and cannot be neglected. All of these arguments were also widely discussed.8o 
In the early 1980' s, the average price of medicine was soaring and health care costs 
increased,8l so Congress faced the pressure from both, pioneer and generic drug makers, 
medical providers, and patients to lower the cost of medicines. These factors led to the 
passage of the Hatch-Waxman Act in 1984,82 and the emergence of the data exclusivity. 
1.1.4 Data Exclusivity 
Prior to the passage of the Hatch-Waxman Act, even though the FDA disagreed to the 
disclosure of test data, most scholars believed that the test data regarding approval of new 
drugs should be disclosed for three important reasons:83 consumers' right to know, lower 
costs of medicine and the progress of science. In addition, these scholars recommended 
that, if the government decided to disclose clinical test data to the public after approving 
new drugs for marketing or relied on the test data, submitted by the pioneer drug makers 
to approve the generic copies of the pioneer drugs, then the pioneer drug makers should 
80 Halperin, supra note 59, at 311 
81 Elizabeth Stotland Weiswasser & Scott D. Danzis, The Hatch-Waxman Act: History, Structure, and 
Legacy, 71 Antitrust LJ. 585, 591 (2003). 
82 R 'd el ,supra note 30. 
83 McGarity and Shapiro, supra note 5, at 844-847 (1980). 
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be compensated.84 At some point, Congress adopted the scholars' opinions for balancing 
the interests among consumers, and both the generic and pioneer drug makers. 
Later, Congress added two more provisions in the Drug Price Competition and Patent 
Term Restoration Act of 1984, known as the Hatch-Waxman Act (1984 Act).85 The 1984 
Act compromise the interest of pioneer and generic manufactures.
86 
Thus, on one hand, 
the 1984 Act established a new application process for generic drugs, which was called as 
Abbreviated New Drug Approval (ANDA).87 This new application procedure only 
required the generic drug makers to show that the ANDA drug was identical to a pioneer 
drug; therefore the FDA could rely on the data of pioneer drugs to approve the ANDA 
drug.88 On the other hand, the Act of 1984 provided a limited market exclusivity to 
compensate the pioneer drug ~makers ("data exclusivity right.,,)89 The Act grants two 
types of data exclusivity rights, the five years and three years period of data exclusivity.90 
The five years of exclusivity is for new chemical entities not previously approved by the 
FDA. 91 The three years of exclusivity is for New Drug Supplemental Application 
84 Id. 
85 Hatch-Waxman Act, § 101,21 U.S.C. § 355 (1984). 
86 Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Symposium, Pharmaceutical Innovation and Cost; An American Dilemma, the 
Problem of New Use, 5 YALE J. HEALTH POL'Y, L. & ETHICS, 717, 725-728. 
87 21 U.S.c. § 355. (b) (2). Hatch-Waxman Act codified FDA's "paper NDA" process in § 505(b)(2) of the 
Act; applications filed under this section are now often referred to as "505(b )(2) applications." In addtion, 
Section 505(b )(2) allows approval of generic drugs for which the investigations relied upon "were not 
conducted by or for the applicant, and for which the applicant has not obtained a right of reference or use." 
88 R ·d el ,supra note 30. 
89 Id. 
90 21 u.S.C. § 355 (b), (c), (j). 
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(NDAs) on previously approved products, including as new indications or other changes 
in a previously approved product that require conducting new clinical trials to get FDA 
192 approva. 
Prior to the 1984 Act, generic competitors could not rely on the test data of pioneer drug 
makers to win an approval by the FDA, so they need to create their own data for generic 
drugs.93 However, the cost of regenerating test data for marketing is so high that generic 
drug firms could compete with the pioneer drug firms at lower price, even after their 
patents had expired.94 Congress wanted to settle this question, and introduce generic 
copies of pioneer drugs to the market at an affordable price, and so enacted the 1984 Act. 
The Act, basically, benefits both generic and pioneer drug makers. First, the act provides 
that generic copies of pioneer drugs could file an ANDA to be approved upon a showing 
of bioequivalence to the pioneer drugs, thus allowing them to skip the expensive testing 
process.95 On the other hand, the 1984 Act prohibits filling of ANDA's during the period 
of data exclusivity, which creates a period of market exclusivity to compensate pioneer 
drug makers. 96 These arrangements are compromise legislation for both pioneer and 
generic drug makers. 
91 !d. 
92 21 U.S.C. § 355G)(5)(F)(iii). 
93 E' Isenberg, supra note 84. 
94 1d. 
95 21 U.S.c. § 355G)(5)(F)(iii). 
96 O'Reilly, supra note 62, at 16. 
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1.2 World Public Health Situation and Global Demand of Pharmaceuticals 
The provision of health services is limited on how many resources a country may control, 
own and allocate them.97 As public health policy makers; plan effective national health 
policy, they should be aware of background health situation to improve situation. Such 
information includes what diseases occur in their region, and what risk factor causes 
them. 98 Acquiring both global and regional health information and providing sound 
global and regional health policies and priorities are challenging for domestic and 
international policy makers. To address the widespread demand for health information 
and to further establish a system for assessing health standard, since 1990, the WHO has 
conducted a Global Burden of DIsease (GBD) project to collect information in relation to 
health, and disease' for WHO member states and for sub-regions of the world. 99 
Additionally, in 2002, the directors of GBD found that the impact of the spread of the 
HIV epidemic and the level of HIV / AIDS mortality on the global health was 
underestimated, so a research team reassessed this crucial factor and updated the 
research. 100 The updated GBD project of 2002 (2002 GBD study) projected the global 
mortality at country level and also demonstrated the results in regional and income 
groups. Three income groups included low-, middle-, and high-income, which were 
97 Alan D. Lopez, Colin D. Mathers, Majid Ezzati, Dean T. Jamison, and Christopher J. L. Murray, 
"Measuring the Global Burden of Disease and Risk Factors, 1990-2001." Global Burden of Disease and 
Risk Factors, ed., 1. New York: Oxford University Press. DOl: 10. 1596/978-0-82 l3-6262-4/Chpt-l , 2006. 
98 [d. 
99 About the Global Burden of Disease Project, http://www.who.int/healthinfo/bodabout/en/index.html. 
~ visited April 1, 2007). 
100 Mathers CD, Loncar D, Projections of Global Mortality and Burden of Disease from 2002 to 2030. 
PLoS Med 3(11): e442 doi: 1O.13711joumal.pmed.0030442, 2007, also aviailable on 
http://www.who.int/healthinfo/bodabout/en/index.html (Last visted on April 1, 2007). 
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defined based on World Bank estimate of GDP per capita in 1999. 101 This project 
presented the mortality by disease and injury causes, in which three broad causes of 
groups are comprised: Group I (communicable, material, parental and nutritional 
conditions), Group II (non-communicable disease), and Group III (injuries.)102 At least 
one of the major findings of the updated GBD study in 2001 is helpful to identify the 
demand of medicines in different areas, which is global and regional mortality. 
The 2002 GBD study showed that more than 56 millions people died in 2001, and also 
one death in every three is from Group I causes in the world. 103 Although the death 
caused by most communicable disease had decreased, the deaths caused by HIV / AIDS on 
global health had increased from 2 percent to 14 percent from 1990 to 2001. In particular, . .' 
Group I causes, including HIV / AIDS were responsible for one-third of deaths in South 
Asia and two-thirds of deaths in Sub-Saharan Africa. This finding showed the imminent 
need of HIV / AIDS medicine in South Asian and Sub-Saharan African countries, so 
increasing access to HIV / AIDS's medicine becomes high priority in these regions. 
101 The income categories are based on the World Bank's "2003 World Development Indicators" Report 
(World Bank 2003). Countries are divided according to 2001 GNI per capita, calculated using the World 
Bank Atlas method. The groups are: low income, $745 or less; lower middle income, $746 - $2,975; upper 
middle income, $2,976 - $9,205; and high income, $9,206 or more. 
102 Group I included the causes of Tuberculosis, HIV/AIDS, Diarrheal diseases, Measles, Malaria, Lower 
respiratory infections, Perinatal conditions, Protein-energy malnutrition. Group 2 includes the causes of 
Stomach cancer, Colon and rectum cancers, Liver cancer, Trachea, bronchus, and lung cancers, Diabetes 
mellitus, Unipolar depressive disorders, Alcohol use disorders, Cataracts, Vision disorders, age-related, 
Hearing loss, adult onset, Hypertensive heart diseases, Ischemic heart diseases, Cerebrovascular diseases, 
Chronic obstructive pulmonary diseases, Nephritis and nephrosis, Osteoarthritis, Congenital anomalies, 
Alzheimer and other dementias. Group 3 comprises the causes of injury, which are road traffic accidents, 
falls, self-inflicted injuries, and violence. 
103 
LOPEZ ET AL., supra note 98. 
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Another finding was that the epidemiological transition from infectious to chronic non-
communicable diseases in low-income and middle-income countries (except for South 
Asian and Sub-Saharan African countries), so Group II causes (non-communicable 
diseases) were accounted for more than 50 percent of deaths in adults ages 15 to 59 in 
these countries. 104 In high-income countries, Group II causes (non-communicable 
diseases) are major causes of death, which accounted for more than 80 percent of deaths 
in adults age 15 to 59 in all regions. 105 This implies that the need of medicine and the 
strategy to improve the status of public health should be different in different income 
groups of countries. 
The finding of global mortality, at least, presented a phenomenon. Although most of . .' ,.. 
communicable diseases are curable or controllable in the 21 st century, communicable 
diseases are still responsible for major causes of death in the world, in particular, in low 
and mid-group of countries. Thus, countries in these regions have to provide their people 
adequate access to communicable disease medicines. 
The next section examines global medicine situation and assess whether these regions do 
lack the adequate access to medicines. 
1.3 The Global Policy to Access Medicines 
To provide reliable and accessible source of information on medicines, the WHO 
reviewed the world medicine situation both in 1998 and 2004 (WHO 2004 Report). 106 
104 
LOPEZ ET AL., supra note 98. 
lOS Id. 
106 WHO, THE WORLD MEDICINE SITUATION [Hereinafter WHO 2004 Report] 1-2,2004. 
22 
The WHO 2004 Report presented the available information on global production, R&D, 
international trade and consumption of medicines, 107 and supported a background 
analysis for many major policy issues in medicine strategy, such as intellectual property 
rights, or parallel trade, around which strong disputes lasts at both domestic and 
. . 11 1108 mternatlOna eve. 
According the WHO 2004 Report, the global pharmaceutical market can be separated to 
several submarkets, including "originator", "copy version" (which is produced before the 
expiry of patents), and "generic versions of originators," which is produced after the 
expiry of patent. 109 The originato~ is protected from competition in the jurisdiction of the 
patent before the expiry of patent. The "copy version" of medicine is copied from the . .' 
patented medicine, so its legality relies on patent jurisdiction. In other words, it is perhaps 
not a violation, if countries did not provide patent right to protect the originator of drugs. 
The "generic version of originators" is a multiple source drug, which consists of 
"unbranded commodity generic drug" and "other brands." Due to the complexity of the 
definition of generic medicines, the size of generic market cannot be calculated 
accurately. 
The WHO 2004 Report demonstrated that world sales of medicines in 2000 were around 
US$ 282.5 billion, over 89% of which was concentrated in the high-income countries, 
and over 95% of which was concentrated in the top 10 pharmaceutical markets: USA, 
107 
WHO 2004 Report, supra note 104. 
108 Id. 
109 Id.at 34. 
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Japan, France, Germany, UK, Italy, Spain, Canada, Brazil and MexicoYo The size of 
generic market is hard to estimate because researchers defined generic drug market in 
different ways. IMS, III noted global pharmaceutical market intelligence, simple separated 
the global market into two markets, originator and generic drug markets. According to its 
estimate, the generic drug market is around US$ 87 billion in 2000 (about 30 % of global 
) 
112 sales. 
The sales of medicines in the top 10 therapeutic class medicines in 2001 are anti-ulcers, 
cholesterol and triglyceride reducers, antidepressants, non-steroidal anti-inflammatory, 
anti-hypertension, anti-psychotics, oral anti-diabetics, ACE inhibitors, antibiotics, and 
systematic antihistamines, which are almost accounted for one-third of all sales. 1 \3 The . .. 
data showed that nine classes of top 10 therapeutic classes are for non-communicable 
disease treatment, and only one class is for communicable disease treatment (which sales 
$6.7 billion in 2001, around 2% in global shares). 
In addition, the WHO 2004 Report found originator medicines are the biggest source of 
medicine in high-income countries, which accounted for two-thirds of sales and the share 
110 Id, at 31-40. 
111 IMS is the one global source for pharmaceutical market intelligence, providing critical information, 
analysis and services that drive decisions and shape strategies. 
http://www-imshealth.com/ims/portallfront/indexCI0.2478.65991825.00.htm (last visited on April 1, 
2007) 
112 Despite that the global production and consumption of medicine by volume is a sound instrument to 
analyze how the people in region access the medicine, it is not available. Thus, the most research reports 
use global sales of medicine by value to do basic analysis of pharmaceutical industry. However, this data 
may ignore some significant information. For example, the repost indicated that India accounts for around 
1% of the world's production by value, but 8% by volume (weight). It ranks thirteen in world production 
by value, but ranks forth in the volume of pharmaceutical produced. 
113 
WHO, supra note 104, at 8. 
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of these in total sales. 1 14 In contrast, in low-income countries, genenc medicines are 
major source of medicines, which accounted for 60% of sales in the total sales of 
medicines. lls This shows that low-income countries relied more on generic medicines 
than high-income countries. Also an important conclusion may be drawn from the WHO 
2004 Report, which, the wide uses in low-income countries and the needs for medical 
insurers to lower cost stimulate the growth of generic drug markets. 
However, the emergence of generic drug firms caused an intense competition between 
them and the brand name drug firms. It is clear that more legal protection for brand name 
drug would stimulate the innov~tion, but one the downside it may also create more 
barriers to access medicines; therefore reconciling innovation and access to medicines is . .' 
imperative. 
Meanwhile, the adequate access to medicines does not mean access to any medicine, 
otherwise it would depress the drug market. Therefore, the WHO created the concept of 
essential medicines and selected the essential medicines to lower the financial burden and 
legal barriers to access medicines. 1 16 
1.3.3 The WHO's Essential Medicines Definition and List 
114 WHO, supra note 104, at 35-36. 
115 Id. 
116 Essential Medicines, WHO/ WHO Sites/ Medicines/ Services/ Essential Medicine, 
http://www.who.int/medicines/services/cssmcdicines dcf/en/ (last visited on April 2, 2007). 
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The WHO introduced the concept, "essential medicines", in 1977. 117 The underlying 
premise of the concept, some medicines are so important for human survival; therefore, 
human beings shall have access to them regardless of cost or price, because accessing 
these medicines is a human right. 
Initially, in 1977, WHO has defined the concept as the medicines that [s]atisfy the needs 
of the majority of the population and therefore should be available at all times, in 
adequate amounts in appropriate dosage forms and at a price the individual and 
community can afford. Subsequently, the WHO expanded the definition and clarified its 
contents. As it stands today, the definition seems broad enough to encompass a wide 
range of medicines that are very crucial to all humans: . .' 
" 
"Essential medicines are those that satisfy the priority health care needs of the 
population. They are selected with due regard to public health relevance, 
evidence on efficacy and safety, and comparative cost-effectiveness. Essential 
medicines are intended to be available within the context of functioning health 
systems at all times in adequate amounts, in the appropriate dosage forms, 
with assured quality and adequate information, and at a price the individual 
and the community can afford. The implementation of the concept of essential 
medicines is intended to be flexible and adaptable to many different situations; 
exactly which medicines are regarded as essential remains a national 
responsibility .,,118 
The first WHO Model List of Essential Drugs was promulgated in1977. It identified 208 
individual medicines, which together could provide safe, effective treatment for the 
majority of communicable and non-communicable diseases. The List is updated several 
times. The current Model List of Essential Medicines, prepared by the WHO Expert 
117 See Press Release, Equitable access to essential medicines: a framework for collective action, WHO 
Policy Perspectives on Medicines (March 2004). 
118 WHOlHealth Topic/ Essential Medicine, http://www,who,int/topics/csscntial medicines/en! (last visitd 
April 2, 2007) 
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Committee in March 2005, contains 312 individual medicines, including antiretroviral 
medicines for the prevention and treatment of HIV -AIDS. I 19 
1.3.4 Access to Medicine: Factors, Barriers and Improvement 
WHO has recognized that access to essential medicines is a portion of medicine pOlicy l20 
in the Report of "WHO Medicines strategy 2004-2007: Countries at the core." WHO 
states that, it would provide a guidance and support for countries to improve access to 
essential medicines. 121 
According to the WHO,122 the spending on drugs represents less than one-fifth of total 
public and private health spendIng in most developed countries, but it represents 15 to 
30% of health spending in tra~sitional economies and 25 to 66% in developing countries. 
The figures implied that [p ]harmaceuticals are the largest public expenditure on health 
after personnel costs and the largest household health expenditure in most low-income 
countries. 123 However, the percentage of people who lack access to essential medicines in 
low-income countries is still higher than in high-income countries, which 39 percent, and 
119 Essential Medicines, supra note 115. 
120 In the WHO official website, it declares that WHO's goal in medicines is to help save lives and 
improve health by ensuring the quality, efficacy, safety and rational use of medicines, including traditional 
medicines. Our vision is that people everywhere have access to the essential medicines they need; that the 
medicines are safe, effective, and of good quality; and that the medicines are prescribed and used rationally. 
http://www.who.intlmedicines/en/ (last visited on April 2, 2007). 
121Medicines Policy and Standards, Technical Cooperation for Essential Drugs and Traditional Medicine, 
h!tp:l!www.who.int/medicines/en/ (last visited on April 2, 2007) 
122 E . I d" 1 ssentIa Me lcmes, supra note 15. 
123 Id. 
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0.3 percent respectably.124 In addition, 80 percent of the total number of people (1.3 
billion) in the world who lack essential medicines resided in the low-income countries. 125 
These figures prove that people in low-income countries lack adequate access to 
medicines; accordingly, there is an inherent nexus between lack of access to medicines 
and poverty. To increase access to medicines in this group of countries, the WHO 
identifies all factors that effect access to essential medicines. Those factors are 
categorized into four groups: rational selection, affordable prices, sustainable financing, 
and reliable health and supply systems. 126 
To provide affordable prices of medicine, WHO's policy is not likely to approve the strict 
intellectually property protection, in particular, data exclusivity, since this position 
, .' 
would, inevitably exclude generic drug firms from the drug market and decrease the 
market competition; 127 consequently, the high price drugs will fill up the market. This 
position is based on concerns of human rights law; however, if followed, regardless of its 
side effects this position would improve access to medicines and states would find it easy 
to fulfill their responsibilities under international human rights law. 
1.3.5 Public Health, Innovation and WTO Doha Declaration 
124 
WHO 2004 Report, supra note 104, at 61-75. 
125 
WHO, supra note 104, at 61-75. 
126 Id. 
127 
Id., at 66-71. 
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Globalization has a great impact on the international trade system. 128 Multilateral and 
bilateral trade agreements have increased in number and played significant role in trade 
disputes settlement in the recent decades. The GATT Agreement of 1944, which latter 
became the WTO, is the most significant international trading system. 129 The purpose of 
WTO is to liberalize trade, and to provide a forum for governments to negotiate trade 
agreements. In addition, it also provides a body to settle trade disputes between states. 
The most important function is to operate a system of trade rules. There are 18 specific 
agreements annexed to the Agreement establishing the WTO, five of them are with 
greatest relevance to the health sector: Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of 
intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) the Agreement on the Applica~ion of Sanitary and 
Phytosanitary measure's (SPS);';the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT); the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and trade (GATT); and the General Agreement on Trade 
on Services (GATS). 130 Of course, TRIPS has the greatest effect on the pharmaceutical 
sector, because it sets the rules that are directly applicable to the pharmaceutical industry 
and its intellectual production. 
The harmonization of certain aspects of the protection of intellectual property in the 
international level is one of TRIPS Agreement greatest dedications. \31 The Agreement 
128 Trade and Globalization, http://www.globalizationl 0 1.0rg/issue/tradeI?PHPSESSlD=f (last visited on 
April 2, 2007) 
129 Understanding the WTO, www.wto.org/english/thewto e/whatis e/tif e/understanding e.pdf. (last 
visited on April 2, 2007) 
130 Globalization, TRIPS, and Access to Pharmaceuticals, WHO Policy Perspectives on Medicine, No.3 
March 2001, WHO, Geneva, http://www.who.int/hiv/amds/regulationsl.pdf(last visited on April 2, 2007) 
131 Globalization and Access to Drugs: Perspectives on the WTO TRIPS Agreement, EDM Series No.7, 
17-19, http://www. who.int/medicincs/arcas/policy/who-dap-98-9rev.pdf. (last visited on April 2, 2007) 
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sets out rules to achieve two main objectives: first, the Agreement requires the WTO 
member states to guarantee minimum standard of protection for intellectual property 
rights mentioned in TRIPS;132 second, according to Part III of the Agreement, member 
states must make available for certain procedures to enforce the intellectual property 
rights. 133 Further, the WTO member states attempt to integrate the public health concern 
or concept of access to medicines into TRIPS agreement recently. 
In fact, immediately after the WTO was set, the World Health Assembly (WHA) adopted 
a resolution in 1996, because it thought that the WTO agreements would no doubt effect 
the health situation; 134 therefore, it requested the WTO to report on the impact of the 
WTO agreements with regard to national drug policies and essential drugS. 135 Latter, 
" " 
": 
most of developing counties shared the WHA's views and agreed that the TRIPS 
Agreement would inevitably jeopardize access to medicines. To the contrary, developed 
countries support TRIPS to protect their pharmaceutical industry. 
There are two conflicting views regarding TRIPS and access to drugs. The argument in 
favor of the TRIPS Agreement at stake on access to drugs, including an enlarge in the 
flow of technology transfer, a boost in R&D investments by domestic pharmaceutical 
132 The minimum standards of protection are based on the provisions of Paris conventions (adopted in 
1883) and Bern conventions (adopted in 1886). Id. 
133 Id. 
134 Resolution WHA 49.14. 
135 The Forty-Ninth World Health Assembly in May 1996, adopted a resolution requesting the Director-
General to "report on the impact of the work of the World Trade Organization (WTO) with respect to 
national drug policies and essential drugs. See Globalization and Access the Drug, WTO, 1997, 
http://www.who.intlmedicines/areas/policy/who-dap-98-9rev.pdf, Trade, Intellectual Property rights and 
Access to Medicines, http://www.who.intlmedicines/areas/policy/globtrade/en/ 
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firms in the developing countries. l36 The argument against the Agreement constraints on 
access to drugs responded that the price of drugs would increase, strengthening the 
protection of patented drugs would not increase domestic pharmaceutical firms in R&D 
investments in the developing countries, which lack infrastructure, funds and professional 
specialists. 137 These two competing arguments do not reflect any kind of reality. The first 
one, if followed, would jeopardize the entire pharmaceutical industry, because it assumes 
the pharmaceutical firms should not have protection. The second one, if followed to its 
ultimate end, a monopoly of access to medicine should be assumed. Therefore, a 
reconcillary position between these two arguments is desirable. A position would take 
into account both the protection of pharmaceutical firms and facilitate access to 
medicines. 
The Doha Declaration of 2002 aimed at settling the relationship between public health 
and protection of patented drugs, but whether it is a general principle to apply in any case 
related to drugs access is uncertain. Paragraph 4 of the Doha Declaration only emphasizes 
the importance of protecting public health, promoting access to medicines, and reaffirms 
the right of the WTO member states to use, to the full extent, the provisions in TRIPS 
Agreement in flexible way, l38 but it does not mention that member states can apply this 
declaration in TRIPS. Moreover, Paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration only deals with the 
situation of issuing compulsory license, so it does not deal with the issue of data 
136 Carlos M. Correa, Implications of the Doha Declaration on TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, Health 
Economics and Drugs EDM series No. 12 (WHO/EDMIPARl2002.3), WHO, Jane 2002. 
137 1d. 
138 
CORREA, supra note 134. 
31 
protection. However, seeking a balance point between human rights and the international 
trade is a new trend in international law; therefore, it is expected that the protection of 
pharmaceutical data is likely to follow this trend. 
1.4 Aims and Purpose 
This research engages several inter-related issues: rationality of protection of test data 
and patent, compatibility of public health and innovation. It also examines the rationale 
behind the protection of test data, and the effect of the right to health and the right to 
access medicines vis-a-vis the protection of test data or vice versa. Also, the possible 
flexible measures under the TRIP~ Agreements are examined. Further, a case study from 
Taiwan is provided to highligh! the problems associated with test data protection and it is 
" 
substantial impact on medicines accessibility. Indeed the thrust of this research is the 
legal and policy aspects of these issues; therefore, quantitative and empirical research is 
considered as far as it further the legal and policy outcome of this research. 
1.5 Scope 
Because of development in the digital production of data, there is substantial amount of 
data produced in any industry. Likewise, in pharmaceutical industry, there is a huge body 
of data produced during research, manufacturing, advertising and sales. However, this 
study is only concerned with data produced for developing drugs. 
This study will only focus on the legal regime of the protection of pharmaceutical data, 
which submitted to health authorities for marketing approval. The other kind of data 
made by pharmaceutical firms for other business or management purpose is beyond the 
scope of this study. 
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To examine the compatibility between data protection and the right to access medicines 
in the current data protection regimes, this study examines the concept of data protection 
in current legal regimes, examine exclusive data protection regime, discusses the impact i: 
of the right to medicines on data protection regime, finally provide sound legal reform 
and recommendations to improve the protection of pharmaceutical data. In its entirety, 
this research aims at researching the protection regime of pharmaceutical data from top to 
bottom; therefore, this research conducts a comprehensive analysis within three 
dimensions of protections: first, the international dimension represented by TRIPS, 
second; the regional dimension represented by NAFTA, and CAFTA and other regional 
agreements and; third, the national dimension represented by Israel and India. 
~ 
Another attempt of this research is to explore the entire exceptions of data exclusivity. 
The research reviews the exceptions provided under Article 39.3 of the TRIPS. In 
addition, the compulsory license scheme is another possible ground to exclude data 
exclusivity although it provides under the patent regime; therefore it also examined. The 
thesis will explore the three major sources of WTO documents, 2001 WTO Doha 
Declaration, 2003 Doha Decision and 2005 Amendment to analyze current trends and 
pattern of exceptions of data exclusivity, within the international as well as the national 
system. 
This research also provides an overview of human rights instruments to justify its call for 
the reconciliation of the protection of pharmaceuticals data with the right to health and 
medicines. In the last chapter, the case of Taiwan shows how a state like Taiwan is 
making such reconciliation a reality. 
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2. Concept of Data Protection 
2.1 Introduction 
"The life of the law has not been logic: it has been experience. The felt 
necessities of the time, the prevalent moral and political theories, intuitions of 
public policy, avowed or unconscious, even the prejudices which judges share 
with their fellow-men, have had a good deal more to do than the syllogism in 
determining the rules by which men should be governed.,,1 
"Mr. Justice Holmes" 
While speaking in a different context, perhaps what Justice Holmes had pronounced 
applies, literally, to the concept of "data protection": it comes from necessities, modified 
by reality, and finally becomes a part of the international intellectual property legal 
system. This legal system ha~ three dimensions: multinational, regional, and domestic 
dimensions. In these three dimensions, the development of the concept of Data Protection 
is emerging in two philosophies of intellectual property: the first is trade secrets; while 
the second is not yet recognized as one of intellectual property family, which we may call 
sui generis system.2 It is the system of data exclusivity. This system does not fit within 
any of the four branches of intellectual property family. The formation of these models is 
largely attributable to disagreements among states; the US and the major industrial states 
on one hand and the rest of the world on the other hand. 
I Oliver Holmes, The Common Law (1881), Dover Publications edition, 1991, 1. 
2 Carlos Maria Correa, Protection of Data Submitted for the Registration of Pharmaceuticals: Implementing 
the Standards of the TRIPS Agreement xi, The South Center, avail at 
http://archives.who.intltbs/globallh3009ae.pdf (Last visited on October 26,2008). 
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The US is the first country to grant the data exclusive right, setting the first model for the 
protection of data.3 In addition, the US was the first to introduce this concept in the 
regional level by the signing of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFT A)4 in 
1992. On the international level, the adoption of 1994 Agreement on Trade-Related 
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, (TRIPS)5 has officially marked the introduction 
of the concept on global level. This transformation of the is~ue of data protection from 
being a local concern to an international one, which implicates many vital international 
issues, including human rights, trades and the protection of innovations. But, what more 
urgent is how to balance all these diverse human interests without prejudicing an issue, 
against the other. 
~ 
Although the US and the European Union have established a model for the protection of 
test data by granting exclusive right, TRIPS followed neither of them. 6 The TRIP 
Agreement loosely sets the conditions of protection of test data; it allows state members 
3 Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585 (1984) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C., 21 
U.S.c., 28 U.S.C., and 35 U.S.C.); see, in particular, Hatch-Waxman Act, § 101,21 U.S.C. § 355 (1984) 
[hereinafter Hatch-Waxman Act]. 
4 North American Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Can.-Mex., Dec. 17, 1992, 107 Stat. 2057, 32 I.L.M. 289 
(1993) [hereinafter NAFTA]. 
5 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15,1994, Marrakesh 
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization [hereinafter WTO Agreement]; AnnexlC, art. 39.3, 
33 I.L.M. 81 (1994) [hereinafter TRIPS Agreement]. 
6 Currently, scholars classified two types of the data exclusivity, the US model and European Model. The 
US model provides five years period of data exclusivity and three-year period of data exclusivity to new 
indication of existing drugs. The European Model provides eight years of data exclusivity and two years of 
marketing exclusivity. The market exclusivity means the first pharmaceutical producer has a right to 
monopoly the market for a period even though those products are not protected under the patent. See Meir 
Perez Pugath, Intellectual Property, Data Exclusivity, Innovation and Market Access, in Negotiating 
Health: Intellectual Property and Access to Medicines 97, 104-106 (Roffe, P. et al. eds., 2006). 
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to determine whether they shall grant the exclusive right for pharmaceutical test data 
owners. This flexible approach did not please the US, because it apparently provides a 
lesser protection than what the US wants. Consequently, the US have, attempted, 
bilaterally and unilaterally to circumvent the TRIPS. 
Those agreements, which the US made with countries, can broadly be grouped into three 
models: model one represented by NAFTA, provides five years of exclusive right; model 
two exemplified by the second generation US-FTAs7 (singed between 2003-2007) and 
CAFT A, which provide the data exclusivity right and link the marketing approval with 
patent status; model three represented by the new updated 2007 FTAs (US-Peru FTA, 
US-Panama FTA and US-C::~lumbia FTA) recognizes the Doha Declarations and 
attempted to compromise between the protection of pharmaceuticals with the right to 
access medicine. 
The first model provides the five year data exclusivity on the basis of Hatch-Waxman Act. 
It requires states to protect the submitted undisclosed test data for approving the 
marketing of pharmaceutical product. The "pharmaceutical product shall satisfy the 
requirement of "utilizing new chemicals." It imposed the obligation of non-disclosure and 
non-reliance on states. 
The second model of protection also provides five year of exclusive right and imposed 
non-disclosure and non-reliance regulations. However, it added certain favorable 
pharmaceutical patented products measures. First, it extends the scope of protection of 
7 The US-FT A singed after 2000 can be roughly classified to three generations. The second generation US-
FT A provides five years of data exclusive right and adopts certain favorable pharmaceutical patent 
measures. See the discussion in 2.2.1. 
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pharmaceutical product by adopting a narrower definition of "new chemical entity." 
Second, it counted five years exclusive right from the data of granting the right in the 
reference countries without triggering any waiting period. By doing so, if the originators 
do not apply the marketing approval of new drug in the reference countries, the data 
exclusivity would likely be extended as high as 10 years in the reference countries. Third, 
it links the marketing approval to patent status. Fourth, it mandatory extends the terms of 
patent if unreasonable delay in registrations occurs. Five, it requires the notification of 
patent holders when the same chemical is the target new drug. Those measures block the 
possibilities of the entry of generic drug during the terms of patent. 
The third model stands on t~e basis of the third model and adds some human right 
elements. These adjustments include relinquishing of mandatory extension of patent; 
setting the six-month waiting period; and recognizing the parts of Doha declarations and 
public health waivers. Overall, those changes balance the interests between the protection 
of pharmaceutical products and the access to basic medicines. 
These differences come from that some states consider the issue of data protection as a 
subject matter of exclusive right, while other consider it as a subject matter of trade 
secrets law. Indeed, these two views substantially shaped the issue today. The result is 
that protection is provided under both approaches, but it depends. 
2.2 The Multilateral Protection Regime 
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The national legal system for intellectual property is established since late 15th century. 8 
However, not until 19th century, the modem International Intellectual Property Rights 
integrated European national legal systems and established the principals of international 
Intellectual Property Rights.9 Two important international intellectual property treaties in 
history were formed in 1880's: the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial 
Property (Paris Convention) 10, and Berne Convention for Protection of Literary and 
Artistic works (Berne Convention).!! The Paris Convention provides a protection for 
owners of inventions, trademarks, and industrial design, whereas the Berne Convention 
provides a protection of authors or owners of creative works. Neither of these agreements 
does contain any provisions for the protection of trade secret and pharmaceutical test 
data. 
, TRIPS adopted the Paris Convention and Berne Convention and extended protection of 
subject matter and established universally acknowledged international minimum 
standards for intellectual property protection. These achievements made it the most 
important Intellectual Property international treaty since 1994. The concept of protection 
of test data is first time introduced to the international community by the TRIPS, but its 
8 The first copyright was granted in 1511 in England. The law of trade secrets probably dated back to the 
Rome's Merges. See Menell Lemley, Intellectual Property in the New Technological Age, 27-28, 105-106, 
319-320. (3rd ed, 2003). 
9 Edith Tilton Penrose, The Economics of the International Patent System (1951), cited in Frederick 
Abbott, Thomas Cottier & Francis Gurry, The International Intellectual Property System: Commentary and 
Material 633 (1999). 
10 Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, Mar. 20, 1883,21 U.S.T. 1583,828 V.N.T.S. 
305 [hereinafter Paris Convention]. 
lJ Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, opened for signature Sept. 8, 1886, 
as last revised July 24, 1971,828 V.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter Berne Convention]. 
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formation and interpretation are related to the Paris Convention. Therefore, an analysis of 
Paris Convention would be helpful to understand how this concept works. 
2.2.1 The Paris Convention 
The 18th century of industrial revolution led European market increasingly and rapidly. 12 
The expansion of market increased infringement cases of the patented products in the 
cross-border transaction. This kind of need motivated inventors, patent owners, and 
government officials. They met together at Paris to make international norms in 1880. 
They spent three years in drafting provisions for the protection of industrial property to 
resolve cross border commercial transaction disputes.13 Finally, Paris Convention was 
signed in 1883 and completed,by an Interpretative Protocol in Madrid in 1891, which 
formed a basic model for the protection of intellectual property. 14 With the development 
of technology, the Paris Convention has been revised several times to encompass the new 
technology, but it still has some shortages in the protection of new type of industries. 15 
The number of contracting parties has reached to 172 states in 2007. 16 The Convention 
requires parties to establish a Union for the protection of industrial property. 17 The 
12 Wikipedia, Industrial Revolution, http://en.wikipedia.orglwikilIndustrial revolution (Last visited on 
October 3, 2008). 
13 Frederick Abbott, Thomas Cottier & Francis Gurry, The International Intellectual Property System: 
Commentary and Material 635-643 (1999). 
14 1d. 
15 Paris Convention, concluded in 1883, was revised at Brussels in 1900, at Washington in 1911, at The 
Hague in 1925, at London in 1934, at Lisbon in 1958 and at Stockholm in 1967, and it was amended in 
1979. http://www.wipo.int/treaties/enJip/paris/ (Last vist on October 3, 2008). 
16 World Intellectual Property Organization [hereinafter WIPO], Treaties Statistics: Paris Convention of 
March 20, 1883, available at 
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protections include object patents, utility models, industrial designs, trademarks, service 
marks, trade names, indications of source or appellations of origin, and the repression of 
unfair competition. IS Prior to TRIPS, it is the most important international agreement to 
deal with the protection of inventions. 
2.2.1.1 The Protection of Unfair Competition under Article 10bis 
The original Paris Convention of 1883 did not contain any provisions of the protection 
from unfair competition for industrial property. To repress unfair competition, the 1900 
Brussels additional Act inserted Article 1 Obis to the Paris Convention as a new form of 
national treatment obligation. 19 Further, the 1911 Washington Act added a norm of 
protection against unfair competition and confirmed that parties to the Paris Convention 
.. 
are obligated to provide effective protection against unfair competition.2o Later, 1924 
Hague revisions, 1934 London revisions and Lisbon 1958 revisions extended the original 
http://www .wipo. intitreaties/en/statistics/StatsResults.jsp?treaty ld=2&lang=en (Last visited on October 3, 
2008). 
17 Paris Convention art. 1.1. 
18 Paris Convention art. 1.2. 
19 The national treatment principal is a rule of nondiscrimination, promising foreign intellectual property 
owners that they will enjoy in a protecting country at least the same treatment as the protecting country 
gives to it own national. This principal was first time to embody in the Paris Convention and later in 
TRIPS. See Paul Goldstein, International Intellectual Property Law 20 (1999). 
20 
G.H.C. Bodenhauser, Guide to the Application o/the Paris Convention/or the Protection o/Industrial 
Property, 1968, Reprinted in Paul Goldstein, International Intellectual Property Law 352. The Guide is an 
~nofficial "legislative history", since G.H.C. Bodenhauser was unofficial reporter for the Paris Convention 
III the last 1960's. See Id at 354. 
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substantive obligations of Article 10bis and added a definition and example of unfair 
.. 21 
competItIOn. 
According to paragraph two of Article 10bis, the "unfair competition" is "any act of 
competition contrary to honest practices in industrial or commercial matters .... ,,22 The 
concept of "dishonest practice" is established by three examples under paragraph three of 
Article lObis, it states 
"(i)all acts of such a nature as to create confusion by any means whatever 
with the establishment, the goods, or the industrial or commercial activities, 
of a competitor; 
(i i) false allegations in the course of trade of such a nature as to discredit the 
establishment, . the googs, or the industrial or commercial activities, of a 
competitor; ". 
(iii) indications or allegations the use of which in the course of trade is liable 
to mislead the public as to the nature, the manufacturing process, the 
characteristics, the suitability for their purpose, or the quantity, of the 
goods.,,23 
These three examples deal with three typical case of dishonest practice: first, acts would 
create consumer confusion; second, false allegation would discredit a competitor and 
third misleading indications or allegations use in the trade.24 These specifications made 
the application of Article lObis (2) clear, but these insertions do not unify state practices 
21 See Paul Goldstein, supra note 19, 548. 
22 Paris Convention, art. lObis (2). 
23 Paris Convention, art. 10bis (3). 
24 . 
See Goldstem, supra note 19, at 173. 
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of the law of unfair competition.25 In particular, this insertion creates a new problem of 
the protection of trade secrets between civil law countries and common law countries. 
Due to no express provisions of protection of trade secrets under Paris Convention, states 
otherwise provides the protection of trade secrets with their discretions.26 Prior to the 
adoption of TRIPS, common law and civil law countries apply different rules for the 
protection of trade secrets.27 Civil countries protect interests in undisclosed information 
under the title of unfair competition and the Paris Convention standard of "honest 
practices in industrial or commercial matters.,,28 Common law countries otherwise protect 
undisclosed information through theories of contract, tort or property. In those countries 
that treat undisclosed information as property, a trade secret owner can protect secrets 
.' ,. 
from third parties who obtain information from owner or from a spy and a thief. 
However, civil countries do not provide the protection under these circumstances because 
in these cases where third parties do not participate in any dishonest practice. This 
problem continued in the negotiating process of TRIPS and concluded in TRIPS. 
In order to diminish this discordant practice among civil and common countries, Article 
39 of TRIPS provides the protection of trade secrets. Besides, TRIPS proposed a 
definition of "a manner contrary to honest commercial practices," which includes 
25 Aaron Xavier Fellmeth, Secrecy, Monopoly, and Access to Pharmaceuticals in International Trade Law: 
Protection of Marketing Approval Data under TRIPS Agreement, 45 Harv. Int'l L.J. 443, 453-454 (2004). 
26 
Fellmeth, supra note 25. 
27 Rudolf Krasser, The Protection of Trade Secrets in TRIPs Agreement, From GATT to TRIPs-The 
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects ofIntellectual Property Rights 216 (Friedrich-Karl Beier & Gehard 
Schricker, eds., 1996), cited in Paul Goldstenin, supra note 21, at 548-549, note 2. 
28 
See Goldstein, supra note 19, at 549. 
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"practices such as breach of contract, breach of confidence and inducement to breach, 
and includes the acquisition of undisclosed information by third parties who knew, or 
were grossly negligent in failing to know, that such practices were involved in the 
. .. ,,29 
acqulSltlOn. 
2.2.1.2 Protection of Pharmaceutical Test Data and Paris Convention 
The relation between Paris Convention and the concept of protection of trade secrets 
indirectly guided the development of the concept of protection of test data in TRIPS. This 
concept is in section seven of protection of undisclosed information and this concept is 
ensuring the protection of "undisclosed information." Paragraph 1 of Article 39 directly 
shows this linkage with Pari,s Convention. It states "In the course of ensuring effective 
" 
protection against unfair competition as provided in Article 1 Obis of the Paris Convention 
(1967), Members shall protect undisclosed information in accordance with paragraph 2 
and data submitted to governments or governmental agencies in accordance with 
paragraph 3." Accordingly, the objective of protection of data submitted to governments 
or governmental agencies in accordance with paragraph 3 is to fulfill the obligation of 
Article 10bis of Paris Convention; that is repression of unfair competition.3o 
2.2.2 TRIPS 
WTO's TRIPS agreement, signed on April 15 1994, was a result of final negotiation of 
Uruguay Round of GATT in Marrakesh (Morocco). It is the most significant 
development in international intellectual property law in 20th and 21 st century. It 
29 
TRIP, art. 39. 
30 Jerome H. Reichman, The International Legal Status of Undisclosed Clinical Trial Data: From Private to 
Public Goods? in Negotiating Health: Intellectual Property and Access to Medicines, supra note 6, at 137. 
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established the minimum standards of intellectual property protection found in Berne and 
Paris Conventions. More profoundly, as an Annex to the Agreement Establishing the 
World Trade Organization, the TRIPS, brought the intellectual property within the 
institutional framework of the world's multilateral trading system. TRIPS gives members 
an option to submit the disputes regarding compliance with TRIPS to the settlement 
system of the WTO and to resolve the disputes under the WTO system.31 
TRIPS includes seven important parts: part I provides general provisions and basic 
principles of the protections of intellectual property; part II establishes the standards of 
intellectual property, and clarifies the scope and use of intellectual property right; part III 
sets the measures of enforcement of intellectual property rights; part IV sets the .' 
" procedures of acquisition and maintenance of intellectual property rights; part V deals 
with intellectual property disputes prevention and settlement; part VI and VII deal with 
transitional arrangements and institutional arrangements. 
As mentioned, TRIPS covers the previous Berne Convention for traditional work of 
copyright protection and Paris Convention for the protection of industrial property. In 
addition, it extended the protection of copyright to software, database, and sound 
recording in order to meet the need of new technology. It also extended the protection of 
patent to pharmaceutical products, pesticides and plant varieties. 
The significant achievements of TRIPS, stated in the preamble, include certain areas.32 
First, it recognizes intellectual property rights as the private or individual rights in 
31 Graeme B. Dinwoodie et ai., International Intellectual Property Law and Policy 45 (2001). 
32 
See TRIPS, preamble. 
44 
multilateral level; therefore any member should protect the intellectual property rights 
like the way it p~otect other property. Secondly, it acknowledges "underlying public 
policy objectives of national systems for the protection of intellectual property.,,33 This 
means that members can develop their national intellectual property based on their needs. 
Third, TRIPS affirms the special needs of the least-developed countries (LDCs), so it 
gives a maximum flexibility to state members in the domestic implementation of laws 
and regulations in order to create a sound and viable technological base. Fourth, it is the 
first to adopt international sanctioning tools for violating obligation to ensure the 
enforcement of members. Finally, TRIPS establishes a minimum enforcement norm to 
offer minimum procedural safeguards in order to assure enforceability of the minimum 
rights under the treaty. 
2.2.2.1 The Protection of Pharmaceutical Test Data as an Intellectual Property 
A drug from discovery to marketing has to comply with regulatory requirements. Taking 
the United States as an example, before marketing approval, the United State Food and 
Drug Administration (FDA) requires pharmaceutical company to conduct certain 
preclinical and clinical trials.34 During the preclinical and clinical trial, a pharmaceutical 
should follow the strict procedures and provide a considerable data to the FDA. For 
example, administrating the preclinical trial on animals requires Good Laboratory 
Practice (GLP) and administrating the clinical trial on human requires Good Clinical 
Practice (GCP).35 Those strict procedures and massive data required in the process of 
33 I d. 
34 Ng, Rick, Drugs: From Discovery to Approval 175-282 (2002). 
35 
Ng, supra note 34. 
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filling process increase the cost of developing new drug and delay the drug marketing for 
10 to 12 years. According to the research conducted by Tuffs University in 2001, it 
discovered that the cost of developing a new drug is about $802 million.36 This spending 
includes the cost of developing new patents, and conducting necessary pre-clinical, and 
clinical trial. These high costs prompted the international pharmaceutical companies to 
argue that the data exclusivity right is a necessary compensation for such high costs. As 
Roffe pointed out, this attitude makes the protection of test data a new issue in the 
international pharmaceutical industry. 37 
While intellectual property by no means is a new subject, the protection of 
pharmaceutical test data is not"discussed until 1980s.38 In the US, one of problems that 
contributed to raising this issue of test data protection was the ragging debate with respect 
to the public's right to access these information vis-iI-vis the companies' right to guard 
their information against disclosure. To resolve this issue, the US enacted the Hatch-
Waxman Act/9 which provides the pharmaceutical company five years of exclusive data 
protection. However, the law also gave the public a right to access this same information 
within the exclusivity period. These measures give the public an opportunity to supervise 
trials and guarantee the protection of test data in the US, but it does not secure the 
36 The Ballooning Price Tag, http://enewsJufts.edu/stories/12040IBaI100ningCosts.htm (last visit on 
August 6, 2008). 
37 Pedro Roffe et aI., From Paris to Doha: The WTO Doha Declartation on the TRIPS agreement and Public 
Health, in Negotiating Health: Intellectual Property and Access to Medicines 1,6 (Roffe, P. et aI. eds., 
2006). 
38 
Correa, M. Correa, Protecting Test Data for Pharmaceutical and Agrochemical Products under Free 
Trade Agreements, in Negotiating Health: Intellectual Property and Access to Medicines 81,83 (Roffe, P. 




protection of test data in the global market. Since these measures only apply in the US, a 
third party out of the US, might acquire the information and go to another country where 
disclosure of test data is not required. Such third party may easily get licensed and market 
the drug in that country. This indeed prompted international pharmaceutical companies to 
do whatever they can in order to secure their profits. Consequently, they pushed hard to 
form a global protection system for test data through multilateral, regional and bilateral 
treaties. 
2.2.2.2 The Conditions of Article 39.3 
The pharmaceutical companies' effort is successful. One aspect of this success was the 
making of TRIPS. Article 39.3 introduced the concept of the protection of pharmaceutical .' 
test data in the multilateral level. It establishes a foundation for the protection of test data 
and directs the development of protection of test data. Therefore, members may use as a 
basis to adopt suitable ways to protect test data or negotiate an appropriate provision to 
protect test data in a regional or a bilateral level. 
Article 39.3 of TRIPS protects the test data under the title of undisclosed information, 40 
it states: 
"Member, when requiring, as a condition of approving the marketing of 
pharmaceutical or of agricultural chemical products that utilize new chemical 
entities, the submission of undisclosed test or other data, the origination of 
which involves a considerable effort, shall protect such data against unfair 
commercial use.,,41 
40 
Pugatch, supra note 6, at 98-100. 
41 TRI PS, art, 39.3. 
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It directly imposes an obligation on State members to take action against unfair 
commercial use in order to fulfill their obligation under the TRIPS. 42 The scope of 
obligations includes non-disclosure, but it is not clear whether non-reliance is included.43 
The obligation under the Article 39.3 is constituted of certain basic terms, such as 
"submission of data for marketing approval," "new chemical entities," "undisclosed 
data," "considerable efforts," and "unfair commercial use." TRIPS does not provide 
definitions for those terms, therefore there are lots of controversies over interpretations of 
those terms. The section below discusses these introduced those interpretations related to 
the elements of Article 39.3. Those interpretations trigger other revisions of 
pharmaceutical test data provisions in regional and bilateral agreement. 
" 
1. Submission of Data for Marketing Approval 
Article 39.3 requires members to protect test data if submission oftest data is a condition 
for obtaining marketing approval. Under the theory of agency, state members are not 
required to review data by themselves and they may delegate their duties to research 
groups, non-governmental, or other countries for reviewing the submitted test data. Thus, 
even delegation would not discharge the obligation of state members under Article 39.3. 
A part from the delegation issue, Article 39.3 does not adequately resolve the situation 
where a member does not request the test data but rely on the prior approval test data 
submitted in other countries to grant a marketing approval of generic drugs. In such a 
42 
Lee Skillington & Eric M. Solovy, The Protection of Test and Other Data Required by Article 39.3 of the 
TRIpS Agreement, 24 Nw. 1. Int'l L. & Bus. 1,22-23 (2003). 
43 
Pugatch, supra note 6, at 100. 
48 
case, there are two possible scenarios. The first scenario assumes that the submission of 
test data for marketing approval process is a necessary element to trigger Article 39.3.44 
Thus, Article 39.3 is not applicable when they rely on prior foreign approval to grant a 
marketing approval. Not only this, but if an applicant voluntarily submitted test data to 
the health authorities this would not trigger Article 39.3.45 
By contrast, in the second scenano the protection test data for marketing approval 
includes the cases of indirect submission. 46 That is approving the pharmaceutical 
products on prior approval in other countries or such reliance is, in fact, an indirect act of 
requiring the submission of protected data. Therefore, even though members do not 
require the submission of test data for making approval, they still cannot rely on prior . 
" 
foreign approval test data or permit third party to submit evidence concerning the safety 
or efficacy of a product that was previously approved in another territory.47 
Looking more squarely to the text of Article 39.3, there is no language to support that 
members are subject to second interpretation, an obligation of non-reliance. Thus, 
supporters of non-reliance obligation proposed the unfair competition as a defense. They 
argued if members rely on the foreign test data to approve new medicines, their practice 
would constitute an unfair competition. Nevertheless, Canadian court did not accept this 
44 Carlos Maria Correa, Unfair Competition under the TRIPS Agreement: Protection of Data Submitted for 
or the Registration of Pharmaceuticals, 3 Chi. J. Int'l L. 69, 73 (2002). 
45 Id. 
46 Skillington et al., supra note 42, 24-25. 
47 Skillington et al., supra note 42, 24-25. 
49 
viewpoint even she ratified the NAFT A, in which data exclusivity is granted for five 
48 
years. 
The more explicit languages regarding restriction of reliance in marketing approval 
process can be found in the subsequent US bilateral and regional agreements signed after 
2000. Yet, a general opinion as to whether the obligation of non-reliance can be imposed 
to the parties is still subject to interpretation by the domestic courts in that juridiction.49 
2. The Protected Test Data for Marketing Approval of a New Drug 
The protected form of test data under Article 39.3 should be in writing, because health 
authority can review those test data to make a decision of marketing approval. Indeed, in 
order to qualify for the protection of Article 39.3, the data must be used in the application 
submitted for marketing approval of new drug. so If the data is used for other industrial 
purpose, it would not be protected. 
Thus, in the United State, before obtaining a marketing approval, the pharmaceutical 
sponsors are required to conduct a preclinical, a clinical trial and file an IND and NDA 
applications. In these trials and procedure, human, animal toxicology and other required 
data would be required for the marketing approval. S1 The data from those trials are 
48 
Bayer Inc. v. Attorney General a/Canada, Apotex Inc. et aI., Intervenors, 87 C.P.R. (3d) 293, (Fed. Ct. 
of Appeal 1999). 
49 
Pugatch, supra note 6, at Ill. 
50 The protection of test data under Article 39.3 of the TRIPS includes agriculture chemicals and 
pharmaceuticals, but the protections of data submitted for marketing approval of agriculture chemicals are 
not included in this thesis. 
51 
See Correa, supra note 44, at 73. 
50 
protected under Article 39.3. Moreover, data regarding manufacturing, conservation and 
packaging methods are protected data, if all these data are necessary to obtain a 
marketing approval. 52 The law determines which data is necessary and which is not. 
3. Undisclosed Data at First Time of Submission 
The protected test data under Article 39.3 must be undisclosed and not known for the 
public. 39.3.53 Despite that the fact that the test data after submission might be disclosed 
to the public fully or partially, it would not change the protectable status of the test data 
under Article 39.3. The rationale here is that permitting a third party to appropriate those 
submitted data would constitute an unfair practice and undisclosed requirement cannot 
remain after the first submissWn.54 
By contrast, the data that has been disclosed before the first submission for marketing 
approval, they would not be protected under Article 39.3 because they fall within the 
public domain. 55 For example, before submitted for marketing approval, the test data 
published in scientific journals or disclosed to the public would not be protected under 
Article 39.3, because they are known for the public before they were submitted. 56 
4. New Chemical Entities 
52 
See Correa, supra note 44, at 73. 
53 Skillington et al., supra note 42, at 27-28. 
54 Skillington et al., supra note 42, at 27-28. 
55 
Ng, supra note 34. 
56 
See Correa, supra note 44, at 74-75. 
51 
Article 39.3 requires Member to protect the test data submitted for marketing approval of 
pharmaceutical that utilizes new chemical entities. This describes the usage and objective 
of test data. To trigger the application of Article 39.3, the test data must be provided for 
the marketing approval of pharmaceutical and the pharmaceutical should be new 
chemical. The meaning of "new chemical entity" is not clear in TRIPS. Thus, members 
may have different interpretations for the phrase "new chemical entity".57 
Basically, the interpretation of new chemical involved two issues. First, whether the term 
of "new" in Article 39.3 refers to the same meaning of "novelty" in the patent system.58 
Second, whether the term of new includes a new use of pharmaceutical, which has 
approved for other uses. 59 
,. 
Regarding the first issue, there are two common interpretations. First, a new chemical is a 
chemical that has not been used as a registered60 medicine in human history.61 Second, a 
new chemical is a chemical that meets the standard of the novelty in the patent sense.62 
57 Skillington et al., supra note 42. 
58 Skillington et al., supra note 42. 
59 See Fellmeth, supra note 25, at 464-465; Correa, supra note 44, at 74-75; SkiIlington et al., supra note 
42. 
60 The protection of registered drugs can cover some traditional non-registered medicine. In such cases, 
those traditional medicines have been used in some society or community, but they have not been approved 
as a medicine. In the situation, those chemical entities are not new in the word but they are new to be used 
as medicine. Those application data for those new drugs should be covered under the Article 39.3. 
61 See Correa, supra note 44, at 74-75; Fellmeth, supra note 25, at 464-465; SkiIlington et al., supra note 
44. 
62 
According to Professor Scafidi, only in very rare cases and least likely interpretation, a new chemical 
entity would have to represent a novel patentable invention, and only such products would be entitled to 
test data protection. See Susan Scafidi, The "Good Old Days" a/TRIPS: The u.s. Trade Agenda and the 
ExtenSion 0/ Pharmaceutical Test Data Protection, 4 Yale J. Health Pol'y L. & Ethics 341, 345-346. 
52 
Most commentators prefer the first interpretation, because the TRIPS did not purposely 
restrict the protection in the patentable products.63 Thus, the new chemical entity is new 
as a pharmaceutical, but it need not be new chemical in the world. Accordingly, 
chemicals used in other industrial fields still can be deemed as new if there were no prior 
application for approval of the same drug, or where the same drug was not previously 
known in commerce. 
Regarding the second issue, there are several US Free Trade Agreements adopted the 
protection containing the new use.64 However, scholars overwhelmingly agree that ther 
term only means "new chemical entities," but contain the meaning of new use or new 
dosage.65 This opinion is accepted by the European Court.66 The European Court of . 
Justice indirectly discussed whether the test data submitted for approval of new use is 
protected in Regina v. The Licensing Authority Established by the Medicines Act 1968, ex 
parte Generics (UK) ltd. 67 The Court indicated that a subsequent drug would not have a 
right of marketing exclusivity if it is substantially similar to an earlier approved drug. The 
Court further explained that substantial similarity between these two drugs means that the 
two drugs have the same qualitative and quantitative composition in terms of active 
principles and pharmaceutical forms, and their safety and efficacy are bio-equivalents. 
63 Novelty is a patentability test. An invention is not patentable if it was already known before the date of 
filing or before the date of priority if a priority is claimed, of the patent application. 
64 See Fellmeth, supra note 25, at note 104. See also the detailed discussion section 2.3. 
65 
See Fellmeth, supra note 25, at 464-465; Correa, supra note 59, at 74-75. 
66 
See Regina v The Licensing Authority Established by the Medicines Act 1968, ex parte Generics (UK) 
Ltd. Before the Court of Justice of the European Communities (Fifth Chamber), Case C-368/96, 1998 ECR 
1-7967, [1999]2 CMLR 181 (1998), cited in Correa, supra note 59, at 74-75. 
67Id. 
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Similarly, a new drug application for the approval of new indications, dosage forms, 
combinations, new forms of administration, crystalline forms, isomers, etc., of existing 
drugs is not applied to Article 39.3, because there is no new chemical in the medical 
68 field. 
5. Considerable Effort 
There is no definition of "a considerable effort" in Article 39.3, but most commentators' 
agree this term should cover technical or economic effort.69 It is clear that a conduct of 
collecting test data for approving of a new drug falls within the scope of "considerable 
efforts", because pharmaceutical company need time, labors, and money to collect data. 
However, the concept of rewarding for considerable efforts probably challenges the 
fundamental theory of intellectual property to reward the creation of mind. According to 
World Intellectual Property Organization's interpretation as to what intellectual property 
is, it states that "the intellectual property system protects creations of the mind: 
inventions, literary and artistic works, and symbols, names, images, and designs used in 
commerce.,,70 The labor efforts or economical value traditionally are not protected under 
the intellectual property, but those viewpoints encounter the strict challenges in 
traditional knowledge. 71 Likewise, the concept of the protection of test data to reward a 
68 
Correa, supra note 44, at 74-75. 
69 
Correa, supra note 44, at 74. 
70 
WI PO, What is intellectual property? httR:\' wW.w iRo. intlabout-ip'en! (last visit on August 12, 2008). 
71 
WIPO, Intellectual Property and Genetic Resources, Traditional Knowledge, and Folklore, 
h!.!.nI\\ww.wipo.inUabolil-ip/cn/studicslpublications1gcnetic resources.htm (last visit on August 12,2008). 
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considerable effort or considerable investments is a new trend that reflects a shift of 
thinking toward a more stretchy understanding for the very idea of the intellectual 
72 property. 
6. Protection against Unfair Commercial Use 
Article 39.3 limits the protection of test data against "commercial" uses, thus "non-profit 
use" is not protected. This term is also related to the issue of whether a member may 
approve generic pharmaceuticals relying on the test data submitted in another country. 
The US Trade Representatives and their proponents argue that this is a notion of "unfair 
commercial use." India and her proponents from developing countries relied on those 
data submitted to other states:Jndeed, this disagreement predates the signing of TRIPS. 
As the discussion above showed, due to vagueness of "act of competition contrary to 
honest practices in industrial or commercial matters,,73 in Paris Convention, disputes in 
the enforcement of the protection of unfair competition are triggered. When Article 39.3 
introduced the concept of protection of test data, this concept is established under the 
section of the protection of undisclosed information. Moreover, Article 39.1 74 declares 
that Members shall protect undisclosed information data submitted to governments or 
governmental agencies in accordance with the paragraph is to ensure effective protection 
72 Recently, the possibilities and scheme of new subject matters of intellectual prosperities became the hot 
issues in the WIPO. See id. 
73 P . 
ans Convention, art. 10bis (2). 
74 TRIPS, art. 39.1 states "In the course of ensuring effective protection against unfair competition as 
provided in Article 10bis of the Paris Convention (1967), Members shall protect undisclosed information in 
accordance with paragraph 2 and data submitted to governments or governmental agencies in accordance 
with paragraph 3." 
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against unfair competition as provided in Article 10bis of the Paris Convention (1967). 
Thus, the interpretation of "unfair commercial use" in Article 39.3 should follow the 
interpretative guidelines under Article 10bis of the Paris Convention.
75 
Accordingly, all 
controversies over Article 10bis of the Convention would occur in Article 39.3; those 
made this term become the most controversial in Article 39.3.
76 
Reviewing the negotiation history of TRIPS shows this disagreement. During the 
Ministerial Conference in Brussels in 1990, the facts presented this disagreement. The 
original provision proposed by the European Community, Switzerland, and the United 
States, includes five-year data exclusivity, 77 but the text containing five-year protection is 
debated in the negotiation. The final version of Article 39.3 came from a compromise 
among members. They retained the concept of protection of test data, but rejected 
specification of the form of protection.78 However, this compromise did not put an end as 
what constitute unfair commercial use under Article 39.3 
A researcher has indicated that the current Article 39.3 provides a room for members to 
construe the meaning of this term, so members may determine how to enforce the 
75 
TRIPS, art. 39.1. 
76 
Correa, supra note 44, at 77-79. 
77 Draft Final Act embodying the results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Negotiations, TNC/W/35 
Rev.1, (Dec. 3, 1990), it state "4A PARTIES, when requiring, as a condition of approving the marketing of 
new pharmaceutical products or of a new agricultural chemical product, the submission of undisclosed test 
or other data, the origination of which involves a considerable effort, shall protect such data against unfair 
commercial use. [Unless the person submitting the information agrees, the data may not be relied upon for 
the approval of competing products for a reasonable time, generally no less than five years, commensurate 
with the efforts involved in the origination of the data, their nature, and the expenditure involved in their 
preparation. In addition, PARTIES shall protect such data against disclosure, except where necessary to 
protect the public]." (Emphasis added). 
78 Skillington et aI., supra note 42, at 31-32. 
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protection of test data and decide what unfair commercial use is.
79 
Consequently, 
members may provide the protection of test data against disclosure,80 and rely on the data 
submitted to other members to approve a new drug in their countries.
81 
Instead of 
granting data exclusivity, the supporters of this opinion include India and other 
developing countries. 
By contrast, the United State representatives argued that reliance on the data submitted to 
other members to approve a new drug in their countries is an act of unfair commercial 
use.82 Obviously, this argument goes against to the national health authority power to 
grant marketing approval based on reliance of test data submitted by the original 
applicant. 
The US Trade Representatives and their proponents were partially rejected at the end of 
negotiation of Article 39.3. The final version of Article 39.3 although introduced the 
concept of protection of test data, it does not recognize the data exclusivity and it does 
not deal with the members obligations non-reliance. However, the US and their 
79 R . h elc man, supra note 30, at 144. 
80 
Correa, supra note 44, at 76-79. 
81 Jayasharee Watal, Intellectual Property Rights in the WTO and Developing Countries ch. 2 (2001); 
Reichman, supra note 30, at 144; Correa, supra note 38, at 84. 
82 The US trade representatives stated "TRIPS negotiators understood it [the term "unfair commercial use"] 
to mean that the data will not be used to support, clear or otherwise review other applications for marketing 
approval for a set amount of time unless authorized by the original submitter of the data. Any other 
definition of this term would be inconsistent with the logic and the negotiating history of the provision." 
U.S. Trade Representative, Office of the General Counsel, The Protection of Undisclosed Test Data in 
Accordance with TRIPs Article 39.3, (1995) (unattributed paper for submission in bilateral discussions with 
Australia in May 1995), cited in Skillington et aI., supra note 42, at 33. 
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proponents still promote the data exclusivity legal scheme and incorporate the non-
reliance obligation in regional and bilateral agreements. 
2.3 Regional Protection Regime 
There are two important regional agreements containing the provisions of data 
exclusivity. The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) is the first regional 
agreement to incorporate the term. It introduced the concept of protection of test data 
earlier than TRIPS. However, the TRIPS did not follow NAFT A. The second is Central 
American Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA). It was singed ten years after TRIPS; it 
provides many protections beyond the scope of TRIPS; that is so called "TRIP-plus" 
provisions.83 These two agreements reflect the different needs of the US in two different 
periods with respect the protection oftest data. 
2.3.1 North American Free Trade Agreement 
NAFTA 84 was signed on December 17, 1992; it took effect on January 1, 1994. This 
regional agreement attempted to eliminate all trade restrictions on trade and investment 
among the United Sates, Canada and Mexico. 85 These three countries through this 
83 TRIPS sets a minimum standards agreement, but it does allow for a greater level of protection, which is 
referred to as "TRIPS-plus" protection. TRIPS-plus protection allows developed countries, through their 
disparate bargaining power, to force greater IP protections upon developing countries, and to 
simultaneously decide when to apply Most Favor Nation principles to extend this TRIPS-Plus protection to 
the countries that would actually benefit from the higher standards. See, Brian Cimboli, The Impact of 
Regional Trade Areas on International Intellectual Property Rights, 48 IDEA 53, 56 (2007). 
84 
NAFTA was implemented into U.S. law by North American Free Trade Agreement Implementation Act 
of 1993. (19 U.S.c. 3301-3473). 
85 
. NAFTA, art. 102.1 provides: The objectives of this Agreement, as elaborated more specifically through 
Its principles and rules, including national treatment, most-favored-nation treatment and transparency, are 
to: a) eliminate barriers to trade in, and facilitate the cross-border movement of, goods and services 
?etween the territories of the Parties; b) promote conditions of fair competition in the free trade area; c) 
lllcrease substantially investment opportunities in the territories of the Parties; d) provide adequate and 
effective protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights in each Party's territory; e) create 
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agreement created a free trade zone for goods deemed to originate from these three 
countries.86 They attempted to obtain the maximum benefits and rights among them in 
areas of investment, services and intellectual property. 87 NAFTA has twenty-two 
chapters, including issues ranging from tariffs and non-tariff barriers to serVIces, 
intellectual property, investment, and dispute settlements. 
Although Chapter seventeen of NAFTA on intellectual property rights provides higher 
standard of protection and enforcement than TRIPS, its structure, form and contents are 
similar to TRIPS.88 This chapter is significant in two aspects: first, it requires members 
apply to the substantive provisions of four important international conventions on 
intellectual properties,89 including (l) The Geneva Convention for the Protection of 
Producers of Phonograms against Unauthorized Duplication of their Phonograms, 1971 
effective procedures for the implementation and application of this Agreement, for its joint administration 
and for the resolution of disputes; and f) establish a framework for further trilateral, regional and 
multilateral cooperation to expand and enhance the benefits of this Agreement. 
86 Rules of origin under NAFTA are complex and must be reviewed for each product to determine whether 
product qualifies for NAFTA treatment. Exporters must complete Certificate of Origin stating whether 
product is originating good. Special rules exist for energy and petrochemical products and agricultural 
trade. 
87 N AFT A, preamble. 
88 Cesar Praga, Intellectual Property, in Toward Free Trade in the America: Free Trade Agreement 207,211 
(Maryse Robert & Jose Manuel Salazar X. eds, 2001). 
89 NAFT A, art. 1701.2 provides: 
To provide adequate and effective protection and enforcement of intellectual property 
rights, each Party shall, at a minimum, give effect to this Chapter and to the substantive 
provisions of: (a) the Geneva Convention for the Protection of Producers ofPhonograms 
Against Unauthorized Duplication of their Phonograms, 1971 (Geneva Convention); (b) 
the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, 1971 (Berne 
Convention); (c) the Paris Convention for the Protection ofIndustrial Property, 1967 (Paris 
Convention); and (d) the International Convention for the Protection of New Varieties of 
Plants, 1978 (UPOV Convention), or the International Convention for the Protection of 
New Varieties of Plants, 1991 (UPOV Convention).lfa Party has not acceded to the 
specified text of any such Conventions on or before the date of entry into force of this 
Agreement, it shall make every effort to accede." 
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(Geneva Convention); (2) The Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and 
Artistic Works, 1971 (Berne Convention); (3) The Paris Convention for the Protection of 
Industrial Property, 1967 (Paris Convention); (4) The International Convention for the 
Protection of New Varieties of Plants (UPOV Convention) (1978 and 1991). The 
adoption of those treaties, to ensure the enforcement ofNAFTA, members are required to 
adopt extra provision to supply the insufficiency of the international treaties.9o 
Second, NAFTA did provide a prototype negotiation of TRIPS and certainly effected the 
outcome of TRIPS negotiations; because at the time NAFT A was signed, the TRIPS was 
still in the process of negotiation. 91 Third, NAFT A introduced the new types of 
intellectual properties other than listed in Paris Convention, such as protection of 
, 
pharmaceutical test data, Layout Designs of Semiconductor Integrated Circuits,92 and 
Geographical Indications93etc. 
2.3.1.1 Trade Secrets and Pharmaceutical Test Data 
NAFT A almost reproduced the US model of protection of test data. Under chapter 
seventeen of NAFT A, Article 1711 provides the protection of test data of pharmaceutical 
products under the title of trade secret, but this Article distinguishes the protection of 
general trade secrets from pharmaceutical test data. The protection of general trade secret 
under Article 1711.1 is perpetual, as long as the information remains secret and unknown 
90 
Cesar Praga, supra note 88. 
91Id. 
92 




to the general pUblic. 94 The protection under subsection 5, 6 and 7 of Article 1711 
otherwise adopt the data exclusivity for the protection of pharmaceutical test data. 
2.3.1.2 The Distinctive Features of Protection of Pharmaceutical Test Data 
Although NAFTA is signed two years prior to TRIPS, compared with Article 39.3 of 
TRIPS, the protections of test data under NAFTA are different in many ways: 
1. An Exclusive Right for the Protection of Test Data 
Article of 1711.5 provides a general concept of protection of test data and it requires each 
party should protect the test data from disclosure.95 Article 1711.6 otherwise incorporates 
two distinctive features protection of pharmaceutical test data under ofNAFT A. 
First, Article 1711.6 grants a five-year term of data exclusivity right.96 It requires the 
signatories to protect the test data submitted to the heath authorities for approving new 
94 NAFT A, art. 1711.1 provides: Each Party shall provide the legal means for any person to prevent trade 
secrets from being disclosed to, acquired by, or used by others without the consent of the person lawfully in 
control of the information in a manner contrary to honest commercial practices, in so far as: (a) the 
information is secret in the sense that it is not, as a body or in the precise configuration and assem bly of its 
components, generally known among or readily accessible to persons that normally deal with the kind of 
information in question; (b) the information has actual or potential commercial value because it is secret; 
and (c) the person lawfully in control of the information has taken reasonable steps under the circumstances 
to keep it secret 
95 NAFT A, art. 1711.5, it states as follows: If a Party requires, as a condition for approving the marketing 
of pharmaceutical or agricultural chemical products that utilize new chemical entities, the submission of 
undisclosed test or other data necessary to determine whether the use of such products is safe and effective, 
the Party shall protect against disclosure of the data of persons making such submissions, where the 
origination of such data involves considerable effort, except where the disclosure is necessary to protect the 
public or unless steps are taken to ensure that the data is protected against unfair commercial use. 
96 
NAFTA, art. 1711.6, it states as follows: "Each Party shall provide that for data subject to paragraph 5 
that are submitted to the Party after the date of entry into force of this Agreement, no person other than the 
person that submitted them may, without the latter's permission, rely on such data in support of an 
application for product approval during a reasonable period of time after their submission. For this purpose, 
a reasonable period shall normally mean not less than five years from the date on which the Party granted 
approval to the person that produced the data for approval to market its product, taking account of the 
nature of the data and the person's efforts and expenditures in producing them. Subject to this provision, 
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drug for marketing by granting a minimum five-year period of exclusivity. This text 
almost duplicates the protection scheme in the Hatch-Waxman Act and follows the US 
model of data exclusivity.97 
Second, it deals with member's obligation of non-reliance. This issue is not settled in the 
TRIPS. The obligation of non-reliance requires that a party may not rely on the original 
registration filed for a drug to approve the subsequent application of the generic drug.98 
Article 1711.6 states ". . . no person other than the person that submitted them may, 
without the latter's permission, rely on such data in support of an application for product 
approval during a reasonable period of time after their submission . . . . ,,99 It clearly 
prevents competitors from relying on the initial registrant's test data during the period of 
exclusivity. 
2. The Public Health Exception 
Basically, Article 39.3 uses the same language of Article 1711.5 ofNAFTA, but NAFTA 
sets up an exception for public health. Article 1711.5 states that the pharmaceutical test 
data can be disclosed when it is necessary to the public. By contrast, Article 39.3 of 
TRIPS does not use the same language; thus, it is not clear that the public health 
there shall be no limitation on any Party to implement abbreviated approval procedures for such products 




Pugatch, supra note 6, at 100. 
99 
See NAFT A, art 1711.6. 
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exception applies in TRIPS. This Issue became more complicated after the Doha 
Declaration of 200 1. 100 
3. NAFTA Creates Obligations on Government and Individual 
The foregoing discussion reveals that Article 39.3 imposes an obligation on governments. 
Article 1711.6 of NAFTA, imposes obligations on governments as well as individuals. It 
requires that the subsequent applicants for marketing approval obtain the permission of 
the first applicant. 
4. Protection of Considerable Effort 
The qualified pharmaceutical test data under Article 39.3 of TRIPS has to satisfy the 
requirement of considerable effort. The meaning of "considerable effort" is not clear. 
Article 1711.5 also used the term "considerable efforts," but Article 1711.6 states that the 
protection should take account of the nature of the data and the person's efforts and 
expenditures in producing data. It seemingly suggests that "considerable effort" refers to 
"person's efforts" and the expenses incurred in producing the data. 
2.3.2 Central America Free Trade Agreement 
The United States-Dominican Republic-Central America Free Trade Agreement (DR-
CAFTA),IOI also called CAFTA, is one in a series of Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) that 
100 
The Doha Declaration discussed in chapter 3. 
101 Dominican Republic-Central America-United States Free Trade Agreement, Aug. 5, 2004, 119 Stat. 
462,43 I.L.M. 514 [hereinafter CAFTA], available at 
http://www.ustr.gov/Trade_Agreements/BilateraIlCAFT A/CAFT A-DR _ Final_Texts/Section _ Index.html 
(last visited Feb. 7,2008). The parties ofCAFTA include Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, 
Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua. 
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the United States has entered into with its neighbors in the Western Hemisphere. In the 
beginning, five of Central America countries, Costa Rica, EI Salvador, Guatemala, 
Honduras, and Nicaragua signed the CAFTA in 2004 and Dominican Republic joined in 
2005. 102 The CAFT A like other trade agreements eliminates tariffs and trade barriers and 
expands regional opportunities for workers, manufacturers, consumers, farmers, ranchers 
and service providers of all signatories. 103 DR-CAFTA deals with several important trade 
topics: market access for goods (agriculture, manufactures, textiles and apparel), trade in 
services and related matters, other disciplines (investment protection, intellectual 
property rights, labor and environment, government procurement, and other provisions), 
and the regional application commitments. 104 
Regarding the protection of intellectual property rights, chapter fifteen of DR-CAFTA on 
intellectual property has two objectives, improving Intellectual Property Rights protection 
and granting firms nondiscriminatory treatment. It ratifies a number of international 
treaties dealing with trademark, patent, satellite television; newly develop plant varieties, 
and other IPR issues. It also establishes the minimum standard for protection of local 
brands, geographical indications, Internet domains, authors' rights, satellite signals, and 
patent. IDS Finally, it requires the signatory countries to apply the procedures and resources 
102 Id. 





. rtIcie 15.1 of CAFTA ratifies or accedes to the following agreements by the date of entry into force of 
thiS Agreement:(a) the WIPO Copyright Treaty (1996); and (b) the WIPO Performances and Phonograms 
Treaty (1996); by January 1,2006: (a) the Patent Cooperation Treaty, as revised and amended (1970); and 
(b) the Budapest Treaty on the International Recognition of the Deposit of Microorganisms for the 
Purposes of Patent Procedure (1980); by January 1,2008: (a) the Convention Relating to the Distribution of 
Programme-Carrying Signals Transmitted by Satellite (1974); and (b) the Trademark Law Treaty (1994). 
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for the enforcement of intellectual property. Article 15.10 of CAFT A specifically 
regulates the pharmaceutical product and favors the pharmaceutical companies; however 
this provision sparked debates on public heath issues because it apparently creates 
. . d" 106 ineqUIty m access to me lCme. 
2.3.2.1 Pharmaceutical Data Protection under CAFT A 
Whereas the protection of pharmaceutical test data is under the title of undisclosed 
information in TRIPS or under the title of trade secrets of NAFTA, 107 the CAFTA 
protected the test data under the title of "Measures Related to Certain Regulated 
Products.,,108 Article 15.10 of CAFTA replaced certain unclear terms in Article 39.3 of 
TRIPS and attempted to establish a more complete regime for the protection of 
pharmaceutical test data than TRIPS. For example, Article 15.1 0.2 integrates this 
protection with patent system and in order to provide a strict protection for 
pharmaceutical products, Article 15.1.1 0 (b) covers the common situations of data 
exclusivity and Article 15.10.1 (b) covers situations where a member permits the third 
Also it requires (a) Each Party shall ratify or accede to the International Convention for the Protection of 
New Varieties of Plants (1991) (UPOV Convention 1991). 1 Nicaragua shall do so by January 1,2010. 
Costa Rica shall do so by June 1,2007. All other Parties shall do so by January 1, 2006.(b) Subparagraph 
(a) shall not apply to any Party that provides effective patent protection for plants by the date of entry into 
force of this Agreement. Such Parties shall make all reasonable efforts to ratify or accede to the UPOV 
Convention 1991. Moreover, it requires each Party shall make all reasonable efforts to ratify or accede to 
the following agreements: (a) the Patent Law Treaty (2000);(b) the Hague Agreement Concerning the 
International Registration ofIndustrial Designs (1999); and( c) the Protocol Relating to the Madrid 
Agreement Concerning the International Registration of Marks (1989). 
106 Rahul Rajkumar, The Central American Free Trade Agreement: An End Run around the Doha 
Declaration on TRIPS and Public Health, 15 Alb. L.J. Sci. & Tech. 433, 438 (2005). See also, Intellectual 
Property Watch, The Domino Effect of US FTAs: Public Health Groups, Members of Congress claim 
CAFTA will choke Access to Medicines, Apr. 4, 2004, available at http://www.ip-
~tch.org/weblog/index.php?p=8&res=1024&print=0 (Last visited on Oct. 8,2008). 
107 
NAFTA, art. 1711. 
108 CA FTA, art. 15.10. 
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party to "submit evidence concerning the safety or efficacy of a product that was 
. I d . h ,,109 prevIOUS y approve m anot er country. 
2.3.2.2 Analysis of Article 15.10 
Article 15.1 0 establishes a comprehensive structure for the protection. It clarifies some 
unclear terms in TRIPS, adopts data exclusivity, and links the marketing approval with 
patent status. Scholars point out that certain measures in CAFT A provide better 
protection for pharmaceutical products than the US domestic law and they predict that 
this agreement would undermine access to the essential medicines. 110 Comparing Article 
15.10 with TRIPS, they are different in several respects: 
1. Data Exclusivity Right under. Article 15.10.1 (a) 
Article 15.10.1(a) involves typical situations Illofdata exclusivity, it states: 
"If a Party requires, as a condition of approving the marketing of a new 
pharmaceutical or agricultural chemical product, the submission of 
undisclosed data concerning safety or efficacy, the Party shall not permit third 
persons, without the consent of the person who provided the information, to 
market a product on the basis of (1) the information, or (2) the approval 
granted to the person who submitted the information for at least five years for 
pharmaceutical products and ten years for agricultural chemical products from 
the date of approval in the Party.,,1J2 
109 CAFTA, art 15 .10.1 (b). 
110 
See Robert Weissman, Dying/or Drugs: How CAFTA will Undermine Access to Essential Medicines, 
Mar. 5 2004, available at http://www.essentialaction.org/access/index.php?/archives/21-Dying-for-Drugs-
How-CAFT A-Will-Undermine-Access-to-Essential-Medicines.html (Last visited on Oct. 8, 2008). 
III 
The typical data exclusivity right occurs where a country grants data exclusivity to the pharmaceutical 
holder, then no approval, without permission of holders, could be granted to any generic company during 
the term of data exclusivity. 
112 
CAFTA, art 15.10.1 (a). 
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It applies in the situation where a party of Central American country reqUIres the 
submission of undisclosed test data as a condition of approving the marketing of a new 
pharmaceutical. In such cases, Article 15.10.1 (a) provides the five-year term of data 
exclusivity from the date of approval of the original medicine in the same countries 
. h .. f h . 1 d 113 WIthout t e permIsSIOn 0 p armaceutlca test ata owners. 
2. Data Exclusivity Right under Article 15.10.1 (b) 
Article 15.1 0.1 (b) deals with the situation where a member permits the third party to 
"submit evidence concerning the safety or efficacy of a product that was previously 
approved in another country.,,114 The underlying issue is whether state's obligation of 
non-reliance exists. In other words, in order to grant marketing approval of a new drug, 
whether a party may permit others to submit the evidence concerning the safety or 
efficacy of a product or it may rely on the original registration test data in a foreign 
113 Carlos M. Correa, Bilateralism in Intellectual Property: Defeating the WTO System for Access to 
Medicines, 36 Case W. Res. 1. Int'I L. 79, 85-86 (2005). 
114 
CAFTA, art. 15.10.1 (b), states as follows: 
If a Party permits, as a condition of approving the marketing of a new pharmaceutical or 
agricultural chemical product, third persons to submit evidence concerning the safety or 
efficacy of a product that was previously approved in another territory, such as evidence of 
prior marketing approval, the Party shall not permit third persons, without the consent of 
the person who previously obtained such approval in the other territory, to obtain 
authorization or to market a product on the basis of (1) evidence of prior marketing 
approval in the other territory, or (2) information concerning safety or efficacy that was 
previously submitted to obtain marketing approval in the other territory, for at least five 
years for pharmaceutical products and ten years for agricultural chemical products from the 
date approval was granted in the Party's territory to the person who received approval in 
the other territory. In order to receive protection under this subparagraph, a Party may 
require that the person providing the information in the other territory seek approval in the 
territory of the Party within five years after obtaining marketing approval in the other 
territory. 
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country. The views about this issue under the TRIPS are split. I 15 One scholar argues that 
TRIPS only requires Members to protect test data against disclosure. 116 Another opinion 
favors a test data owner, it argues that the government has non-reliance obligation.
ll7 
Article 15.1 0.1 (b) takes the later position. It favors to the pharmaceutical companies, 
because it prohibits the use of test data submitted to a foreign authority as well as relying 
h · I' fi . 118 on t e pnor approva III a orelgn country. 
Another two issues in Article 15.10.1 (b): the first issue is whether a generic company 
may register a generic medicine within the five years instead of marketing it, 119 and the 
second issue is whether a test data owner loses their protection if they do not follow 
Article 15.1.1 0 (b) to provide "the information." 
Regarding whether a genenc company may register medicine during the exclusivity 
period, there are two opinions. One scholar argues that Article 15.10.1 (b) strictly 
prohibits marketing approval grounds on reliance of previously approved test data. 120 The 
other view is that Article 15.10.1(b) did not restrict the registering of generic product, 
115 
See Pugatch, supra note 6, at 114. 
116 
See Correa, supra note 44, at 76. 
117 
Jayasharee Watal, Intellectual Property Rights in the WTO and Developing Countries ch. 2 (2001); 
Reichman, supra note 30, at144; Correa, supra note 38, at 84. 
118 R 'k aJ umar, supra note 106, at 465. 
119 
Scholars make a distinction between the process of registering a generic drug and the actual marketing. 
See Pugatch, supra note 6, at 114. 
120 
Pugatch, supra note 6, at 114. 
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because it only restricts two acts, obtaining authorization and marketing a prodUCt. 121 
According to the later opinion, if the generic company did not market the product, it is 
permissible to register the product during the exclusive period. 
CAFT A is not clear with respect to the second issue where health authority does not 
obtain "the formation" said in Article 15.1.1 0 (b). According to Article 15.1.1 0 (b), a 
party may require the person providing the "information in the other territory to seek 
approval in the party territory within five years after obtaining marketing approval in 
other territories." This measure considers the reality of enforcement, because a party, 
which not the previous territory of granting making approval, may not have sufficient 
information to determine whether the submissions of the test data by subsequent generic 
companies are subject to the protection of test data. However, Article 15.1.1 0 (b) state 
would owners lose protection, if they did not provide information. 
3. Waiting period 
According to Article 1711.7 of NAFT A, "When a Party relies on a marketing approval 
granted by another Party, the reasonable period of exclusive use of the date submitted in 
connections with obtaining the approval relied on shall begin with the data of the first 
marketing approval relied on.,,122 In other words, under NAFTA, the data protection 
period would begin with the date of marketing approval of the original country. Thus, the 
faster owners register their product in other country after obtaining a marketing approval 
of the US FDA, the longer exclusivity period owners will receive in other countries. 
121 Id. 
122 
Pugatch, supra note 6, at 114. 
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However, due to delay of approving procedure in reference country, pharmaceutical 
company practically does not receive any data exclusivity protection. 123 To avoid this 
disadvantage, CAFT A breaks the data exclusivity linkage between reference country and 
the original granting country. 124 However, this arrangement creates problems. 
If the exclusive period did not link the original granting country, the exclusive period in 
the reference country would begin at the date of making approval in the reference 
country. The problems corne when the test data owners delay the application for 
marketing approval of its product until the last day of exclusive period; then the data 
exclusivity would extend to ten years from the first date of marketing approval of the 
original country. 125 Commentators suggest the cap of data exclusivity or a waiting period 
should be established in this scenario in order not to improperly undermine the access to 
essential medicine. 126 
The concept of waiting period is coming form limiting the possibility that the originator 
pharmaceutical company delay the application for marketing approval of its product but 




Correa, supra note 38, at 89. 
126 
ld, at 94. 
127 
ld, at 89. 
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months to one year. 128 Because the CAFTA does not set a waiting period, then holders of 
test data may unfairly extend their exclusive period as high as 10 years.129 
4. Definition of a New Product 
The product qualified for the protection of test data under Article 39.3 of TRlPS must 
satisfy the criteria of new chemical entity. The term of "new chemical entity" is not 
defined under TRlPS; thus Members may have their interpretations. l3O Article 15.1.10 (c) 
131 0therwise provides a clear definition of "new product," it sates that "a new product is 
one that does not contain a chemical entity that has been previously approved in the 
territory of the Party." This definition is narrower in that, the new chemical is entity not 
previously approved in the same jurisdiction. Likewise, a product previously approved in 
a foreign county would still be new for that Party until that party approved it, though it 
was registered many years after its first marketing approval. 132 
5. Public Health Exception 
Similar to Article 1711.5 of NAFTA, Article 15.1.10 (d) provides an exception for states 
when the undisclosed information is necessary to the public. It states, " ... each Party 
128 
Jd, at 94. 
129 
Jd, at 89. 
130 
The more detailed discussed in 2.1.2.2. 
131 
CAFTA, art. 15.1.10 (c) states: 
For purposes of this paragraph, a new product is one that does not contain a chemical entity that has been 
previously approved in the territory of the Party. 
132 
Correa, supra note 113, at 87. 
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shall protect such undisclosed information against disclosure except where necessary to 
protect the public, and no Party may consider information accessible within the public 
domain as undisclosed data . . . ." The details of the public heath exception will be 
discussed on the later chapter. 
6. Acting on Behalf of Party 
Generally speaking, in order to obtain the marketing approval, a pharmaceutical company 
is required to submit the test data to the national health agency. However, it is not clear 
whether Article 39.3 applies if the national health agency delegates the duty of reviewing 
the test data to institutions, research groups, and other governmental agencies review the 
submission test data. 133 In this instance, the theory of agency should apply and delegation 
should not discharge the principal's obligation, because there is an apparent or implied 
authority, reviewing agency acting on behalf of government, and reviewing the test data 
within the scope of employment. 
CAFTA otherwise introduced the concept of agency into Article 15.1 0.1 (d), it sates 
"Notwithstanding the foregoing, if any undisclosed information 
concerning safety and efficacy submitted to a Party, or an entity acting 
on behalf of a Party, for purposes of obtaining marketing approval is 
disclosed by such entity, the Party is still required to protect such 
information from unfair commercial use in the manner set forth in this 
Article." 134 
133 Sk'! . 
1 !mgton et a!., supra note 42, at 23. 
134 CAF TA, art. 15.10.2 Cd). 
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It requires a party to protect undisclosed information when she receives this information. 
In addition, if a party delegates the duty to other entities, such as institution, research, a 
party is still required to protect undisclosed information. The party cannot discharge her 
duty to protect undisclosed information, because those entities are acting on behalf of the 
party. 
7. The Patent Protection Measures under Article 15.10.2 
In addition to data exclusivity, CAFTA provides more protections for patented 
pharmaceutical products than TRIPS. Article 15.1 0.2 directly links the drug registration 
to patent status. 135 This linkage includes two aspects: first, Article 15.10.2 (a) explicitly 
restricts the approval of generic product for use on the basis of reliance during the terms 
of patent of the original product; second, Article 15.1 0.2 (b) requires the party to inform a 
patent owner, if claiming the approved product or its approved use is identified as a 
patented product. 
Article 15.10.2 (b) is similar measure to the US law. Under the United Sates Law, the 
FDA should inform the patent owner if claiming the approved product or its approved use 
135 CAFTA, art. 15.10.2, provides:"Where a Party permits, as a condition of approving the marketing of a 
pharmaceutical product, persons, other than the person originally submitting safety or efficacy information, 
to rely on evidence or information concerning the safety and efficacy of a product that was previously 
approved, such as evidence of prior marketing approval in the territory of a Party or in another country, that 
Party: (a) shall implement measures in its marketing approval process to prevent such other persons from 
marketing a product covered by a patent claiming the previously approved product or its approved use 
during the term of that patent, unless by consent or acquiescence of the patent owner; and (b) shall provide 
that the patent owner shall be informed of the request and the identity of any such other person who 
requests approval to enter the market during the term of a patent identified as claiming the approved 
product or its approved use." 
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is identified as a patented product. 136 However, a patent owner is still necessary to bring a 
suit to claim their right if the patent owners want to claim right or found infringements. 137 
In practice, almost all countries separate the patent application and drug marketing 
approval procedures. J38 In such cases, the patent office deals with the patent application 
and health authority deals with the drug approval, because their objectives and 
procedures are different. These two new measures under Article 15.1 0.2 linked these two 
systems together, but this kind linkage is not inconsistent with the current practice of 
patent and marketing approval process. 139 However, difficulties in enforcement still arise 
in new systems. 
One of these difficulties, as commentators have pointed out is that Article 15.10 .2 (a) 
would make the marketing approval decision by regulatory authorities rely on the will of 
the patent owner. 140 Therefore, the term of data protection would be effectively extended 
136 See The Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C § 355 (c) (3). 
137 Id. 
138According to Rossi, he pointed out states provides the health regulations to guarantee the safety, efficacy, 
and quality of products to consumers and the intellectual property regulations to secure the personal 
economic interests. Therefore, in many countries, the health regulations are totally independent of 
intellectual property regulations. Rossi, F., Free trade agreements and TRIPS-plus measures, lInt. 1. 
Intellectual Property Management 150, 158, also available at 
h..ttp:l/inderscience.metapress.com/medialS70cqnvywI7g74nm8eeq/contributions/a/e/2/w/ae2wygk40Sr27v 
m.e.pdf (Last visited on October 10, 2008). 
139 
Frederick M. Abbott, Intellectual Property Provisions of Bilateral and Regional Trade Agreements in 
Light of u.s. Federal Law 11, International Center for Trade and Sustainable Development Issue Paper No. 
12 (2006). 
140 
Pedro Proffe & Christoph Spennemann, The Impact of FTAs on Public Health Policies and TRIPS 
Flexibilities, lInt. 1. Intellectual Property Management 7S, 84 (2006), available at 
http://ictsd.net/downloads/2008/08/roffe-spennemann.pdf (Last visited on October 3, 2008). 
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to the full term of a patent. 141 Another difficulty is that 15.10.2 creates extra burdens for 
health authorities to determine the validity of patents. They question the capability of the 
health authorities in developing countries to do patent reviews, a task traditionally done 
by patent offices. 142 Further, even though health authority did make a decision that the 
claiming approved product infringed the patent product, the patent office would not 
bound by health authority opinions. 143 The patent owners still need to take action to 
protect their right. However, the opinion regarding the patent infringement made by the 
health authority is enough to undermine the market entry of generic drugs and would 
prohibit the issuing of compulsory licenses. 
The controversy spouses Article 15.10.2 is that it would negate a CAFTA country's 
ability to grant a compulsory license, 144 because during period of valid patent the health 
authority cannot grant any marketing approval without the permission of patent owner. 145 
This restriction on compulsory license is likely to violate Article 27.1 of TRIPS. Some 
members of Congress, NGOs and expert saw the impact of US Free Agreements (FTAs) 
on the access to medicine and made efforts to change US FT As model language since 
2001.14~ In 2007, the USTR adjusted the trade policy and input the public health concern 
141 Id. 
142 
Abbott, supra note 139, at 1l. 
143 Id. 
144 Maria Victira Stout, Crossing the TRIPs Nondiscrimination Line: How CAFT A Pharmaceutical Patent 
Provision Violate TRIPS Article 27.1, 14 B.UJ. Sci. & Tech. L. 177, 195-196. 
145 Id. 
146 
GAO 2007 Report, supra note 21, at 3-4. 
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into the model template of US FTAs. 147 Following section would examme the 
transformation of US FT AS. 
2.4 Evolution of Data Exclusivity under the Bilateral Agreements 
Given that TRIPS does not follow the US and EU approach to protect test data, the data 
exclusivity still survives in most FTAs agreements after 2000.
148 
After the US failed to 
insert the data exclusivity into the TRIPS, it becomes one of the priority issues when the 
USTRs negotiate FTAs with her partners, such as Malaysia, Thailand, and five nations of 
the African Southern Customs Union (SACU).149 The USTR uses US FT As to expand 
protection standards and provide a higher protection than TRIPS.
150 
As early as 2001, experts, NGOs and human rights advocates pointed that US FTAs 
provide a higher standard of intellectual property than TRIPS and adopt some measures, 
which undermine the access to essential medicine in the developing countries.
151 
With 
respect to the protection of test data, commentators argued that most of bilateral FT AS 
adopt some measures that had not been adopted in Article 39.3 of TRIPS. These 
measures can be summarized in: 
147 See section 2.4.3. 
148 Although EU also signed agreements with developing countries, but this studying is only focus the US 
and other developing countries agreements. See US-Singapore FTA art. 16.8 and US-Australia FT A art. 
17.10.1. 
149 Charles T. Collins-Chase, Comment: The Case against TRIPS-PLUS Protection in Developing 
Countries Facing AIDAS Epidemics, 29 U. Pa. 1. Int'l L 763, 799-780 (2008). See also, Hamed EI-Said & 
Mphammed El-Said, TRIPs, Bilateralism, Multilateralism & Implications for Developing Countries: Jordan 
Drug Sector, 2 Manchester J. Int'l Econ. L. 59, 59 (2005). 
150 L' lew Woon Yin, Intellectual Property Rights in US-Singapore Free Trade Agreement: Highlights and 
Insights 123, 125, (Koh, Tommy eds., 2004). 
151 
GAO 2007 Report, supra note 21,38-39. 
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(1) FTAs negate the flexibility in TRIPS by granting five years oftest data 
protection. 
(2) FTAs require the health authority to give a notice to the patent holder. 
(3) FTAs link the marketing approval to patent status. 
(4) FT As mandatory extend terms of patent in case of unreasonable delays in 
regulatory approval. 152 
It is obvious the USTR through bilateral agreement, the US get more protection for 
pharmaceutical product than TRIPS and even NAFT A. However, these favorable 
measures to patent owners are perpetual; they compromise the right of access to 
medicine. In 2007, the US government revised US FTA model language and affirmed the 
public health concern in new version of FTAS. Reviewing those bilateral FTAS signed 
from 2000-2007 would shed some lights on the ongoing development process of data 
exclusivity. 
2.4.1The First Generation FTA provision - US-Jordan FTA 
The Jordan Free Trade Agreement (US-Jordan FTA),153 singed in October 24, 2000, is 
the US first FTA with an Arab state. US expected that Jordan FTA could build a 
corporate scheme for Jordan's neighbors. 154 The Jordan FTA dealt with significant and 
152 Id. 
153 . 
Agreement on the EstablIshment ofa Free Trade Area, U.S.-Jordan, Oct. 24, 2000, 41 I.L.M. 63, 70 
(entered into force Dec. 17,2001) [hereinafter US-Jordan FTA], also available at 
!D:vw.ustr.gov/assets/Trade Agreements/[3ilateraliJordaniasset upload file2S0 SI12.pdf. 
154 . 
White House Office of Press Secretary, Overview U.S.-Jordan Free Trade Agreement (FTA), on Sep. 
29,2001, available at http://www.whitchollsc.gov/ncws/rcleascs/2001/09f700109/ 8-12.html. (Last Visited 
On October 10, 200S) 
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extensive trade issues, including all tariff and non-tariff barriers to bilateral trade in 
virtually all industrial goods and agricultural products within ten years. 155 
Regarding the protection of intellectual property, US-Jordan FTA restated that Jordan is 
obligated to WTO's obligations, such as providing the protection of intellectual property 
rights under TRIPS. The Jordan FTA incorporates the international standards for 
copyright protection, 156 ratifies and implements the World Intellectual Property 
Organization's (WIPO) Copyright Treaty and WIPO Performances and Phonograms 
Treaty. 
With respect to the test data protection, US-Jordan FTA does not adopt US model; 
instead it reproduced the text of Article 39.3 of TRIPS for the protection of test data. 
Article 4.22 of Jordan FTA sates 
"Pursuant to Article 39.3 of TRIPS, each Party, when requiring, as a condition 
of approving the marketing of pharmaceutical or of agricultural chemical 
products that utilize new chemical entities, the submission of undisclosed test 
or other data, or evidence of approval in another country, the origination of 
which involves a considerable effort, shall protect such information against 
unfair commercial use. In addition, each Party shall protect such information 
against disclosure, except where necessary to protect the public or unless 
steps are taken to ensure that the information is protected against unfair 
commercial use. IS7 
Generally speaking, Article 4.22 remains the flexibility of TRIPS and leaves a room to 
Jordan to determine what the terms of protection it should adopt, whether it should notify 
patent holder when the claiming approved product is identical to the patented product, 
ISS Id. 
IS6 Wh· lte House Office of Press Secretary, supra note 154. 
157 
US-Jordan FTA, art. 4.22. 
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and whether a marketing approval should be linked to patent status. Article 4.22 may also 
be classified as the first generation provision of FT A for the protection of test data, 
because the text is similar to Article 39.3 of TRIPS. 
2.4.2 Second Generation FT A provision 
FTAs, signed between 2003 and 2007, can be classified as the second-generation 
provision of FT A for the protection of test data. They take a favorable approach to 
pharmaceutical patent holders and they provide the protection of test data beyond the 
scope of TRIPS, which critics also called those provisions as "TRIPS-plus" 
provisions. 158 FT As at this period were not identical, but they include some common 
features, such as the requirement of notifying patent holders, making approval linking to 
patent status and mandatory extensions in case of unreasonable delays in regulatory 
approval. Some argue that those common features negate the flexibility of TRIPS. These 
common features include the examples for this period US-Chile FTA, 159 US-Singapore 
FTA,160 US-Australian FTA,161 US-Morocco FTA I62 
158 TRIPS sets a minimum standards agreement, but it does allow for a greater level of protection, which is 
referred to as "TRIPS-plus" protection. TRIPS-plus protection allows developed countries, through their 
disparate bargaining power, to force greater IP protections upon developing countries, and to 
simultaneously decide when to apply Most Favor Nation principles to extend this TRIPS-Plus protection to 
the countries that would actually benefit from the higher standards. See, Brian Cimboli, The Impact of 
Regional Trade Areas on International Intellectual Property Rights, 48 IDEA 53, 56 (2007). 
159 U . . . 
nIted States-Chile Free Trade Agreement, June 6, 2003, 42 I.L.M. 1026, available at 




nIted States--Singapore Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Sing., May 6, 2003 [hereinafter US-Singapore 
FTA], available at http://www.ustr.gov/Trade_ 
Agreements/B i lateral/Singapore _ FT A/Final_ Texts/Section_Index .htm I . 
161 
U.S.-Austl. Free Trade Agreement, May 18, 2004, 118 Stat. 919 [hereinafter US-Australian FTA]. 
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2.4.2.1 The US-Chile FT A 
The US-Chile FTA (Chile FTA) was effective on January 1, 2004. 163 It is the first free 
trade agreement between the United States and a South American country. It provides the 
protection of intellectual property under chapter seventeen of the US-Chile FT A. Chapter 
seventeen deals with certain IP regulations, sets certain standards of protection, and 
builds on the foundations established in TRIPS. In addition, it affirms the rights and 
obligations set forth in TRIPS Agreement. 164 
Article 17.10 of the US-Chile FT A protected the test data under the title of "certain 
regulated product." This article is important in two aspects: namely, granting data 
exclusivity, and patent linkage measures. 
With respect to the protection of test data, Article 17.1 0.1 grants the five years exclusive 
right to data owners; it states: 
"If a Party requires the submission of undisclosed information concerning the 
safety and efficacy of a pharmaceutical or agricultural chemical product 
which utilizes a new chemical entity, which product has not been previously 
approved, to grant a marketing approval or sanitary permit for such product, 
the Party shall not permit third parties not having the consent of the person 
providing the information to market a product based on this new chemical 
entity, on the basis of the approval granted to the party submitting such 
information. A Party shall maintain this prohibition for a period of at least 
five years from the date of approval for a pharmaceutical product and ten 
162 US-Morocco United States-Morocco Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Morocco [hereinafter US-Morocco 
FTA], June 15,2004,44 I.L.M. 544, available at http://w\vw.ustr.govlTrade 
~ements/Bilateral/Morocco FTA/Flnal Text/Section Index.htm!. 
163 U . 
nlted States-Chile Free Trade Agreement Implementation Act, Pub. L. No.1 08-77, 117 Stat. 909, 911 
(2003); Office of the United States Trade Representative, Economic benefit to Chile of FTA, available at 
hnvJ/www.llstr.gov!assets!Trade AgreementsIBilateral!Chile PTA/asset upload me 198 13333.pdf (last 
visited on October 19,2008) 
164 
US-Chile FT A, ch. 17, preamble. 
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years from the date of approval for an agricultural chemical product. Each 
Party shall protect such information against disclosure except where necessary 
to protect the public.,,165 
In TRIPS and NAFTA, the protection of test data is under the title of undisclosed 
information and trade secrets. By contrast, the protection of test data is under the title of 
"Measures Related to Certain Regulated Products". 166 This change did not extend the 
scope of protection under Article 17.1 0.1. US-Chile FT A still protected test data that is 
qualified as "undisclosed information. Chile FT A representatives perceived this is an 
important accomplishment in negotiations because the US original proposals suggested 
any information should be protected regardless of disclosure. 167 Another accomplishment 
is that US-Chile FT A only applies in the case where the pharmaceutical product utilizes a 
new chemical entity. Chile representatives reject the US proposals dealt with any 
pharmaceutical product regardless of whether or not it utilized a new chemical product. 
Regarding the patent linkage, Article 17.10.2 imposes other three obligations in relation 
to the protection oftest data, it states 
"With respect to pharmaceutical products that are subject to a patent, each 
Party shall:(a) make available an extension of the patent term to compensate 
the patent owner for unreasonable curtailment of the patent term as a result of 
the marketing approval process;(b) make available to the patent owner the 
identity of any third party requesting marketing approval effective during the 
term of the patent; and(c) not grant marketing approval to any third party prior 
to the expiration of the patent term, unless by consent or acquiescence of the 
165 US . -ChIle FT A, art. 17.10.1. 
166 US . -Chile FT A, art. 17. 10. 
167 
Pedro Roffe, Bilateral Agreement and a TRIPS-plus World: the Chile -US Free Trade Agreement, 
Canada Quaker International Affair Programme 24, 2004. 
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patent owner.,,168 
First, Article 17.10.2 ( a) of the US-Chile FT A provides an extension of the patent term to 
compensate the patent owners for unreasonable curtailment. Second, Article 17.1 0 .2(b) 
requires government to have a mechanism that patent owner can identify any third party 
who requests the marketing approval. Third, Article 17.1 0.2 (c) links marketing approval 
with patent status. Some commentators argued these linkages create controversy 
regarding negating the flexibility of TRIPS and license curtailment. 169 Other optimistic 
commentator say it does not explicitly state that the party cannot grant the marketing 
approval relied on the test data which the originator apply the marketing approval in 
another country.l70 
2.4.2.2 US-Singapore FT A 
The U.S. has a substantial economic stake in Singapore to enter a free trade agreement 
(US-Singapore FT A), because Singapore is a member of ASEAN, 171 and it is the second 
largest Asian investor in the U. S., after Japan. 172 For the US, Singapore FTA can serve 
as a template in its negotiations with other Asian countries and economies. For the 
Singapore, this Agreement would secure tariff entry to the U.S. market and also secure 
168 US . -ChIle FTA, art. 17.10.2. 
169 
Roffe, supra note 167, at 26. 
170 
See Pugatch, Table 7.4 Data exclusivity formulas in US-led Free Trade Agreements, supra note 6, at 
123. However, US-Chile FTA did not deal with the issue whether the application in other country, so it is 
unlikely to explain in the same way as the US-Singapore FT A. 
171 
KOH, TOMMY, The USSFTA: A Personal Perspective, in US-Singapore Free Trade Agreement: 
Highlights and Insights 3,8 (2004).With two-way trade of nearly $168.5 billion in 2006, the lO-member 
ASEAN group already is the U.S.' fifth largest trading partner collectively. 
172 Id. 
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the most important source of technology and know-how for Singapore. Therefore, to 
benefit each other and build a close relation between them, they sign free trade agreement 
in 2003. 173 
Before singing the FT A, Singapore as a member of the WTO is obligated by TRIPS, 
therefore it has an obligation to provide the minimum protection for the test data based on 
Article 39.3 of TRIPS. 174 However, US-Singapore FTA incorporated TRIPS-plus 
measures and provided more protections for pharmaceutical test data than TRIPS. With 
respect to the protection oftest data, Article 16.8 of US-Singapore FTA protected the test 
data under the title of regulated product not undisclosed information, extended the scope 
of Article 39.3 and linked the patent status with the marketing approval procedure. 
Article 16.8 includes four paragraphs dealing with the protection of test data and related 
protections and also deals with two issues, data exclusivity and patent linkage. 
The data exclusivity is incorporated into Article 16.8.1, it states: 
173 
" If a Party requires the submission of information concerning the safety and 
efficacy of a pharmaceutical or agricultural chemical product prior to 
permitting the marketing of such product, the Party shall not permit third 
parties not having the consent of the party providing the information to 
market the same or a similar product on the basis of the approval granted to 
the party submitting such information for a period of at least five years from 
the date of approval for a pharmaceutical product and ten years from the date 
of approval for an agricultural chemical product.,,175 
World of Information, Singapore Business Intelligence Report 5 (2005). 
174 y' 
In, supra note 165, at 125. 
175 
US-Singapore FTA, art. 16.8.1. 
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There are two different points from TRIPS in this Article. First, Article 16.8.1 protected 
the test data if it is "information" regardless whether it was disclosed or not. 176 This is a 
higher standard than TRIPS, because Article 39.3 only protected the "undisclosed 
information." Second, Article 16.8.1 granted a five-year term of data exclusivity. Those 
protections are similar schemes to Article 1711 of NAFTA. Article 16.8.1 provides a 
protection in the first approving country, which is similar to Article 39.3 of the TRIPS. 
The Article 16.8.2 otherwise extended the exclusive protection of test data beyond the 
national territories of the parties involved. It states: 
"If a Party provides a means of granting approval to market a product 
specified in paragraph 1 on the basis of the grant of an approval for marketing 
of the same or similar product in another country, the Party shall defer the 
date of any such approval to third parties not having the consent of the party 
providing the information in the other country for at least five years from the 
date of approval for a pharmaceutical product and ten years from the date of 
approval for an agricultural chemical product in the territory of the Party or in 
the other country, whichever is later.,,177 
Under this Article, a domestic health authority cannot grant marketing approval based on 
foreign approvals at least five years after a pharmaceutical product has been approved for 
the data originator in the foreign countries or domestically. This would happen even if the 
applicant cannot obtain the permission of data originator in other countries. That is to say, 
the data originator once has received marketing approval anywhere or even in a country 
not a party of FT A, she still gets the protection in a party of the FT A. 178 The views 
regarding the restrictions of health authority reliance on prior foreign approval are split. 
176 
Roffe et aI., supra note 140, at 83. 
177 
US-Singapore FTA, art 16.8.2. 
178 
Roffe et at., supra note 140, at 83. 
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Some argue that the scope is not clear and subject to interpretations,179 others perceive 
that the restriction only prevents recognition of foreign marketing approval decision. 18o 
Article 16.8.3 clarifies that data exclusivity is a different right from the patent right, 
which is not clear in TRIPS. 181 It states "Where a product is subject to a system of 
marketing approval ... and is also subject to a patent in the territory of that Party .... ,,182 
It takes a position that the protection of test data can exist even when a pharmaceutical 
product is not patented. That is to say, the generic company is not able to get marketing 
approval for its product unless it generates its own test data or waits until the exclusivity 
period if the patent has expired. 
Regarding the linkage with patent, Article 16.8.4 provides three favorable measures for 
patent holders, which are similar to the CAFT A and US-Chile FT A. It states: 
179 
180 
" With respect to any pharmaceutical product that is subject to a patent: (a) 
each Party shall make available an extension of the patent term to compensate 
the patent owner for unreasonable curtailment of the patent term as a result of 
the marketing approval process;(b) the Party shall provide that the patent 
owner shall be notified of the identity of any third party requesting marketing 
approval effective during the term of the patent; and( c) the Party shall not 
grant marketing approval to any third party prior to the expiration of the 
patent term, unless by consent or with the acquiescence of the patent 
owner.,,183 
Pugatch, supra note 6, at 123. 
Roffe et at., supra note 140, at 83. 
181 Robert Galantucci, Note: Data Protection in a US-Malaysia Free Trade Agreement: New Barriers to 
Market Access for Generic Manufacturers, 17 Fordham Intel!. Prop. Media & Ent. LJ. 1083, 1096-1097 
(2007). 
182US . 
-Smgapore FTA, art. 16.8.3. 
183 Us . 
-Smgapore FTA, art. 16.8.4. 
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First, Article 16.8.4 ( a) requires mandatory extension of patent term due to the delay of 
marketing approval. Second, Article16.8.4 (b) requires health authority to notify the 
patent holders. Third, Article 16.8.4(c) links the marketing approval process with patent 
status. Like CAFT A, there are two criticisms regarding these linkages: one is related to 
the compulsory licenses, 184 the other is related to the practice of marketing approval 
procedures. 185 The discussions of these two issues are the same as in CAFT A. 
2.4.2.3 The US-Morocco FT A 
The US-Morocco signed FTA on June 2004,186 provides lengthy paragraphs for the 
protection of test data. Like the Singapore and Chile FT A, the Morocco FT A 
distinguishes the protection from trade secrets and provides the protection under the title 
of measures related to certain regulated and grants exclusivity right for pharmaceutical 
product of five years from the date of original approval. This FT A like the other second 
generation of FT As adopts some measures to ensure the benefit of patent holders, such as 
an extension of patens term, 187 linking the marketing approval with patent status, 188 
notice of patent owner. 189 The US-Morocco FTA also includes two important 
modifications, which are different from other second generations of FT A agreement, 
providing the definition of new product, and protection of new clinical information. 
184 
Stout, supra note 144, 195-196. 
185 
ld, at 195-197. 
186 
US-Morocco FTA. 
187 US -Morocco FTA, art. 15.10.3. 
188 1d. 
189 
US-Morocco FTA, art. 15.1004. 
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1. Definition of New Product 
Article 39.3 of TRIPS provides the protection of pharmaceutical chemical product, which 
utilizes new chemical entities, but it does not explain what the "new chemical entities are. 
Article 15.10 clarifies this sentence, it protects a "new pharmaceutical chemical entities", 
and it further explains, "a new product is one that contains a new chemical entity that has 
not been previously approved in the Party's territory.,,190 
2. The Protection of New Clinical Information 
Regarding the scope of protection, Article 15.2 of US-Morocco FT A gives the protection 
of safety and efficacy as well as new clinical test data. 191 The three years protection for 
new clinical is a new type of protection, which is not available in the former FT As, 
TRIPS and NAFTA. l92 
3. Measures Favor Patent Owners 
Unlike second generation FT As, the linkage between marketing approval and patent 
status in the US-Morocco Agreement is inconspicuous. In most of the second generation 
PT As, marketing approval requires the consent of the patent owner if the approved 
190 
US-Morocco FT A, art. 15.10. 
191 If a Party requires the submission of new clinical information that is essential to the approval of a 
pharmaceutical product (other than information related to bioequivalency), or (b) evidence of prior 
approval of the product in another territory that requires such new information, the Party shall not permit 
third persons not having the consent of the person providing the information to market a pharmaceutical 
?roduct on the basis of such new information or the approval granted to the person submitting such 
IUformation for at least three years from the date of approval in the Party. A Party may limit such protection 
to new clinical information the origination of which involves considerable effort. 
192 
Scafidi, supra note 62, at 349-350. 
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product is identical to the patented product. However, the text of Article 15.1 0.4
193 
is not 
clear as to whether the marketing approval is up to the will of patent owners. It requires 
parties to implement measures in its marketing approval process to prevent such other 
persons from marketing a product covered by a patent during the term of that patent, 
unless the patent owner consented or acquiesced. 194 Thus, if the patent owner does not 
take any actions to protect her rights, then marketing approval can be granted to a third 
party. 
Meanwhile, it is not clear what "measures in its marketing approval process" to prevent 
from marketing approval are. One commentator suggests this measure should include the 
notifying the patent owner under Article 15.1 0 .4 (b) and a court injunction relief. 195 
2.4.2.3 The US-Australian FTA 
The US-Australian FTA was completed and signed on May 18,2004.
196 
At the time the 
FTA was signed, Australia's pharmaceutical sector far exceeds most of the developing 
countries, and it had the fifteenth largest economy. Surprisingly, the US did not propose 
193 US-Morocco FTA, art. 15.1004, provides: "With respect to any pharmaceutical product that is subject to 
a patent, and where a Party permits authorizations to be granted or applications to be made to market a 
pharmaceutical product based on information previously submitted concerning the safety and efficacy of a 
product, including evidence of prior marketing approval by persons other than the person that previously 
submitted such information, that Party: (a) shall implement measures in its marketing approval process to 
prevent such other persons from marketing a product covered by a patent during the term of that patent, 
unless by consent or with the acquiescence of the patent owner, and (b) if it allows applications 15 to be 
made to market a product during the term of a patent covering that product, shall provide that the patent 
owner shall be notified of the identity of any such other person who requests marketing approval to enter 
the market during the term of a patent notified to or identified by the approving authority as covering that 
product." 
194 US -Morocco FTA, art. 15.1004. 
195 
Abbott, supra note 139, at 11. 
196 
U.S.-Austl. Free Trade Agreement, May 18,2004,118 Stat. 919 [hereinafter US-Australian FTA]. 
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favorable terms to Australia. 197 Instead, the US-Australian FTA prOVlSlon for the 
protection of test data embodies the same features as most of the second generations 
FT As. 198 Moreover, it provides a new protection for the test data which are submitted for 
certain new uses of the same product; that is, the qualified product for the protection is 
not limited to the new product and it can be the new uses of the precedent approved 
d 199 pro uct. 
The protection of test data is established under the title of "measures related to certain 
regulated products." Like other second generation FTAs for protection of test data, it 
embodies three distinguished features different from TRIPS. These are: 
(1) extension of patent term for the compensation of marketing approval 
procedure;200 
(2) favorable measures for patent holders;201 and 
(3) the linkages between marketing approval and patent status.202 
When those provisions incorporated into the Australian Law,203 they raise concerns 
regarding the access to medicine as to whether the Australian Health Authority is capable 
of reviewing the patent claims.204 
197 Charles T. Collins-Chase, Comment: The Case against TRIPS-Plus Protection in Developing Countries 
Facing AIDS Epidemic, 29 U. Pa. J. Int'L. 763, 793-796 (2008). 
198 
US-Australian FTA, art. 17.10. 
199 
US-Australian FTA, art. 17.10.1(d). 
200 
US-Australian FTA, art. 17.9. 
201 US . 
-A ustrahan FT A, art. 17.10.4. 
202 US . -Austrahan FTA, art. 17.10.4. 
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2.4.3 The Third Generation FT A Provision 
The favored measures for patent holders are not ideal to enforce in reality and they raises 
concerns of violations of TRIPS 27.1. 205 Consequently, the US Congress moved to 
modify the template of FT A provisions in relation to the protection of test data in 2007.206 
The modifications somehow ameliorate some of Article 27.1 of TRIPS problems and also 
affirm the Doha Declarations 2003 waivers.207 Those changes will affect the future US 
FT As but they would not affect ratified agreements because they were no retroactive 
effect clauses. The updated FT A may be named as the third generation of FT A for the 
protection of test data. Those agreements deal with controversial issues presented in the 
second generation of FTA provisions. 208 US-Peru FTA,209 US-Panama FTA 210 are 
203 Bryan Mercurio, International Law Weekend-West: Panel Presentation: The Impact of the Australia-
United States Free Trade Agreement on the Provision of Health Services in Australia, 26 Whittier L. Rev. 
1051, 1090-1092 (2005). 
204 Idat 1091-1092. 
205 S tout, supra note 144, at 198. 
206 Id. 
207 World Trade Organization, Ministerial Declaration of 14 November 2001, WT/MIN(01)/DEC/2, 41 
I.L.M. 746 (2002), available at www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/minOI_e/mindecUrips_e.htm 
[hereinafter the Doha Declaration]. Also, Decision by the General Council for TRIPS, Implementation of 
Paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, WT/L/540 (Aug. 30, 
2003), available at www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/implem-IJara6_e.htm. 
208 Brook K. Baker, Ending Drug Registration Apartheid: Taming Data Exclusivity and Patent! Registration 
Linkage, 34 Am. J. L. and Med. 303, 337-341 (2008). 
209 U . 
ntted States-Peru Trade Promotion Agreement, U.S.-Peru, art. 16.10.2, Dec. 14,2007, available at 
wwW.ustr.gov/assets/Trade_Agreements/BiiateraI/Peru_ TP A/Final_ Texts/asset_upload _ file3 92 _9546.pdf 
[hereinafter U.S.-Peru FTA] 
210 • 
Untted States-Panama Trade Promotion Agreement, U.S.-Pan., art. 15.10.2, Dec. 19,2007, available at 
www.ustr.gov/assets/Trade_Agreements/BilateraI/Panama _FT A/Final_ Text!asset_ upload_file 131_1 0350.p 
df[hereinafter U.S.-Panama FTA] 
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examples for this new revision of FTAs. Taking US-Peru FTA as an example, there are 
certain unique features: 
1. Distinctions between Pharmaceutical Products and Non-Pharmaceutical Products in 
Patent Extensions. 
The third generation now provides that a party must adjust the term of a non-
pharmaceutical patent to compensate for umeasonable delays that occur in granting the 
patent. 211 However, a party has discretion to adjust the term of a pharmaceutical product 
patent to compensate for umeasonable delays in granting patents. In other words, the 
mandatory extension of patent term is no longer shown in those FT A. 
2. Waiting Period is Six Months 
The waiting period limits the possibility when the originator pharmaceutical company 
delays the application for marketing approval of its product but still restricts others from 
marketing. This concept has been disused for a period of time, but it has not been 
incorporated into the FT A model until 2007. It comes from the result of the new reform 
of the US trade policy. Under Article 16.10.2 (c) of the US-Peru Agreement, it was first 
2lJ 
US-Peru FTA, art. 16.lO. 
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in time to limit the waiting period within six months.212 This limitation encourages data 
holders for early registration to avoid abridging of data exclusive period.213 
3. Public Health Waiver 
Article 16.10.2 (e) recognizes 214 exceptions to data exclusivity that would allow 
registrations of a follow-on product to meet the public health needs. Article 16.1 0.2 (e) (i) 
provides an exception to the data exclusivity obligations for the measures to protect 
public health in accordance with the Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health 
and other TRIPS amendments. It implies that Doha Declaration can justify overriding a 
data exclusivity claim.215 The Doha Declaration explicitly recognizes that: "Each member 
has the right to grant compulsory licenses and the freedom to determine the grounds upon 
which such licenses are granted." 
4. Definition of Chemical Entity 
212 US-Peru FTA, art. 16.10.2 (c) provides: "Where a Party relies on a marketing approval granted by the 
other Party, and grants approval within six months of the filing of a complete application for marketing 
approval filed in the Party, the reasonable period of exclusive use of the data submitted in connection with 
obtaining the approval relied on shall begin with the date of the first marketing approval relied on." 
213 
Baker, supra note 208, at 338-339. 
214 US-Peru FTA, art. 16.10.2 (e) provides: "Notwithstanding subparagraphs (a), (b), and (c), a Party may 
take measures to protect public health in accordance with:(i) the Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and 
Public Health (WT/MIN(01)/DEC/2) (the "Declaration");(ii) any waiver of any provision of the TRIPS 
Agreement granted by WTO Members in accordance with the WTO Agreement to implement the 
~eclaration and in force between the Parties; and (iii) any amendment of the TRIPS Agreement to 
unplement the Declaration that enters into force with respect to the Parties." 
215 
Center for Policy Analysis on Trade and Health, New Peru Trade Text: Improvements for Access to 
MedicinesThreats to Public Health Remain, on July 5, 2007, available at 
http://www . cpath. org/ site buildercontentl sitebuilderfiles/perurevisedcpathcomm ent7 -5 -07 . pdf. 
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The new Agreement limits the application of data exclusivity to "new chemical 
entities,"(16.l0.2(a)), meaning it can only be applied to truly innovative drugs, and not to 
those that simply entail minor modifications to already known substances. 
5. Data Exclusivity and Scope 
It protects only "undisclosed data" that is the result of "considerable effort." Other 
versions have allowed originator companies to hold up access even to "information" 
already in the public domain and that required little investment in order to block approval 
for generics. The data exclusivity period is limited to 5 years, not "at least" 5 years.216 
6. The Patent Linkage 
If Peru grants marketing approval to an originator company within six months of filing, 
based on prior approval in the U.S., the data exclusivity period begins with the date of 
approval in the US (16.10.2.(c)).there would be no link between the marketing approval 
and patent status. Although Article 16.10.4 still provides some measures to link patent, 
but those mechanism would not negate the ability of health authority to grant marketing 
approval. 
216 
Letter from Jim Mcdemott, Member of Congress, Access to Life-Saving Medicine: Real Changes in the 
Peru FTA 
h!m!/way'sandmeans. house. gOY Imcd ia/pdfi 1 1 O/peru%20 fta%20matcriaisO;\)20and%20news/PER U 0;\)2 0 FT A 
~MEDICINES.pdr (Last visited on October 23,2008) 
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Those pharmaceutical related provisions of the US-Peru FTA provide a balance between 
fostering drug innovation and ensuring access to affordable medicine. Although they are 
not perfect, but at least this is a right direction toward the access to medicine.217 
2.5 Municipal Law 
The example in this section deals with some countries which have not adopted the US 
model of data exclusivity or have granted less protection than that of the US's model for 
the protection of test data. Those countries encounter extreme economic threats from the 
US and are listed on the US Special 301 of 2008 Report. 218 The USTR warned them to 
adopt the strong data exclusivity approach, but they argued that the flexibility of TRIPS 
gave them a room to decide in which way to protect the test data. 
2.5.1 The Case of India 
As a member of WTO, India was required to implement the obligation of TRIPS. Under 
the US economical pressure, India reformed the Indian Patent Act of 1970 in 2005.219 
The 2005 of amendment provides for product patent for foods, biotechnology products, 
chemical and medicines. However, the US and the EU still complained that India has not 
come into full compliance with all TRIPS obligations, such as the Data Exclusivity. In 
2004, the Indian government referred those patent law complaints to an expert group to 
217Letter form Henry Waxman, Member of Congress, on November 5, 2007, available at 
http://wavsandmeans.house.gov!media/pdflI I 0!perl.l%20fta%20materials%20and%20news!Peru<% ')0 FTA % 
fQ--%20MedicinesO/020DC%')OWaxman.pdf(Last visited on October 23,2008) 
218 Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America [hereinafter PhRMA], Special 301 Submission 
2008 [hereinafter 2008 Special 2008 Report], Febuary 11,2008, 
http://www.ustr.gov/assets/Trade _ SectorslIntellectuatProperty/Special_ 30 I_Public_Submissions _ 2008/as 
set_upload_file 109 _I4495.pdf. 
219 
The Patents (Amendment) Act, 2005, effected on March 31, 2005 available at 
h1!p://www.indiacodc.nic.in (Last visited on October 26, 2008). 
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make an overall analysis and propose recommendations in the same year. The committee 
made the report public in July 2007 and suggested a three-year period of data exclusivity. 
220 However, the Indian health authority did not accept this recommendation and refused 
granting data exclusivity. 
The Indian health authority made a public statement and insisted that the protection of 
test data should still remain in the field of trade secrets.221 Thus, it is not necessary to 
grant the data exclusivity in India, because they thought it is enough to protect test data 
under the trade secret. Obviously, this opinion has a great impact on the generic medicine 
market since India import more medicine and occupies great global market. It is also 
affirmed that the data exclusivity is not the only way to protect the test data. 
2.5.2 The Case of Israel 
Israel owned the biggest generic multinational pharmaceutical company in the world, but 
she did not grant data exclusivity to pharmaceutical companies after it signed the TRIPS. 
For a long time, the multinational research-based pharmaceutical industries complained 
that Israel generic pharmaceutical companies caused them to lose considerable profits, 
because new pharmaceutical products registered in Israel were immediately exposed to 
generic competitions?22 The absence of data exclusivity legislation in Israel became one 
of major disputes between Israel and her trading partners. 
220 
Satwant Reddy & Gurdial Singh Sandhu, Report on Steps to be taken by Government of India in the 
Context of Data Protection Provisions of Article 39.3 of TRIPS Agreement on May 21 2007. 
221 • 
Mamsh Singh Nair, India: Ministries Say Yes To Data Protection, Lex Orbis, September 152007. 
available at http://www.mondaq.com/article.asp?articleid=523 16&login=true&newsub=1 . 
222 
Pugath, supra note 6, at 125. 
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In 2004, responding to an ongoing pressure from the EU and the US, Israel proposed a 
bill that introduced legislation for protecting the research data of innovative drug 
makers?23 This bill, enacted on March 2005, provides for a five year period of protection 
for new chemical entities under Article 47 of the Pharmacists Ordinance new subsection 
D (2), nevertheless this legislation does not meet the expectations of the European 
Commissions and the US. They had two reservations with respect to the new legislations. 
First, they argued that Israel does not provide absolute "five-year" period of data 
exclusivity. According to Article 47 D (2), it provides a type of protection where the 
health authority may rely on the test data to register generic products during the 
exclusivity period. It only secures protection against disclosure of data but allows 
reliance. Further, 47D (b) (2) of the Pharmacist Ordinance provides five years exclusivity 
from the day of product registration in Israel, or five and a half years of exclusivity from 
the day of the earliest registration in any of the 'Recognized Countries,224, whichever is 
shorter. That is to say, the five years period of protection, will commence upon the earlier 
registration of the pharmaceutical product in either Israel or a "recognized country" by 
Israel. In addition, the protection period will come. to an end as soon as a generic 
substitute to the original drug is marketed in one of the recognized countries (this latter 
condition appears to be abolished). That is to say when the process of marketing approval 
has been delayed, the real data exclusivity in Israel would be less than five years, since 
ill . 
Market Access Database, Lack of Data Exc/usivity:Isreal, latest update on July 22, 2008, aVaIlable at 
lmr1:/lmkaccdb.eu.int/madb barriers/barriers details.htm?barrier 1d=050004&version=8 (Last visited on 
October 23, 2008) 
224 
A "recognized country" includes the EU Member States, the United States, Canada, Norway, 
SWitzerland, Iceland, Japan, Australia and New Zealand, as defined in the Israeli Pharmacist Regulations -
Pharmaceutical Products - 1986) 
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the data exclusivity would expire at last day of 5.5 years from the first day of making 
approval in any recognized countries. As a result, US and other European Countries 
argued that Israel cuts marketing exclusivity less than five years, if the marketing 
approval is delayed in Israel. 
Second, USTR also complained that the Israel Pharmacist Ordinance offers no protection 
for new indications (new uses of existing drugs), while the legislations in the U.S. and in 
the EU provide three years and one year, respectively, and the US provides exclusivity 
for new presentations and or dosage forms. 225 
Regarding the first observation, the USTR, according to the new trade policy of 2007, 
may change their opinions regarding the viewpoint of data exclusivity.226 New bilateral 
Agreements such as the US-Peru FTA set some limitations on data exclusivity 
provisions. 
2.5.3 Other Cases 
According to Special 301 227 submission 2008228, there are still many countries do not 
provide data exclusivity legislations for the protection of test data, such as Indonesia, 
225 2008 Special 301 Report, supra note 208, at . 
226 
GAO 2007 Report, supra note 21. 
227 
Special 301 is originated from President Reagan signed into law the Omnibus Trade and 
Competitiveness Act of 1988 (the "1988 Trade Act") on August 23,1988. Special 301, is designed to use 
the credible threat of unilateral retaliation by the United States to "persuade" trading partners to reform 
currently deficient intellectual property practices. See Judith H. Bello & Alan F. Holmer, "Special 301 ": 
Its Requirements, Implementation, and Significance, 13 Fordham Int'l LJ. 259 (1989-1990). See also, 
Office of United States Trade Representatives, Background on Special 301, 
http://www.ustr.gov/assets/Document_ Library/Reports ]ublications/2007 12007 _ Special_30 1_ Review/asse 
tUPload_file694_11120.pdf 
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Brazil, Algeria, Lebanon, Pakistan, Turkey, Thailand and most of African countries. 
Other countries provide the protection of test data but PhRMA complained that those 
protections are not sufficient for the protection of test data. 
For example, PhRMA complained that Thailand government provided a weak protection 
of test data. To implement the obligation of Article 39.3 of TRIPS, the Thai Parliament 
passed a Trade Secret Act in 2002?29 However, like India, Thai government protected the 
test data from disclosure but it did not provide a data exclusivity to exclude the use or 
reliance on test data for the approval of generic drug. 
In the case of China, Regulation of the Drug Administration Law and the Drug 
Registration Regulation did establish a six-year period of protection for test data. 
However, PhRMA still complained that weak enforcement of implementation of law of 
data exclusivity. They also complained that China's regulatory procedures still permit the 
State Food and Drug Administration (SFDA) to grant marketing approval to products that 
have previously been outside of China. Besides, through the interpretation of SFDA, 
PhRMA complained that there is no data exclusivity if originators are not the first 
application of new drug in China.23o 
Other complaints include that States do not link the marketing approval process with the 
patent status, or do not provide the protection of certain pharmaceutical test data due to 
the absence of clear definition of "new chemical." 
228 
2008 Special 2008 Report, supra note 230. 
229 
Id, at 37. 
230 
2008 Special Report, supra note 240, at 49-54. 
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2.6 Conclusion 
Article 39.3 of TRIPS establishes the concept of test data, and recognizes that test data 
should be protected as undisclosed information. However, it does not specify how to 
protect it. Through states practice, the protection of pharmaceutical test data can be 
classified into two forms: trade secrets and data exclusivity. The protection of test data 
under the law of trade secrets includes states such as India, Thailand and most of WTO 
members. The data exclusivity has developed in three major models. The first model of 
data exclusivity simply grants five years of exclusivity. Apparently, the US, NAFTA 
members, Jordan, Israel, and Taiwan are the states that exemplify this model. The second 
model of protection not only provides the basic form of data exclusivity but also links the 
marketing approval with patent status. This model also extends the scope of protected 
product by giving a definition of pharmaceutical that favors the patent owners. Those 
who have adopted the third model are Singapore, Australia, and Morocco. The third data 
exclusivity model is 2007 reforms of US-FTAs, such as US-Peru FT A. These three 
models, indeed comply with requirement of Article 39.3 of TRIPS even though they 
follow different approach for the protection of test data. 
India is important manufacturer in the global generic drug market. Thus, the US and other 
ED countries are concerned as to how India provides the protection for pharmaceutical 
products. Opposed to providing the protection of pharmaceutical products prior to 
TRIPS, India passed an act to grant the pharmaceutical patent to comply with the 
requirements of TRIPS in 2005. The Congress of India however declared that they would 
protect the pharmaceutical test data through the law of trade secrets. They explained that 
.. their actions satisfy the requirement of TRIPS. The US and the EU argued that India 
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violated Article 39.3 of TRIPS, but they have not taken up their case to the WTO. This 
the most basic form of protection of test data in India. India also would not spend other 
expenses to provide the protection and the pharmaceutical holder must meet the 
requirements of trade secrets in order to obtain the protection. 
The first model, which includes the US, Canada, Mexico and early signatory countries of 
US FTA, grants a five-year exclusionary right. While the time of protection may vary, in 
general it is in line with the US policy and law. They grant a period of data exclusivity by 
cloning the US model. This model provides two exclusive rights to ensure the protection 
of pharmaceutical products: patent and data exclusivity. This form is designed to grant 
the data exclusivity to keep the generic drugs out of the market for a period of time. This 
triggers the question of why another exclusive right should be granted to the patented 
pharmaceutical product. The answer to this question depends on what philosophy of 
protection a state follow and what are the economic underpinnings that result from 
following such a philosophy. 
The second data exclusivity model includes the members of CAFTA, and recent US-FTA 
signatory countries (signed 2000-2007). They grant the data exclusivity and moreover 
they link the marketing approval with patent status. Those bilateral and regional 
agreements also have the same problems like the second model. In particular, the 
protection of this group concerning favorable terms for the protection of patented 
pharmaceutical products creates more questions than the second model. First, this 
protection blocks the possibilities of granting the compulsory license and has been proved 
to violate Article 27.1 of TRIPS. Second, this protection raises the concern of violation of 
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human right laws by blocking the possibilities of entry to genenc drug without 
exceptions. Third, this protection imposes heavy burdens on health authorities to review 
the patent claims during the approval process. From the pharmaceutical inventors' 
perspective, this model provides more measures to protect the pharmaceutical product. 
From the other perspectives, it is not the sound way of the protection of pharmaceutical 
test data because it raises two important concerns: the capability of health agency and the 
possibility of violation to human rights law. 
The third data exclusivity model, such as that of the US-Peru FT A, basically incorporates 
parts of Doha Decorations and recognized the waivers of public health. To some degree, 
it is a response to human right law concerns. This model, although revives parole's hope 
of balancing the protections of pharmaceuticals and the right to medicine, it is too early to 
predict its effect. 
Among these three models it is notable that countries are attempting to balance their 
interests. It is a dilemma. Those countries have to promote new inventions but also they 
have to provide medicines. Granting the data exclusivity means the emergence of a new 
type of intellectual property, and it can promote the research and development of new 
drugs. Nevertheless as explained above, it is certain that this new IP scheme would 
impede the right to medicine. 
The protection of pharmaceutical test data cannot be apart from the human rights. This is 
the stand of the WHO and public health experts. They both agree that TRIPS does not 
mandate an exclusive protection. Indeed certain kind of protection is needed; however, 
this protection must be balanced against the right to medicine. This protection must also 
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reflect the true value of the intellectual efforts that were put to develop the particular 
drug. In conclusion, the human rights concerns must be taken into account whenever a 
system for the protection of any data is designed. At the end it is only logical to say 
because all things must be considered from their beneficial use to human beings, such 
view must be followed. 
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3 The Waivers of Protection of Pharmaceutical Data 
3.1 Introduction 
In 2006 the WHO reported that around 2 billion persons, one-third of the global 
population, do not have regular access to essential medicines. In Africa and lowest-
income countries in Asia; an estimated more than half of the population lacks access to 
essential medicines. 1 There are an estimated 40 million persons infected with HIV / AIDS 
in developing countries, where only 300,000 of the 5-6 million persons in need of 
treatment could acquire life-saving antiretroviral medicines (ARVs)? The WHO has 
declared this crisis to be a global health emergency and established strategies to expand 
access to medicine in these countries. 3 
A report published jointly by the WHO Regional Office for Africa and HAl-Africa, based 
on a survey conducted in 11 countries found that prices of brand names of medicines 
found in private sector outlets were to be as much as 7 times higher than the prices of 
their generic equivalents.4 Similar finding was also reported in the synthetic report, 
published in 2007. In Uganda, a country plagued with public health crises, the original 
1 WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, WHO MEDICINES STRATEGY: 2004-2007 (hereinafter WHO Medicine 
Strategy 2004-2007), available at http://whqlibdoc.who.intlhq/2004/WHO EDM 2004.5.pdf. 
2 
Id, at 2-3. 
3WHO, Fact sheets: The 3 by 5 Initiative, December 2003, available at 
http://www.who.intlmediacentre/factsheets/2003/fs274/en (last visited Dec. 2,2008) 
4 
WHo, Regional Committee for the Eastern Mediterranean, Technical discussion on Medicine prices and 
access to medicines in the Eastern Mediterranean Region, Forty- Fourth Session, Agenda item 5 (a), at page 






brand of Atenolol5 is about 13 times the price of the generic.6 Even in the US, the average 
price of a brand name prescription drug was $96.01, compared to $28.74 for the generic 
version.7 The facts also show, even in developed countries, that expense on public health 
100 times more than developing countries, still considerable numbers of persons cannot 
afford their needs. 8 In the US alone, it was reported in 2005 over 14 million patient with 
chronic diseases cannot afford their prescription drugs.9 
High price of brand name drugs drives customers to seek cheaper generic medicines in 
the US. This shows that opening up the access to generic medicines is not only an issue in 
developing countries rather it is a global issue. 10 No doubt TRIPS exacerbates this 
problem, because of its impacts on the import, export, and manufacturing of generic 
medicines in the territories of the WHO members. ll Naturally, this crisis flamed the 
debates concerning the compatibility of the protection of pharmaceuticals and the right to 
access medicine. To be more specific, it is true that TRIPS as it stands today incorporates 
certain measures pertinent to public health, exceptions and flexibilities for 
5 Atenolol is a medicine used to treat cardiovascular diseases and conditions such as hypertension, coronary 
heart disease, arrhythmias, angina and to reduce the risk of heart complications following myocardial 
infarction (heart attack). htJp:!len.wikipedia.org/wikiiAtenolol. (last visited Dec. 2, 2008). 
6 WHO, Measuring Medicine Prices, Availability, Affordability and Price Components, 2008, page 4. 
hnp://wwvi.who.int/medicincs/areas/acccssiOMS Medicine prices.pdf (last visited Dec. 2, 2008). 
7 Michelle Meadows, Saving Money on Prescription Drugs, FDA Consumer magazine September-October 
2005 Issue, http://www.fda.gov/fdac/featuresI2005/505_save.htm!. ( last visited December 2,2008). 
8 WHo medicines strategy 2004-2007, supra note 1. 
9 
Marie C. Reed, An Update on Americans' Access to Prescription Drugs Issue Brief No. 95, May 2005, 
h!m://www.hschange.org/CONTENT/738/ (last visited Dec. 2, 2008). 
10 
WHO medicines strategy 2004-2007, supra note 1, at 2. 
11 
Chaudhuri, Sudip, The WTO and India's Pharmaceuticals Industry: Patent Protection, TRIPS, and 






implementation of intellectual properties, yet, ambiguities of provisions made these 
measures inoperative in practice. 12 Consequently, developing countries that are most 
often affected by public health crises, when they issued compulsory licenses to increase 
access to medicines under the public health exception-which is legal under TRIPS, these 
states were taken to courts by other members. 
After feeling the heat, arising from the debate concerning medicine, and also recognizing 
the need to make TRIPS flexibilities worthwhile, the WTO members come up with the 
Doha Declarations. The Doha Declarations addressed, at least in papers, the issue of 
developing and least developing countries with respect to access to medicines. 13 It 
assumed these countries that TRIPS would not interfere with access to medicines. 
Meanwhile, since Doha Declaration was seen as only an inspiration, the need for 
practical step was urgent. To do this, it came the 2003 Cancun meeting. 14 One of major 
outcomes of the Cancun meeting was the creation of new compulsory license scheme. 
With this new compulsory license scheme, people living in the less fortunate countries 
supposed to be capable to afford medicines. In 2005, WTO members approved the 2003 
Decision regarding paragraph 6 to be an amendment to TRIPS and inserted a new 
provision, Article 31 bis. 15 The 2005 Amendment has significant impacts on access to 
12 Jessica J. Fayennan, The Spirit of TRIPS and The Importation of Medicines Made Under Compulsory 
License After the August 2003 TRIPS Council Agreement, 25 Nw. J. Int'l L. & Bus. 257, 261 (2004). 
13 WTO, Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, WT/MIN(01)/DEC/2, 41 I.L.M. 755 
(2002) [hereinafter Doha Declaration]. 
14 
General Council, Implementation of Paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and 
Public Health, WT/L/540 (Sept. 1,2003),43 I.L.M. 509 (2004) [hereinafter 2003 Decision]. 
15 
General Council, Amendment of the TRIPS Agreement, WT/L/64 1 (Dec. 8,2005) [hereinafter 2005 
Amendment], available at http://www.wto.org/en!!iish/tratop e/trips ei wtl641 e.htm. (last visited Dec. 2, 
2008). 
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medicines, in some aspects. First, the Amendment clearly represented the interests of 
developing countries; 16 in that it temporally suspended the protection of patent for 
pharmaceuticals under certain conditions. Second, the Amendment represented the first 
comprehensive attempt to reform the compulsory license scheme for developing 
countries that lack manufacturing capacity in international level. Yet, for the Doha 
Declaration, this scheme is not good enough to attain the goal of access to medicines. 17 
One of their concerns was that this scheme leaves out another barrier for access to 
medicines, that is, the protection of pharmaceutical data. IS 
As discussed above, the pharmaceutical companies cannot market a new drug without the 
permission of the local health authority. To gain the permission, the company should 
conduct the costly and time-consuming experiments. 19 In order to promote the developing 
of the new drugs, Article 39.3 of the TRIPS requires that governments provide the 
protection to the pharmaceutical data that are submitted to the health authorities in that 
country. In the post-TRIPS era, the US related regional and bilateral FTAS adopted 
stricter protection measures than TRIPS and this made it impossible to market the generic 
16 Frederick M. Abbott, The WTO Medicines Decision: World Pharmaceutical Trade and the Protection of 
Public Health, 99 AM. 1. INT'L L. 317, 343 (2005). 
17 Amir H. Khoury, The Public Health of the Conventional International Patent Regime and the Ethics of 
"Ethicals:" Access to Patented Medicines, 26 Cardozo Arts & Ent L. 1. 25,37-38, 2008. See also, Brittany 
Whobrey, International Patent Law and Public Health: Analyzing TRIPS' Effect on Access to 
Pharmaceuticals in Developing Countries, 45 Brandeis LJ. 623, 630 (2007). 
18 
Brook K. Baker, Arthritic Flexibilities for Accessing Medicines: Analysis of WTO Action Regarding 
Paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, 14 IND. INT'L & 
COMPo L. REV. 613, 633-72 (2004). 
19 
See T Lynn Riggs, Research and development costs for drugs, The Lancet, January 17, 2004, available at 
h!m:1!www.cptech.orglip/health/rnd/riggsOll72004.html (last visited Dec 2, 2008) 
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medicines even when the compulsory license is issued?O It is no question that these 
restrictions hamper the right to medicines. 
Unlike patent under TRIPS, there are no exceptions and compulsory license schemes in 
the protection of pharmaceutical data. Likewise, there are no such exceptions in the 
regional and most of the bilateral agreements. Lack of clear exceptions for data 
exclusivity in TRIPS is likely to negate the ability of states to issue compulsory license 
and impede the access to medicines. Professor Baker21 predicted this shortcoming and 
indicated the international community's need for establishing exceptions for data 
protections. 
In the previous chapter we discussed the necessity of protection of pharmaceutical data. 
We pointed out that this protection is established through international, regional and 
domestic law. This chapter discusses when states can legally suspend their obligations 
under the international law, or what is called "public health" related exception. Under this 
exception, the state could legally implement the measures to alleviate the emergency if 
that particular state is encountered with a national emergency of public health crisis. In 
addition, in what circumstances the protection of pharmaceutical test data could be set 
aside to ensure access to medicines. 
20 
Baker, supra note 18. 
21 Id. 
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3.2 The Possible Limitations and Waiver of Protection of Pharmaceutical Data 
under the TRIPS Regime 
Patent and data protection are two maj or instruments to protect pharmaceutical products 
under TRIPS. Patent provides the right to exclude third parties from making, using, 
selling, offering for sale, or importing the patented invention for the term of the patent,22 
while the data protection protects commercial efforts against unfair commercial use.23 
The submission of pharmaceutical data is a requirement to obtain marketing approval 
from national health authorities, and this requirement ensures the safety of new drugs.24 
The protection of data provides investors incentives to develop new drugs, even when the 
patent of a chemical has expired or the chemicals are not patentable.25 However, either 
conferring patent right or data protection to some degree would delay the entry of generic 
version of the respective brand drugs. This delay, though inevitable will impede the 
access to affordable medicines, in particular in developing countries. 
The concern that access to medicines would be impeded by the implementation of 
intellectual property laws in the developing countries has been important issue among 
22 Article 28.1 of the TRIPS Agreement reads: 
A patent shall confer on its owner the following exclusive rights: 
(a) where the subject matter ofa patent is a product, to prevent third parties not having the 
owner's consent from the acts of: making, using, offering for sale, selling, or importing (6) 
for these purposes that product; 
(b) where the subject matter of a patent is a process, to prevent third parties not having the 
owner's consent from the act of using the process, and from the acts of: using, offering for 
sale, selling, or importing for these purposes at least the product obtained directly by that 
process. 
23 The elements of Article of 39.3 are discussed in chapter 2. 
24 Carlos M. Correa, Unfair Competition Under the TRIPS Agreement: Protection of Data Submitted for 
the Registration of Pharmaceuticals, 3 Chi. J. Int'l L. 69, 71 (2002) 
25 
Brook K. Baker, Ending Drug Registration Apartheid: Taming Data Exclusivity and Patent/Registration 
Linkage, 34 Am. J. L. and Med. 303, 304-305 (2008). 
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WTO members. As TRIPS by itself reveals,26 its aim is not only to provide the minimum 
standard27 to implement the intellectual property right, but also attempts to make a 
balance with other social policies.28 The right to medicine as one fundamental human 
right should be taken into account when WTO members implement intellectual 
29 property. 
To balance other social interest, TRIPS establishes exceptions to exclude patent under 
Article 7, 8 and 30 and 31. Yet, this seemingly well-designed framework cannot 
guarantee the right to access medicine even though states are under health crises. The 
framework to exclude data protection is even less complete than patent. 30 This will no 
26 The WTO Members have adopted the following instruments on TRIPS and public health: first, Paragraph 
17 of the main Doha Declaration, adopted on 14 November 2001 by the Fourth WTO Ministerial 
Conference, Doha, Qatar; second, Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, adopted on 14 
November 2001 by the Fourth WTO Ministerial Conference, Doha, Qatar; third, Decision on the 
Implementation of Paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, 
adopted by the General Council on 30 August 2003; and Decision on the Amendment of the TRIPS 
Agreement, adopted by the General Council, 6 December 2005; avail at 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratope/tripse/pharmpatente.htm#declaration (last visited Dec 2, 2008). 
27 Article 1.1 of the TRIPS Agreement reads: 
Members shall give effect to the provisions of this Agreement. Members may, but shall not 
be obliged to, implement in their law more extensive protection than is required by this 
Agreement, provided that such protection does not contravene the provisions of this 
Agreement. Members shall be free to determine the appropriate method of implementing 
the provisions of this Agreement within their own legal system and practice. 
28 A . I rtlC e 7 of the TRIPS Agreement reads: 
29 
30 
The protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights should contribute to the 
promotion of technological innovation and to the transfer and dissemination of technology, 
to the mutual advantage of producers and users of technological knowledge and in a 
manner conducive to social and economic welfare, and to a balance of rights and 
obligations. 
Carvalho, Nuno Pires de., The TRIPS Regime of Patent Rights 121 (Kluwer Law International ed., 2002). 
Baker, supra note 25, at 315-316. 
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doubt delays the entry of generic drugs and keep the essential medicine at unaffordable 
price. 
The default exceptions to suspend the protection of test data are established under Article 
39.3, which requires two grounds to exclude the protection of pharmaceutical data, under 
each of which, the protection of pharmaceutical could be set aside. The first ground, the 
suspension must be "necessary to protect public"; the second, uses must be fair and non-
commercial. Perhaps, a general exception that permits states to take measures to protect 
public health; this could be considered the third exception.3 ! The TRIPS regime of 
compulsory license could provide the fourth ground to exclude the protection of 
pharmaceutical test data. 
Opinions are split as to how these four exceptions are applied to resolve the issue of 
access of medicines. Human Right advocates support that those exceptions should be 
used broadly for cases of emergency or public health, 32 while international 
pharmaceutical compames and the developed countries argue that those exceptions 
should be applied strictly and limited to certain situations.33 These disagreements, indeed, 
are the result of the broader question of how to harmonize the right to health with TRIPS. 
31 See infra text 3.2.2 State Right to Public Health in TRIPS. 
32 The case of Brazil presents how difficult a state to use public health ground to suspend the states 
responsibilities .. 
33 
See Special 301 Public Submission 2008 by Pharmaceutical Research and Manufactures of American, 
http://www.ustr.gov/assets/Trade _ Sectors/Intellectual_Property/Speciat30 I_Public_Submissions _ 2008/as 
set_upload_file 109 _14495.pdf 
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Since TRIPS was adopted, pertinent provisions, later amendment, as well as decisions 
concerning the public health have been made. Still, in the global level, WTO members 
encounter the difficulties in implementing effective measures to access medicines. One 
reason is resulting from the ambiguities of the TRIPS text. Another reason comes from 
the rigid application of the exceptions. This rigidity, indeed, makes it difficult to apply 
the public health exceptions. 
3.2.1 The Limitations of Article 39 
Until today, no jurisprudence or decision of a competent WTO body, or international 
tribunal concerning the application of article 39.3 is elaborated. 34 Yet this should not be a 
problem because TRIPS, as an international treaty, its provisions should be interpreted in 
accordance with the customary rules of interpretation of public international law and their 
codified versions in Articles 31 35 and 3236 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of 
34 WTO, WTO ANALYTICAL INDEX: TRIPS, art. 39.3, also available at 
http:/\vww.\vto.org/english/res e!booksp e/analytic index e/trips 03 e.htmflmticle39 (last visited Dec 2, 
200S) 
35 Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties concluded at Vienna on May 23, 1969 (UN 
Doc A/Conf/39/2S) (hereinafter designed as "Vienna Convention") reads: 
1. A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be 
given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose. 
2. The context for the purpose of the interpretation ofa treaty shall comprise, in addition to 
the text, including its preamble and annexes: 
(a) any agreement relating to the treaty which was made between all the parties in 
conn ex ion with the conclusion of the treaty; 
(b) any instrument which was made by one or more parties in connexxion with the 
conclusion of the treaty and accepted by the other parties as an instrument related to the 
treaty. 
3. There shall be taken into account, together with the context: 
(a) any subsequent agreement between the parties regarding the 
interpretation of the treaty or the application of its provisions; 
(b) any subsequent practice in the application of the treaty which establishes the agreement 
ofthe parties regarding its interpretation; 
(c) any relevant rules ofintemationallaw applicable in the relations between the parties. 
4. A special meaning shall be given to a term if it is established that the parties so intended. 
36 Article 32 of the Vienna Convention (Supplementary Means ofInterpretation) reads: 
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Treaties. 37 The sub-paragraph Sea) of 2001 Doha Declaration on TRIPS and Public 
Health reiterates the principles of interpreting an international treaty. It states: 
"In applying the customary rules of interpretation of public international law, 
each provision of the TRIPS Agreement shall be read in the light of the object 
and purpose of the Agreement as expressed, in particular, in its objectives and 
principles.,,38 
In accordance with this interpretative guidance, when reading Article 39.3 of the TRIPS, 
those interpretations should take into account the objectives and principles set forth in 
Article 7 and 8 of the TRIPS.39 That is to say, the implementation of data exclusivity 
should be reconciled with other social interests. This indeed includes the right to 
medicines. Moreover, a group paper submitted to Doha meeting by the developing 
countries in 2001 supported such interpretative approach. In this paper, the developing 
countries pointed out that "the protection of intellectual property rights, in particular 
patent protection, should encourage the development of new medicines and the 
Recourse may be had to supplementary means of interpretation, including the preparatory 
work of the treaty and the circumstances of its conclusion, in order to confirm the meaning 
resulting from the application of article 31, or to determine the meaning when the 
interpretation according to article 31: 
(a) leaves the meaning ambiguous or obscure; or 
(b) leads to a result which is manifestly absurd or unreasonable 
37 See Georges Abi-Saab, The Appellate Body and Treaty Interpretation in Giorgio Sacerdoti, Alan 
Yanovich and Jan Bohanes (eds.), The WTO at Ten: The Contribution of the Dispute Settlement System 
(Cambridge University Press, 2006). 
38 The Doha Declaration, paragraph 5 (a). 
39 Paper submitted by a group of developing countries to the TRIPS Council, for the special discussion on 
intellectual property and access to medicines (hereinafter Group Paper), 20 June 2001 pointed out "Each 
provision of the TRIPS Agreement should be read in light of the objectives and principles set forth in 
Articles 7 and 8. The protection of intellectual property rights, in particular patent protection, should 
encourage the development of new medicines and the international transfer of technology to promote the 
development of manufacturing capacities of pharmaceuticals, without restraining policies on access to 
medications." IP/C/W/296 (hereinafter group paper IP/C/W/296), advance copy received 19 June 2001, 
available at http://www.wto.org/english/tratope/TRIPSe/paperdevelopw296e.htm ( Last visited on 
Dec 2,2008) 
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international transfer of technology to promote the development of manufacturing 
capacities of pharmaceuticals, without restraining policies on access to medications.,,4o 
This viewpoint, eventually was accepted by the paragraph 4 of 2001 Doha Declaration,41 
states: 
"We agree that the TRIPS Agreement does not and should not prevent 
members from taking measures to protect public health. Accordingly, while 
reiterating our commitment to the TRIPS Agreement, we affirm that the 
Agreement can and should be interpreted and implemented in a manner 
supportive of WTO members' right to protect public health and, in particular, 
to promote access to medicines for all.,,42 
Applying the logic of paragraph 4 to resolve the ambiguity of TRIPS text, the case of 
data protection, when looked through Article 39.3 provides two express exceptions in 
pharmaceutical test data protection.43 To reach the goal to increase access to medicines; 
these two exceptions should be read in light of the objectives and principles set forth in 
Articles 7 and 8. 
3.2.1.1 Fair Use 
The data protection under Article 39.3 confers a right against "unfairly commercial use" 
on data holder.44 This means that non-commercial fair use (fair use) is not restricted.45 A 
40 
Group Paper IP/C/W/296, supra note 39, at summary paragraph 4. 
41 Susan K. Sell, TRIPS and the Access to Medicines Campaign, 20 Wis. Int'l L.J. 481, 516-517 (2002). 
42 The 2001 Doha Declaration, paragraph 4. 
43 
Carvalho, supra note 29, at 315-316. 
44 
Carcalho, supra note 29, at 272. 
45 With respect to concept of "fairly" "non-commercial use", it is noted that non-commercial use is fair use. 
However, some non-commercial use is not necessary to be a fair use. For example, a misappropriate use for 
non-commercial reason, an act of breaching confidence; cannot be deemed to be a fair use. Moreover, both 
voluntary and non-voluntary licensees are commercial users, but their uses are fair. Therefore, the use is 
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use is either a fair use or unfair commercial use subject to the interpretation of Article 
10bis of the Paris Convention.46 One scholar pointed out any act without breaching of 
confidence would not be deemed "unfair.,,47 He exemplified three types of fair uses: (1) 
an act of state; (2) a voluntary license; and (3) a non-voluntary license. 
In the case of an act of state, a government may contract an institution to verify the 
accuracy and qualities of test data or assign this task to a third party.48 This act is of a 
non-commercial nature and as such it is a fair use. 
A voluntary license is the second type of fair use. This kind of case can occur when the 
repetition of test data in inhumane. In such case, the animal and humans would bear 
suffering during the trials; thus, originators and the subsequent generic manufacturers 
should enter into the voluntary license to authorize the use.49 A noted scholar proposed 
two measures to deal with this situation. 50 He recommended that states should ask the 
holders of test data to enter into a voluntary agreement with the subsequent applicants or 
grant a compulsory license to the subsequent applicants with reasonable compensation. 
Both of these two measures are fair use. 
pennitted if acts are deemed to be fair. The eligible fair uses are permitted regardless of commercial or non-
commercial. 
46 
See supra text 2.2. 
47 
Carvalho, supra note 29, at 272-273. 
48 Id. 
49 Carvalho, supra note 29, at 272-273. Although Carvalho pointed out this is a case of the voluntary 
license, but it is, indeed, likely to be another example of non-voluntary license, because state will not give 
hOlders of pharmaceutical data a chance to say "no" in this situation. 
SOld. 
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The third example is the compulsory licensing of the patent to a third party; this is also 
known as non-voluntary licensing. In such a case, the reliance on the previous data to 
approve that product by the licensee is deemed to be a fair use. Since the third kind of fair 
use relied on the granting of compulsory license, it would raise two same issues arising 
from the issuance of compulsory license.51 One issue is under what circumstances states 
may grant compulsory licenses to use such data. Another issue is as to weather bilateral 
agreements would restrict the use of data even when compulsory license has been issued. 
3.2.1.2 The Situation Is Necessary to Protect Public 
In accordance with an exception set forth in Article 39.3, a state government may 
suspend their responsibility, if the situations that called for such suspension are necessary 
to protect the public. 52 This exception involves the interpretations of two terms: 
"necessary" and "protect public." 
With respect to the term "necessary" under Article 39.3, it would make the application of 
this exception subject to a "necessity test.,,53 The necessary test is "a tool that reflects the 
balance between each country's prerogative to regulate in its own jurisdiction and the 
51 S . '" ee mira text 3.2.2. 
52 
The TRIPS, art. 39.3. 
53 Carlos Correa, Protection o(Data Submitted (or the Registration o(Pharmacellticals: Implementing the 
SLandards o(the Trips Agreement 21,2002, South Centre, also available at 
http://www .who.int/medicinedocs/en/d/Jh3009ac/#Jh3009ac (Last visited on Dec 12,20(8). 
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multilateral interest in progressive liberalization of services trade." 54 Indeed as the WTO 
Secretariat pointed out: 
"These tests reflect the balance in WTO agreements between two important 
goals: preserving the freedom of Members to set and achieve regulatory 
objectives through measures of their own choosing, and discouraging 
Members from adopting or maintaining measures that unduly restrict trade. 
Necessity tests typically achieve this balance by requiring that measures, 
which restrict trade in some way (including by violating obligations of an 
agreement) are permissible only if they are "necessary" to achieve the 
Member's policy objective." 55 
The necessary test only applies when some elements are satisfied. The essential elements 
of the necessity tests which are used in numerous WTO Agreement include the less/least 
trade-restrictiveness, balancing, means--ends test, and comparison between alternatives 
and reasonable availability.56 The necessary test on the specific context of the measures 
in issue should be assessed in different manner from in the WTO agreements. 57 Thus, the 
elements of the necessities are Agreement-specific.58 This further means, the elements of 
the necessity test were specified in the agreement, and as such when a state uses this test, 
it must follow the agreement text. 
54 Panagiotis Delimatsis, Determining the Necessity of Domestic Regulations in Services :The Best Is Yet 
to Come, 19 Eur. 1. Int'l L. 365,401. 
55 WTO Secretariat, Necessity Tests in the WTO', Working Party on Domestic Regulation, S/WPDRlW/27, 
Dec. 2, 2003, p. I. 
56 A measure is 'necessary' or it is less trade-restrictive refers to no reasonably available alternative 
measure could attain the same level of protection as the contested measure, or could fulfil a legitimate 
objective equally satisfactorily with the contested measure. The balancing test will determine whether the 
necessary could be applied. This test would examine that whether two of the three conditions can be 
satisfied. First, the suitability requirement would examine whether the measure is suitable to attain the 
Member's desired objective or the level of protection (causal relationship). Second, it would examine 
Whether the measure is necessary for the achievement of a given objective. See also Delimatsis, supra note 
54. 
57 
Carvalho, supra note 29, at 119-120. 
58 [d. 
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In addition, if governments take measures to protect the public or to suspend 
responsibilities under Article 39.3, those measures are required to comply with four 
elements under Article 8.1 :59 
(1) the measures should be law or regulations; 
(2) the measure should be necessary to protect public health; 
(3) the promotional measures should be vitally important in benefiting the sectors; 
and 
(4) aU measure adopted should be consistent with the provisions of the TRIPS. 
Applying these elements in Article 39.3, measures governments take to exclude the test 
data protection should consider several points. First, states should have law or regulations 
to exclude the pharmaceutical protection. Second, the measure cannot violate the TRIPS. 
Third, the measure to exclude pharmaceutical test is "necessary" to "protect public." 
With respect to the term "protect public," Correa indicated that "public interest' should 
include the promotion of competition and "no impendence of timely entrance of generic" 
competitors to off-patent drugs and promoting greater accessibility of medicines. 60 In this 
regard, the measures to increase access to medicines are deemed to protect public. 
However, measures necessary to expand the accesses to medicines should comply with 
goals and requirements under Article 7 and 8 of the TRIPS. Article 7 demonstrates the 
objectives of TRIPS would not simply protect the holders of intellectual property, but 
59 A . I rtlc e 8.1 of the TRIPS reads 
Members may, in formulating or amending their laws and regulations, adopt measures necessary to protect 
pUblic health and nutrition, and to promote the public interest in sectors of vital importance to their socio-
economic and technological development, provided that such measures are consistent with the provisions 
ofthis Agreement. See also Carvalho, supra note 29, at 119. 
60 
Correa, supra note 53, at Exclusive summary. 
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also seek a balance of users' interests.61 Thus, the enforcement of intellectual property 
should balance other social interests. Article 8 allows states to take measures to protect 
the public, but those measures should be "necessary.,,62 These articles seemingly, provide 
enough room for states to take measures to protect public health and set the enforcement 
of intellectual property aside temporarily, if there is a national emergency or public health 
crisis within the territory. Yet, cases in the late 1990 did not show such inspiring 
outcomes. 
In 1997, the South African government amended the South African Medicines and 
Medical Devices Regulatory Authority Act (Medicine Act). This amendment allowed the 
government to issue a compulsory license to manufacture cheaper generic HIV / AIDS 
drugs or import generic medicine from third countries. 63 The South African was 
immediately subject to lawsuits by multinational pharmaceutical companies because of 
this amendment. 64 
In 1999, the Brazilian President issued a decree that allowed the government to grant a 
compulsory license for non-commercial use, national emergency, or public interest.65 
The Brazilian government used the threats of issuing a compulsory license for the 
61 Hestenneyer, Holger. Human Rights and the WTO: The Case of Patents and Access to Medicines. 
International economic law series 51 (2008). 
62 
The TRIPS, art 8.1. 
63 
Sell, supra note 41, at 501-502. 
64 Kara M. Bombach, Can South Africa Fight AIDS? Reconciling the South African Medicines and Related • 
Substances Act with the TRIPS Agreement, 19 B.U. Int'I LJ. 273. (2001). 
65 
Brazil: Presidential Decree on Compulsory Licenses, available at 
lmJ:t1/www.cptech.org/ipihealth/c/braziI/PresDecree.html(last visited on Jan 8, 2009) 
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:';! 
manufacture of the antiretroviral drugs to negotiate drug prices. 66 The international 
pharmaceutical companies and the USTRs were enraged by such actions and brought a 
WTO case against Brazi1.67 
In these two different circumstances involving South Africa and Brazil, the threats of 
issuance of compulsory licenses by these two countries or allowance of parallel importing 
under the compulsory license to combat national HIV/AIDS crisis, jeopardized the trade 
relations between them and the developed countries.68 Although the lawsuit against South 
Africa and the WTO case against Brazil were finally withdrawn,69 the series of events 
dramatized the economic pressures from the developed countries 70 and the possible legal 
challenging when they take some measures on the ground or reason of public health, or 
access to medicines. These two unsuccessful cases, in fact have weakened the argument 
that TRIPS provides states with flexible way to provide access to medicines. 
In Canada - Pharmaceutical Patents, 71 the EC complained that Canada's two 
pharmaceutical provisions violate its obligations under the TRIPS Agreement. These 
provisions in questions provide two exceptions to exclude patent: (1) regulatory review 
66 August 22, 2001. Statement by Jose Serra, Minister of Health, available at 
h!tp:I/ww\v.cptcch.orgiipihcalth/c/brazil/nclf0822/ 00 I.html (last visited on Jan. 8,2009) 
67 Chaudhuri, Sudip, The WTO and India's Pharmaceuticals Industry: Patent Protection, TRIPS, and 
Developing Countries 101 (2005). 
68 S 'd ee 1 and also Sell, supra note 41, at 501-502. 
69 
The Bureau of National Affairs, Inc., United States Drops WTO Case against Brazil Over HIVIAIDS 
Patent Law (June 26, 2001), also available at http://www.cptech.org/ip/health/c/brazil/bna06262001.html. 
(last visited on Jan. 8, 2009). 
70 
Sell, supra note 41, at 500-501. 
71 
Canada--Patent Protection of Pharmaceutical Products, WT/DSII4/R, 17 March 2000. 
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exception;72 (2) the stockpiling exception.73 The essential issue in this case is whether 
these two exceptions satisfy the requirements under Article 30 of TRIPS, which is 
"limited exceptions to the exclusive rights conferred by a patent.,,74 
The EC complained that both two exceptions violated Article 28 of the TRIPS. The 
Canadian government argued that both two exceptions could be considered to be "limited 
exceptions" under Article 30. The panel agreed that the regulatory review exception 
satisfies the elements of Article 30 but the stockpiling exception did not. The Panel 
further explained that a qualified exception should satisfy three criteria under Article 30: 
(1) the exception must be limited; 
(2) the exception must not 'unreasonably conflict with normal exploitation of the 
patent; 
(3) the exception must not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the 
patent owner. 75 
72 The regulatory review excretion allows potential competitors of a patent owner to use the patented 
invention during the term of the patent in order obtain government marketing approval. It only provides for 
uses reasonably related to the development and submission of information required under any law that 
regulates the manufacture, construction, use or sale ofa product (subsection 55.2(1) of the Patent Act). The 
stockpiling allowed competitors to manufacture and stockpile patented goods during a certain period before 
the patent expires, also available at http://www.international.gc.ca/trade-agreements-accords-
commerciallx/disp-diftfslImmary.aspx?lang=en#WTO (last visited on Jan 8, 2009). 
73 The stockpiling allowed competitors to manufacture and stockpile patented goods during a certain period 
before the patent expires. This exception provides during a limited, prescribed period immediately 
preceding the expiry of the patent, for the manufacture and storage of articles intended for sale after the 
patent expires (subsection 55.2(2) of the Patent Act)., also available at http://www.international.gc.ca/trade-
f\greements-accords-commerciaux/disp-diftlsummary.aspx,?lang=en#WTO (last visited on Jan 8, 2009). 
74 Article 30 of the TRIPS (Exceptions to Rights Conferred) reads: 
Members may provide limited exceptions to the exclusive rights conferred by a patent, provided that such 
exceptions do not unreasonably conflict with a normal exploitation of the patent and do not unreasonably 
prejudice the legitimate interests of the patent owner, taking account of the legitimate interests of third 
parties. 
~ . 
Panel Report on Canada - Pharmaceutical Patents, paras. 7.20-7.21. 
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prior to this case, a general opinion as to Article 30 is that this provision provides for 
very broad exceptions to the patent requirements.76 Thus, developing countries believed 
that they could use this general exception to grant the compulsory licenses to import the 
generic medicines without limitation of Article 31 (£).77 Instead of this broad approach, 
the Panel took a narrow approach to interpret Article 30.78 This restrictive approach 
limited the possibilities that Article 30 could be as an alternate mechanism for 
compulsory licensing. 
The general view point is that if all states recognized the flexibilities in Article 7, 8, 30 
and 31 of the TRIPS, those flexibilities provide enough grounds for states to grant a 
compulsory license in order to manufacture, or import the anti-retro virus medicine for 
people in need of AIDS treatment. Yet, some scholars and developed countries, such as 
EU and US do not support this viewpoint. 79 Indeed the difficulties in implementing the 
TRIPS flexibilities to increase the access to medicines can be attributed to several legal 
reasons. First, TRIPS lacks express languages concerning the overall public health 
issue. 8o Second, there is no operative standard to trigger the exception regarding the 
76 Robert Weissman, A Long, Strange TRIPs: The Pharmaceutical Industry Drive to Harmonize Global 
Intellectual Property Rules, and the Remaining WTO Legal Alternatives Available to Third World 
Countries, 17 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 1069,1081 (1996); Amit Gupta, Patent Rights on Pharmaceutical 
Products and Affordable Drugs: Can TRIPS Provide a Solution?, 2 Buff. Intel!. Prop. LJ. 127, 141 (2004) 
77 Thomas A. Haag, TRIPS Since Doha: How Far Will the WTO Go Toward Modifying the Terms for 
Compulsory Licensing?, 84 J. Pat. & Trademark Off. Soc'y 945 at 950 (2002). 
78 Frederick M Abbott & Jerome H. Reichman, The Doha Round's Public Health Legacy: Strategies for the 
Production and Diffusion of Patented Medicines under the Amended TRIPS Provisions, 10 J. Int'l Econ. L. 
921, 986 (2008) 
79 Canada--Patent Protection of Pharmaceutical Products, WT/DS 114/R, 17 March 2000. 
80 S. 
Isule F. Musungu et ai, Utilizing TRIPS Flexibilities for Public Health Protection through South-South 
Regional Frameworks 2 ( South Center ed., 2004), also available at 
!m.t2.J/www.who.intimcdicincdocs/cn/diJs4968c/#Js4968c (last visited on Jan 8, 2009) 
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public health crisiS.81 Third, many states lack, either entirely or partially, the appropriate 
legal framework to enforce such kind of exceptions.82 The fourth reason, also the most 
important one, is that there are disagreements regarding the legal status of the right to 
health, or the right to medicines in TRIPS.
83 
Nevertheless, the deepening HIV I AIDS crisis and insufficient access to medicines in 
most of developing countries turned WTO members' attitude more positive to engage the 
public health related issue in TRIPS.84 In 2001, WTO Council addressed the issues 
concerning intellectual properties and access to medicine in Doha meeting. They made a 
compulsory license related decision in 200385 and finally amended the TRIPS in 2005.
86 
These three official texts basically attempted to clarify the relationship between 
intellectual properties and public health. They also clarify the ambiguities of the states' 
right to protect public health, and the limitations of this right. 
3.2.2. State's Right to Protect Public Health in TRIPS 
In previous section, the cases discussed proved that the grounds for the exception 
"protecting public health" under the TRIPS are more complicated than the developing 
81 Bradly Condon & Tapen Sinha, Global Diseases, Global Patents and Differential Treatment in WTO 
Law: Criteria for Suspending Patent Obligations in Developing Countries, 26 Nw. 1. INT'L L. & BUS. 1, 
31-40 (2005). 
82 
Musungu et ai, supra note 80, at 24. 
83 Tina S. Bhatt, NOTE: Amending TRIPS: A New Hope for Increased Access to Essential Medicines, 33 
Brooklyn 1. Int'l L. 597, 611-615 (2008) 
84 
Hestermeyer, supra note 63, at 255. 
85 .• 
The 2003 DecIsion, supra note 14. 
86 
The 2005 Amendment, supra note 15. 
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countries have expected. This section discusses how developing countries addressed 
these difficulties in WTO Ministerial Conference and attempted to establish public health 
related exceptions under TRIPS regime in the Doha meeting. 
3.2.2.1 The Emergence of the Declaration 
The developing countries belief that the TRIPS provides sufficient flexibilities for them 
to take measures, in particular the issuing of compulsory licenses. This belief was 
attacked after the 1997 South African case8? and the 1999 Brazilian Case.88 These two 
cases illustrated the risks of lawsuits from multinational pharmaceutical companies and 
the developed countries, when developing countries avail themselves of issuing 
compulsory licenses. Consequently, developing countries, assertively and actively, 
sought official confirmation to avoid dispute settlement procedures when states take 
measures to protect public health. 89 
The anthrax90 case in US magnifies the significance of issue of compulsory license. In 
October 200 1, the US found itself facing an emergency when some postal and media 
workers exposed to anthrax spores in tainted mails. 91 Five people died and seventeen 
people were infected due to this attack. This event raised the fear of bio-terrorism92 in US 
87 See supra text in page 16-17. 
88 Id. 
89 
Bhatt, supra note 83, at 614. 
90 Wikipedia, Anthrax, available at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Anthrax (last visited on Jan. 8,2009). 
91 The 2001 anthrax attacks in the United States occurred beginning on September 18,2001, 
h!m:I/en.wikipedia.org/wikiI200 I anthrax attacks (last visited on Jan. 8,2009). 
92 Us Center of Disease Control defines that "a bioterrorism attack is the deliberate release of viruses, 
bacteria, or other genns (agents) used to cause illness or death in people, animals, or plants. These agents 
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and Canada.93 Immediately, the availability of Ciprofloxacin, the chemical that is used to 
treat anthrax infections, became at issue.94 Without this medicine, if an attack occurred 
such an attack constitutes a threat to national security not just in the US but likely in the 
whole North American Continent. 
As a response to this dire circumstance, the US threatened Bayer, the manufacturer ofthe 
Cipro, that it would issue compulsory licenses to domestic manufacturers if Bayer would 
not lower the price of the Cipro. 95 Eventually, the US did not grant compulsory licenses, 
but this threat had the price of Cipro been cut trough negotiation.96 This event proves 
that, even a country with enormous powers and resources, such as the US, could still 
encounter serious obstacles when issues of public health and national security are at 
stake. This incident is also significant from the perspective that issues of public health 
and national security are not just domestic problems, they have their global dimension. 
are typically found in nature, but it is possible that they could be changed to increase their ability to cause 
disease, make them resistant to current medicines, or to increase their ability to be spread into the 
environment." http://www.bt.cdc.gov/bioterrorism/overview.asp (last visited on Jan. 8,2009). 
93 Canada received numerous threats and around October 25th, 2001 at least 11 Jewish organizations in 
Toronto, Montreal, Ottawa and Windsor received letters purporting to contain anthrax-laced white powder. 
Police seized the letters and dispatched them for analysis. See Robert Shapiro, Patent Infringement During 
a Time of National Emergency: Are Canadian, American and Mexican Governments Permitted to Do So 
under Their Domestic Law, NAFTA and TRIPS; IjSo at What Cost? 18 Windsor Rev. Legal & Soc. Issues 
37, 55-56 (2004). 
94 
Sell, supra note 41, at 515-516. 
95 Ciprofloxacin is a broad-spectrum antibiotic against both Gram-positive and Gram-negative bacteria, 
available at http://www.cipro.com/html/pdtlcipro medguide.pdf(last visited on Jan. 8,2009) 
96 Jill Carroll and Ron Winslow, Bayer to Slash by Nearly Half Price u.s. Paysfor Anthrax Drug, The 
Wall Street Journal on Oct. 25, 200l. 
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On November 14, 2001, the Doha WTO Ministerial Conference adopted the Declaration 
(2001 Declaration) of the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health.97 The Declaration was 
initially proposed by a group of 80 counties, led by the African group, India and Brazi1.98 
These developing countries attempted to affirm an interpretation of TRIPS that would 
shield them from any legal proceedings from other members when they take measure to 
increase access to medicines in their territories. 99 With aggressive diplomacy these 
countries succeeded in making the conference adopt their viewpoints. Eventually, when 
the Declaration came out, in 2001, the state right to protect public health was considered 
huge achievement. 
3.2.2.2 The Right to Protect Public Health and the Declaration 
The Declaration contains seven paragraphs. 100 Paragraph four and five affirm 
interpretations of flexibility of TRIPS; paragraph six requires an action when resolving 
97 The Doha Declaration, supra note 14. 
98 Sell, supra note 41, 516. 
99 Id. 
100 The Doha Declaration reads: 
1. We recognize the gravity of the public health problems afflicting many developing and 
least-developed countries, especially those resulting from HIY/AIDS, tuberculosis, malaria 
and other epidemics. 
2. We stress the need for the WTO Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects ofIntellectual 
Property Rights (TRIPS Agreement) to be part of the wider national and international 
action to address these problems. 
3. We recognize that intellectual property protection is important for the development of 
new medicines. We also recognize the concerns about its effects on prices. 
4. We agree that the TRIPS Agreement does not and should not prevent members from 
taking measures to protect public health. Accordingly, while reiterating our commitment to 
the TRIPS Agreement, we affirm that the Agreement can and should be interpreted and 
implemented in a manner supportive of WTO members' right to protect public health and, 
in particular, to promote access to medicines for all. 
In this connection, we reaffirm the right ofWTO members to use, to the full, the provisions 
in the TRIPS Agreement, which provide flexibility for this purpose. 
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the issue of compulsory license; and paragraph seven provides the extension of 
transitional period for LDS in relation to the protection of pharmaceutical products. 
Indeed, the Declaration does not create any exception for the public health. Instead, it 
reaffirms states right to protect public health and recognizes that this right should not be 
derogated by the intellectual property. The contributions of the Declaration to access to 
medicines can be highlighted as follow: 101 
101 
(1 ) It declares that "the TRIPS Agreement does not and should not prevent 
members from taking measures to protect health." 
(2) It affirms that the Agreement can and should be interpreted and implemented in 
5. Accordingly and in the light of paragraph 4 above, while maintaining our commitments 
in the TRIPS Agreement, we recognize that these flexibilities include: 
In applying the customary rules of interpretation of public intemationallaw, each provision 
of the TRIPS Agreement shall be read in the light of the object and purpose of the 
Agreement as expressed, in particular, in its objectives and principles. 
Each member has the right to grant compulsory licences and the freedom to determine the 
grounds upon which such licences are granted. 
Each member has the right to determine what constitutes a national emergency or other 
circumstances of extreme urgency, it being understood that public health crises, including 
those relating to HlY! AIDS, tuberculosis, malaria and other epidemics, can represent a 
national emergency or other circumstances of extreme urgency. 
The effect of the provisions in the TRIPS Agreement that are relevant to the exhaustion of 
intellectual property rights is to leave each member free to establish its own regime for 
such exhaustion without challenge, subject to the MFN and national treatment provisions 
of Articles 3 and 4. 
6. We recognize that WTO members with insufficient or no manufacturing capacities in the 
pharmaceutical sector could face difficulties in making effective use of compulsory 
licensing under the TRIPS Agreement. We instruct the Council for TRIPS to find an 
expeditious solution to this problem and to report to the General Council before the end of 
2002. 
7. We reaffirm the commitment of developed-country members to provide incentives to 
their enterprises and institutions to promote and encourage technology transfer to least-
developed country members pursuant to Article 66.2. We also agree that the least-
developed country members will not be obliged, with respect to pharmaceutical products, 
to implement or apply Sections 5 and 7 of Part II of the TRIPS Agreement or to enforce 
rights provided for under these Sections until 1 January 2016, without prejudice to the right 
of least-developed country members to seek other extensions of the transition periods as 
provided for in Article 66.1 of the TRIPS Agreement. We instruct the Council for TRIPS to 
take the necessary action to give effect to this pursuant to Article 66.1 of the TRIPS 
Agreement. 
The Doha Declaration, paragraph 4, 5 and 6. 
126 
.... 
a manner supportive of WTO members' right to protect health, in particular, to 
promote access to medicines for all. 
(3) It reaffirms that WTO members have right to use, to the full, the provisions in 
the TRIPS Agreement, which provide flexibilities for this purpose. 
(4) It states that members have "the right to determine what constitute a national 
emergency or other circumstances of extreme urgency," when the states adopt 
other measures under article 8. 
(5) Finally, the sixth paragraph instructs the Council of TRIPS to find a solution 
for those members who lack manufacturing capacities so they can make 
effective use of compulsory licensing under the TRIPS. 
Most human right scholars eulogize the achievements of the Declaration on the access to 
medicines. 102 They recognized that it is a kind of a victory for developing countries. 
Apparently, the Doha Declaration attempts to establish a general exception to exclude the 
protection of intellectual property, when states take measures to protect public health. 
This general exception would likely exclude legal barriers, including the patent and the 
protection of test data, if it could be worked out. 
Despite the optimism of human rights advocates, many scholars argued that the impacts 
of Doha Declaration are limited, because they did not impose any substantive 
responsibilities within TRIPS and they are not binding texts. 103 For this reason, after the 
Doha declaration, the developing countries sought more effective ways to increase the 
102 
Bhatt, supra note 83. 
103 
Abbott, supra note 16,330. 
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access to medicines,104 by reforming the existing compulsory licensing scheme under the 
TRIPS and pursuing amendment permanent to TRIPS. !Os 
3.2.3 The Compulsory License Scheme 
The compulsory license is a traditional measure that states take to expand access to 
medicines. Through such measure, a given government could grant a compulsory license 
that authorizes the use of patent and test data. In practice, there are several 
pharmaceutical compulsory licenses granted by WTO members. These cases raised the 
issue of harmonization between the right of health and intellectual property rights. Most 
of discussions in relation to compulsory licenses are focused on the patent area, but the 
same logic can be applied in the area of pharmaceutical test data protection. That is to 
say, if the circumstances allowing for the granting of a compulsory license, these same 
circumstances can allow the use of patent and test data at the same time; in essence 
treating both, test data and patents as one issue. Thus, the difficulties in implementing the 
compulsory license to exclude either protection of patent or data would be the same. One 
reason for this approach is that, these is no authoritative text dealing with test data 
compulsory licensing; therefore, the use of test data must be inferred from the use of 
patented drugs when it comes to the issue of compulsory licensing. 
Article 27 of the TRIPS establishes a basic framework for patent right. 106 First, it states 
that the subject matters of patents can be products or processes. Second, the patent shall 
104 1d. 
105 S . 
ee mfra text 3.2.3 
106 A . 
rtlcie 27 of the TRIPS reads: 
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be available for any inventions in all fields of technology. It means that the availability of 
patent cannot be a discrimination ground on the field technology. 107 In other words, 
members could not exclude certain areas, which have been traditional subjects to 
discriminations, in particular the pharmaceutical and chemical field. 108 Third, it requires 
that the patentable inventions should be new, involving a creative step and capable of 
industrial application."lo9 Fourth, it excludes some areas from patentability, such as 
therapeutic and surgical methods. 110 
Article 27 embodies the notion that the patent is not an absolute right under the TRIPS. 
The patent should be balanced with other social interests. I I I Thus, Article 30 and 31 of 
107 
1. Subject to the provisions of paragraphs 2 and 3, patents shall be available for any 
inventions, whether products or processes, in all fields of technology, provided that they 
are new, involve an inventive step and are capable of industrial application. (5) Subject to 
paragraph 4 of Article 65, paragraph 8 of Article 70 and paragraph 3 of this Article, patents 
shall be available and patent rights enjoyable without discrimination as to the place of 
invention, the field of technology and whether products are imported or locally produced. 
2. Members may exclude from patentability inventions, the prevention within their territory 
of the commercial exploitation of which is necessary to protect ordre public or morality, 
including to protect human, animal or plant life or health or to avoid serious prejudice to 
the environment, provided that such exclusion is not made merely because the exploitation 
is prohibited by their law. 
3. Members may also exclude from patentability: 
(a) diagnostic, therapeutic and surgical methods for the treatment of humans or 
animals; 
(b) plants and animals other than micro-organisms, and essentially biological processes 
for the production of plants or animals other than non-biological and microbiological 
processes. However, Members shall provide for the protection of plant varieties either by 
patents or by an effective sui generis system or by any combination thereof. The provisions 
of this subparagraph shall be reviewed four years after the date of entry into force of the 
WTO Agreement. 
Carvalho, supra note 29, at 161. 
108 ld 
109 The terms "inventive step" and "capable of industrial application" may be referred to the terms" non-
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the TRIPS provides several grounds to exclude patent, such as research exception, Bolar 
exception, anti-competitive practice measures, and compulsory license scheme. 112 
Among them, the most important measure to balance between the right of access to 
medicines and intellectual property is compulsory license system. I 13 
3.2.3.1 Granting Compulsory License under Public Health Related Grounds 
The compulsory license is the process by which a government authorizes a third party to 
perform acts that originally requires the authorization of the patentee but because of the 
public health reason the government need not obtain the patentees' consent. Article 31 
does not use the term "compulsory license," because several jurisdictions do not use this 
term. 114 Instead, it is titled "other use without authorization of the right holder," to 
represent the same administrative actions. liS 
112 The research exception under Article 30 allows researchers to use a patented invention for research 
during the patent term. The regulatory review exception under Article 30, also known as Bolar exception, 
allows manufacturers of generic drugs to use the patented product to obtain marketing approval without the 
patent owner's permission and before the patent protection expires. Under 8 and 40, governments can take 
measures to prevent patent owners and other holders of intellectual property rights from abusing 
intellectual property rights, "unreasonably" restraining trade, or hampering the international transfer of 
technology. See http://www.wto.org/english!tratope/tripse/factsheetpharm02.e.htm#exceptions( ast 
visited on Dec 2, 2008) 
113 Chaudhuri, supra note 81, at 83. 
114 
Carvalho, supra note 29, at 230. 
115 Article 31 of the TRIPS reads: 
Where the law of a Member allows for other use (7) of the subject matter of a patent 
without the authorization of the right holder, including use by the government or third 
parties authorized by the government, the following provisions shall be respected: 
(a) authorization of such use shall be considered on its individual merits; 
(b) such use may only be permitted if, prior to such use, the proposed user has made 
efforts to obtain authorization from the right holder on reasonable commercial terms and 
conditions and that such efforts have not been successful within a reasonable period of 
time. This requirement may be waived by a Member in the case of a national emergency or 
other circumstances of extreme urgency or in cases of public non-commercial use. In 
situations of national emergency or other circumstances of extreme urgency, the right 
130 
By nature, compulsory licenses are kind of administrative contracts, or a kind of 
administrative intervention. Such intervention would abrogate the rights of patent 
holders, because they deprive the right of patent holders to refuse to deal with third 
parties. 1 16 Thus, such license should be granted only in limited grounds. Otherwise, it 
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holder shall, nevertheless, be notified as soon as reasonably practicable. In the case of 
public non-commercial use, where the government or contractor, without making a patent 
search, knows or has demonstrable grounds to know that a valid patent is or will be used by 
or for the government, the right holder shall be informed promptly; 
(c) the scope and duration of such use shall be limited to the purpose for which it was 
authorized, and in the case of semi-conductor technology shall only be for public non-
commercial use or to remedy a practice determined after judicial or administrative process 
to be anti-competitive; 
(d) such use shall be non-exclusive; 
(e) such use shall be non-assignable, except with that part of the enterprise or goodwill 
which enjoys such use; 
(f) any such use shall be authorized predominantly for the supply of the domestic market 
of the Member authorizing such use; 
(g) authorization for such use shall be liable, subject to adequate protection of the 
legitimate interests of the persons so authorized, to be terminated if and when the 
circumstances which led to it cease to exist and are unlikely to recur. The competent 
authority shall have the authority to review, upon motivated request, the continued 
existence of these circumstances; 
(h) the right holder shall be paid adequate remuneration in the circumstances of each 
case, taking into account the economic value of the authorization; 
(i) the legal validity of any decision relating to the authorization of such use shall be 
subject to judicial review or other independent review by a distinct higher authority in that 
Member; 
(j) any decision relating to the remuneration provided in respect of such use shall be 
subject to judicial review or other independent review by a distinct higher authority in that 
Member; 
(k) Members are not obliged to apply the conditions set forth in subparagraphs (b) and 
(f) where such use is permitted to remedy a practice determined after judicial or 
administrative process to be anti-competitive. The need to correct anti-competitive 
practices may be taken into account in determining the amount of remuneration in such 
cases. Competent authorities shaH have the authority to refuse termination of authorization 
if and when the conditions which led to such authorization are likely to recur; 
(I) where such use is authorized to permit the exploitation of a patent ("the second 
patent") which cannot be exploited without infringing another patent ("the first patent"), 
the following additional conditions shall apply: 
(i) the invention claimed in the second patent shall involve an important technical 
advance of considerable economic significance in relation to the invention claimed in the 
first patent; 
(ii) the owner of the first patent shall be entitled to a cross-licence on reasonable terms 
to use the invention claimed in the second patent; and 
(iii) the use authorized in respect of the first patent shall be non-assignable except with 
the assignment of the second patent. 
Carvalho, supra note 29, at 230. 
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would harm the intellectual property system and impede the promotions of innovation. 
Further, authorization of such use shall be considered on its individual merits; thus states 
authorization can be justifies on the grounds of social and collective interests. 117 Article 
31 of the TRIPS was designed to achieve these ends. 
Under Article 31, governments may grant compulsory license to authorize a third party to 
manufacture the generic medicines, but such authorization must satisfy several 
requirements: 118 
(1) the use of the patented product must be predominately to serve the domestic 
market; 
(2) adequate remuneration based on the economic value of the license must be paid 
to the patent holders; 
(3) the negotiation process is required in cases of national emergency, extreme 
urgency, or non-commercial public use; and 
(4) use for the judicial remedy of anti -competitive practices is not required to 
comply the requirements of negotiation or predominately serving is the 
domestic the domestic market. 
In practice, Article 31 provides a sound basis for compulsory licensing and waives the 
requirement of negotiation, which is time-consuming process when a public health crisis 
occurs. Thus, governments can use this measure to provide generic medicines through 
public health institutions or domestic healthcare scheme without time-consuming 
negotiation. In such cases, it is easy for governments to pass the requirements of Article 
31, because the use of patent product is targeted in the domestic market and provided for 
117 1d. 
lIS Condon & Sinha, supra note 81, at 7-9. 
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non-commercial public. 119 Even the originators are willing to negotiate prices with 
governments, because they understand that governments are not required to do that.
120 
This allows states to determine reasonable prices for medicines. 
Yet, in order to apply the exceptions under Article 31, the circumstance must reach the 
level of national emergency or extreme urgency. Yet, TRIPS lacks operative standards to 
determine what constitutes "national emergency" or "extreme urgency.,,121 It is not until 
2001, when paragraph 5 (c) of the 2001 Declarations bridged this gap. It allows members 
to determine whether a case constitutes a national emergency or is a case of extreme 
urgency.122 Further, it specifies four cases; HIV/ AIDS, tuberculosis, malaria and other 
epidemics, which are considered national emergencies or other circumstances of extreme 
urgency.123 In other words, governments are exempted from proving a case of national 
emergency or extreme circumstance if they grant compulsory license on these four 
grounds. 
3.2.3.2 The 2003 Decision and 2005 Amendment 
In the TRIPS Council Meeting of June 2001, Brazil introduced its successful experience 
of distributing HIV / AIDS medicines at low cost. 124 It proved that taking measures, such 
119 Id, at 236 
120 Condon & Sinha, supra note 81, at 9. 
121 Jennifer Bjomberg, Brazil's Recent Threat on Abbott's Patent: Resolution or Retaliation?, 27 Nw. J. 
INT'L L. & Bus. 199,207 (2006). 
122 The Doha Declaration, 5 (c). 
123 Id. 
124 See Sell, supra note 41, at 513 and also Tina Rosenberg, Look at Brazil, N. Y. TIMES, Jan. 28 2001, 
also available at 
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as threats of issuing compulsory license is effective way to reduce the price of medicines 
through negotiations with pharmaceutical companies. The successful AIDS program in 
Brazil inspired other developing countries to combat HIV / AIDS pandemic and convinced 
them to support a flexible compulsory license scheme under TRIPS regime. 125 It is noted 
that the issue presented in 2001 Doha meeting is not whether the compulsory license in 
permitted under the TRIPS regime but the implementation of the compulsory license. 126 
The limitation imposed by Article 31 (f) of the TRIPS requires that a compulsory license 
predominantly supply the domestic market, 127 because it attempts to confine the 
geographical scope of each compulsory license within the territory the public interests it 
is aimed at attaining. 128 The reasoning to impose the limitation of Article 31 (f) on the 
compulsory license scheme is in compliance with the principle of independence of 
patents. 129 However, it ignores the unique feature of international pharmaceutical market. 
According to the 2000's WHO report, manufacturing capabilities of pharmaceuticals are 
only concentrated in few countries, such as the US, some EU States, Japan, Australia, and 
India. The rest of the world counties have no manufacturing capabilities. 130 Therefore, 
http://qllerv.nytimes.com/gst/flillpage.html ?sec=health&res=9D05E5 DB 113CF93 BA 157 52COA9679C8B6 
}, (last visited on Jan. 8. 2009). 
125 
Sell, supra note 41, at 513. 
126 The Doha Declaration, paragraph 6. 
127 
Correa, supra note 53, at 20. 
128 
Carvalho, supra note 29, at 240. 
129 The principle of independence of patents was found in Article 4bis of the Paris Convention. It can be 
understood in simple way; that is all legal effects of patent in one countries would not be necessary the 
same in another countries. See id. 
130 K Balasubramaniam, Equitable Pricing, Affordability and Access to Essential Drugs in Developing, 
WHO/WTO Secretariat Workshop on Differential Pricing and Financing of Essential Drugs Countries 
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even if they are willing to issue compulsory licenses; there is no local manufacturer to 
produce affordable generic medicine for them. 
Ironically, one of most powerful measures that attempted to balance between the 
intellectual properties and the right to access medicines is not producing medicines in 
developing countries; it was the importation of generic drugs.13\ The limitation requires 
that the products made under a compulsory license be sold in the licensee's domestic 
market. Moreover, a compulsory license may not be granted as a response to the interests 
of a foreign territory. This limitation rendered the compulsory license of little or no use in 
those countries because they are not capable of manufacturing generic medicines. In 2001 
this issue drew attention. Accordingly, it was addressed in paragraph 6 the 2001 Doha 
Declaration on TRIPS and Public Health. 
Paragraph 6 of the 2001 Doha Declarations is an operative provision,132 which instructs 
the Council for TRIPS to find a solution regarding the access to medicine in the countries 
lacking, or with insufficient manufacturing capabilities in the pharmaceutical sector. On 
August 30, 2003 the TRIPS Council arrived at a decision on the implementation of 
paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health. 
Although there is more than one possible solution to deal with this issue, but 2003 
Consumers Perspective, Apr 8-11, 2001, also available at 
http://www.wto.orglenglish/tratop e/trips elhosbjor presentations e/35balasubramaniam e.pdf (last 
visited Jan. 8,2009) . 
131 See TRIPS and Public Health, WTO document No. IP/C/W/296, Jun. 29,2001; this a working paper 
submitted by the AfricaGroup, Barbados, Bolivia, Brazil, Dominican republic, Ecuador, Honduras, India, 
Indonesia, Jamaica, Pakistan, Paraguay,Philippines, Peru, Sri Lanka, Thailand and Venezuela. A total of30 
COuntries. 
132 The Doha Declaration, supra note 14. 
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decision resolves this issue by waiving certain requirements under Article 31 (t). In 2005, 
members agreed to make this decision a permanent amendment to the TRIPS Agreement, 
Article 31 bis; this amendment will take effect when two third of the members accept it. 
The addition of Article 31 bis to the Agreement adds five new paragraphs. 133 The first 
paragraph allows pharmaceutical products, made under compulsory licenses to be 
133 Article 31bis of the TRIPS reads 
I. The obligations of an exporting Member under Article 31(f) shall not apply with respect 
to the grant by it of a compulsory licence to the extent necessary for the purposes of 
production of a pharmaceutical product(s) and its export to an eligible importing 
Member(s) in accordance with the terms set out in paragraph 2 of the Annex to this 
Agreement. 
2. Where a compulsory licence is granted by an exporting Member under the system set out 
in this Article and the Annex to this Agreement, adequate remuneration pursuant to Article 
31(h) shaH be paid in that Member taking into account the economic value to the importing 
Member of the use that has been authorized in the exporting Member. Where a compulsory 
licence is granted for the same products in the eligible importing Member, the obligation of 
that Member under Article 31(h) shall not apply in respect of those products for which 
remuneration in accordance with the first sentence of this paragraph is paid in the exporting 
Member. 
3. With a view to harnessing economies of scale for the purposes of enhancing purchasing 
power for, and facilitating the local production of, pharmaceutical products: where a 
developing or least developed country WTO Member is a party to a regional trade 
agreement within the meaning of Article XXIV of the GATT 1994 and the Decision of28 
November 1979 on Differential and More Favourable Treatment Reciprocity and Fuller 
Participation of Developing Countries (Ll4903), at least half of the current membership of 
which is made up of countries presently on the United Nations list of least developed 
countries, the obligation of that Member under Article 31 (f) shall not apply to the extent 
necessary to enable a pharmaceutical product produced or imported under a compulsory 
licence in that Member to be exported to the markets of those other developing or least 
developed country parties to the regional trade agreement that share the health problem in 
question. It is understood that this will not prejudice the territorial nature of the patent 
rights in question. 
4. Members shall not challenge any measures taken in conformity with the provisions of 
this Article and the Annex to this Agreement under subparagraphs l(b) and 1 (c) of Article 
XXIII of GATT 1994. 
5. This Article and the Annex to this Agreement are without prejudice to the rights, 
obligations and flexibilities that Members have under the provisions of this Agreement 
other than paragraphs (f) and (h) of Article 31, including those reaffirmed by the 
Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health (WT/MIN(Ol)IDEC/2), and to 
their interpretation. They are also without prejudice to the extent to which pharmaceutical 
products produced under a compulsory licence can be exported under the provisions of 
Article 3 1 (f). 
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exported to countries lacking production capacity. 134 The second paragraph requires that 
the compensations is paid by an exporting countries where a compulsory is granted; in 
this way, double remuneration to the patent-owner cab be avoided. 135 The third paragraph 
deals with a situation where a developing country or least-developed member is a 
member of regional trade agreements. In such case, pharmaceutical products imported 
into one member of regional agreement may also be exported to other developing and the 
least-developed countries of the region that share the same health problem in question. 136 
The forth paragraph requires that WTO members not raise non-violation complaints in 
connection with Article 31 bis. \37 Finally, it retains all existing flexibilities under TRIPS 
Agreement. 138 
The 2005 Amendment will take effect when two thirds of the WTO's members have 
accepted the change. Until the end of 2008, less than two thirds of members have ratified 
the changes. They original deadline set for states to ratify was 1 December 2007 and this 
date was extended to 31 December 2009 under a decision by the General Council on 18 
December 2007. 139 
134 Peter K. Yu, The International Enclosure Movement, 82 IND. LJ. , 881-886 (2007). 
135 The double remuneration refers to a situation which a patent holder is compensated in both the country 
ere the pharmaceutical products are manufactured and the country imports the pharmaceutical products. 
See Thomas, John T., Pharmaceutical Patent Law Cumulative Supplement 177 (2006). 
136 
Yu, supra note 134, at 882-883. 
137 Yu, supra note 134,at 883-884. 
138 
Thomas, supra note 135, at163. 
139 See http://www.wto.org/english/tratope/tripse/amendmente.htm. (last visited on Jan. 8,2009) 
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With respect to this new scheme, Rwanda submitted the first notification of issuing 
compulsory license on July 17, 2007,140 and Canada followed on October 4, 2007. 141 
With these two notifications, Canada can produce generic medicines for the treatment of 
HIV/AIDS for Rwanda and Rwanda can import generic medicines from Canada. This 
kind of model is restricted by Article 31 (f) of the TRIPS. The 2005 Amendment provides 
the waivers for subparagraph (f) of Article 31 and retains the flexibilities in TRIPS, but 
its impact, if it could take effects, on the access to medicines is limited for some reasons. 
First, in order to implement new scheme, the states are required to enact new domestic 
law to comply with the conditions before issuing compulsory license. 142 Second, the new 
compulsory license scheme created new problems in implementation. 143 Thus, only few 
counties used this new compulsory license scheme. 144 
3.3 Exception under the Regional and Bilateral Agreement 
The previous chapter has shown that there is a trend to provide higher level of protection 
for pharmaceuticals through a series of regional and bilateral trade agreements between 
the US and developing and countries, including Chile, Australia, Singapore, Morocco, 
Central America (including Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua 
140 Tove Iren S. Gerhardsen, Rwanda Pioneers Use OfWTO Patent Flexibility For HIV/AIDS Medicine, 
Intellectual Property Watch, available at http://www.ip-watch.org/weblog/index.php?p=696, also see 
Rewanda's submission document IP/N/9/RWA/1. 
141 WTO: 2007 NEWS ITEMS: Canada is first to notify compulsory licence to export generic drug, 
available at http://www.wto.org/english/newse/news07e/tripshealthnotifoct07e.htm; also see 
Canadian Submission Document IP/N/l0/CAN/l/. 
142 Cynthia M. Ho, Comment: VII. Access to Essential Medicines: A New World Order for Addressing 
Patent Rights and Public Health, 82 Chi.-Kent. L. Rev. 1469, 1490-1493 (2007). 
143 Abott & Reichman, supra note 78, at 936-949. 
144 
Ho, supra note 142, at 1491. 
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and the Dominican Republic) ('CAFTA-DR') and in signed, but not yet ratified, 
agreements with Panama, Peru, Colombia and South Korea. 14S These bilateral and 
regional agreements vary in context, but they share some features, such as they 
demonstrate that protection is beyond the scope of TRIPS and negate the flexibilities in 
TRIPS. 146 Those features in relation to data protection were presented in two aspects: 
granting a fixed period of marketing exclusivity for clinical trial data;147 and linking 
patent with marketing approval process. 148 Unlike Doha Declaration, members in 
regional and bilateral agreements, lack collective support from the developing countries. 
They had to face strong economic pressure from the US by themselves. 149 In the 
negotiation of these treaties, due to the lack of legal expertise, and the weak bargaining 
power of these countries the right to affordable medicines became less important than 
other trade issues. As a result, those agreements conceded the issue of pharmaceutical test 
protection and tighten the scope of exceptions for data protection. ISO These situations, in 
reality prevented those states from utilizing the easy, flexible standard provided to those 
145 See supra text chapter 2; U.S. Free Trade Agreements can also be found from 
http://www.export.gov/fta/ (last visited Jan. 8, 2009) 
146 Testimony ofMSF on IP Provisions in DR-CAFTA & Consequences For Access to Essential 
Medicines, submitted to the Committee on Ways and Means of the House of Representatives April 2005 , 
April 22, 2005, http://www.doctorswitholltborders.org/pllblications!article.cfm?id= 1361 (last visited Jan. 8, 
2009) 
147 Some commentators pointed out that those agreements also restrict reliance on foreign marketing 
approval or foreign submission of regulatory data. See chapter 2. 
148 The patent linkage would prohibit health regulatory agent to grant a marketing approval for generic 
medicine during the patent term without the consent or acquiescence of patent holders. See Abott & 
Reichman, supra note 78, at, 936-949. 
149 
Baker, supra note 25, at 323-328. 
150 Id at 328. 
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states under TRIPS.151 Bottom line, those states that are members to those FTAs, and 
CAFT As, but also members to TRIPS cannot fully realize their rights under TRIPS. 
3.3.1 The Regional Agreements 
Two important US related regional agreements represent the trends of data protection; 
those are NAFTA and CAFTA. The law of data protection in these treaties has been 
discussed in the previous chapter; here the focus is on the exceptions of data protection 
and that whether those treaties contain law conducive to the right to public health and 
right to medicines. 
3.3.1.1 Exceptions under the NAFTA 
Article 1711.5 of the NAFTA sets two exceptions for data exclusivity; first, disclosure is 
permitted when it is necessary to protect the public, and second, it is permitted when it is 
fair use. 152 Basically, these are the same exceptions guaranteed by Article 39.3 of TRIPS. 
Likewise, the issues resulting from the interpretations of these two terms under Article 
39.3 "the necessary to protect public" and "unfair and commercial" are encountered in 
Article 1711.5. 153 
The only difference in reality, unlike most WTO members in Africa, members of 
NAFT A are capable of manufacturing medicines if they had to. Thus, the capability of 
manufacturing pharmaceutical is not a concern under the NAFTA regime. Nevertheless, 
when a members deals with a public health crisis, that state may issue a compulsory 
151 Id at 331. 
152 
The NAFTA, art. 1711.5. 
153 See detailed the section 3.2. 
140 
license because of insufficient availability of medicines. Article 1709(10) (b) of the 
NAFTA contains an emergency doctrine which allows a Party to expropriate a patent 
during a national emergency or if the need is urgent. 154 When a party utilizes those 
exceptions, NAFTA only requires states to give an adequate and prompt notice to the 
right holders, and then states may grant compulsory license. 155 However, NAFTA, like 
other instruments did not define the terms "national emergency" or "extreme urgency." 
Thus it was inevitable states interests had to clash over what constitute national 
emergency, or extreme exigency. In the Anthrax case of2001, the Canadian government, 
attempted to issue a compulsory license for a generic production of the drug Cipro, under 
the pretext of extreme emergency. 156 Although the Canadian government did not issue 
the license, the mere idea ignited a debate as to what constitute national emergency and 
when governments have the power to derogate intellectual property rights for the sake of 
public health. 157 
Here, in the Canadian case, measuring by the real size of the case there was no public 
health crisis that should trigger the application of the exception, yet, if Canada insisted on 
issuing the license it would have done it without fear of any reprisal from the US. There 
was no credible threat. Ironically, hundred of thousands, in three continents die from 
deadlier diseases and public emergencies; nevertheless, their situation does not qualify as 
154 The NAFT A, art. 1. 
155 In case of national emergency or circumstances of extreme urgency, the NAFT A requires a Party to 
notify the rights holder as soon as reasonably practicable. In the case of fair and non-commercial use, if the 
government knows or has reasons to know that a valid patent is or will be used by or for the government, 
the right holder shall be informed promptly. See Shapiro, supra note 93. 
156 Paul Lungen, Anthrax scare in community, Canadian Jewish News, page 1, Oct. 25, 2001. 
157 Shapiro, supra note 93, at 55-56. 
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public emergency. The argument here is that the term "national emergency" is not static. 
This term, when interpreted, certain factors must be taken into account. For instance, the 
number of the patients, the state's where the emergency is taking place capacity to 
respond to such situation, and how credible the threat to public health. Indeed these are 
not all inclusive factors but these must be taken into account when considering the 
declaration of public emergency on the ground of pubic health. 
3.3.1.2 Exceptions under the CAFT A 
With respect to the protection of pharmaceutical test data, Article 15.1.10 (d) of CAFT A 
follows TRIPS regime. ISS The data is protected against disclosure unless it is necessary to 
protect the public. In addition, the protection is against the unfair commercial use; 
therefore, the fair non-commercial use is permitted. 
The debates in CAFT A are its potential negative consequences on access to essential 
medicines among members. 159 Commentators argued that the CAFTA provides high level 
protection by adopting the TRIPS-plus provisions. 160 By country, the USTR asserted that 
158 Article 15.lO.l.(d) of the CAFTA 
For purposes of this paragraph, each Party shall protect such undisclosed information 
against disclosure except where necessary to protect the public, and no Party may consider 
information accessible within the public domain as undisclosed data. Notwithstanding the 
foregoing, if any undisclosed information concerning safety and efficacy submitted to a 
Party, or an entity acting on behalf of a Party, for purposes of obtaining marketing 
approval is disclosed by such entity, the Party is still required to protect such information 
from unfair commercial use in the manner set forth in this Article. 
159 Maxwell R. Morgan, Medicines for the Developing World: Promoting Access and Innovation in the 
Post-TRIPS Environment, 64 U. Toronto Fac. L. Rev. 46, 97 (2006). 
160 Christine A. Chung, NOTE & COMMENT: A Cry for Cheap Drugs: CAFTA'S Inflexible Intellectual 
Property Protections Create an Ominous Impact on Life-Saving Medicines, 13 Sw. lL. & Trade Am. 171, 
171-175 (2006) 
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the US Side Letters about DR-CAFT A and public health had confirmed the conclusion of 
the Doha Declaration; 161 thus, the CAFT A would not impede the access to medicines. 
The USTR's arguments are not persuasive, because Central American countries 
understand that Side Letters are not legally enforceable and would not supersede the texts 
in the CAFTA. 162 Human right supporters point out that creating a Doha-like declaration 
that coincides with CAFT A or amending the CAFT A would be a better solution to the 
access to medicines for the Central American countries, because such amendments would 
create TRIP-like flexibilities in CAFT A. 163 Those flexibilities would allow member to 
interpret and implement the CAFT A in a manner furthering the promotion of access to 
medicines. 164 In addition human rights advocates recommended that CAFTA include a 
waiver for data exclusive right under the conditions of national emergency or other 
161 Side Letter of the CAFTA, UNDERSTANDING REGARDING CERTAIN PUBLIC HEALTH 
MEASURES on August 5, 2004 reads: 
The obligations of Chapter Fifteen do not affect a Party's ability to take necessary 
measures to protect public health by promoting access to medicines for all, in particular 
concerning cases such as HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, malaria, and other epidemics as well as 
circumstances of extreme urgency or national emergency. 
In recognition of the commitment to access to medicines that are supplied in accordance 
with the Decision of the General Council of 30 August 2003 on the Implementation of 
Paragraph Six of the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and public health 
(WT/L/540) and the WTO General Council Chairman's statement accompanying the 
Decision (JOB(03)1177, WT/GC/M/82) (collectively the "TRIPS/health solution"), Chapter 
Fifteen does not prevent the effective utilization of the TRIPS/health solution. 
With respect to the aforementioned matters, if an amendment of a pertinent provision of the 
WTO Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects ofIntellectual Property Rights (1994) enters 
into force with respect to the Parties and that amendment is incompatible with Chapter 
Fifteen, our Governments shall immediately consult in order to adapt Chapter Fifteen as 
appropriate in the light of the amendment. 
Also available at http://www.ustr.gov/assets/Trade Agreements/Bilateral/CAFT'A/CAFTA-
DR Final Texts/asset upload file697 397 5.pdf (last visited on Jan. 8, 2009) 
162 Baker, supra note 25, at 332. 
163 
Baker, supra note 18, at 633-72. 
164 Chung, supra note 161, at 186-187. 
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circumstances of extreme urgency.165 This would allow generic drug manufacturers to 
use the data and produce cheaper drugs for national emergency or other circumstances of 
extreme urgency. 
3.3.2Bilateral Trade Agreements 
The adoption of data exclusivity and other TRIPS-plus provisions for pharmaceutical 
products in the US bilateral agreements strengthened the position of originator of 
pharmaceutical enterprises on national markets by providing strong intellectual property 
protection. 166 It is noted that strong protection policy would attract more US investments 
and technology transfers. 167 However, this strong policy towards protection hinders the 
right to access medicines. 
Many commentators found that flexibilities in TRIPS are being weakened by bilateral 
trade agreements. 168 These trade agreements, in particular, impose restrictions on 
compulsory licensing. As discussed above, the 2001 Brazil case proved that the 
compulsory license is a powerful tool for governments to negotiate prices of 
medicines. 169 Once a state adopts data exclusivity without exceptions, those restrictions 
would effectively preclude use of compulsory licensing. 170 Moreover, the registration of 
165 Robert Weissman, Public Health-Friendly Options for Protecting Phannaceutical Registration Data, Int'l 
J. Intel!. Prop. Mgm't 113, 124-27 (2006). 
166 Ho, supra note 143, at 1495-150l. 
167 Robert Bird & Daniel R. Cahoy, The Impact of Compulsory Licensing on Foreign Direct Investment: A 
Collective Bargaining Approach, 45 AM. BUS. LJ. 283, 283&317 (2008) 
168 See Ho, supra note 142, at 1496-1501; Abott & Reichman, supra note 78, at 962-963. 
169 See supra text in page 16-17. 
170 See Baker, supra note 25, at 330-331 (2008). 
144 
generic medicines produced under compulsory licenses could be excluded, if the bilateral 
FTAs contain patent linkage provisions. 171 In such case, the marketing approval of 
generic medicines during the patent term would rely on the consent of the patent holder 
for marketing approval. 
The US Congress found abuse in bilateral trade agreements and began to find a solution 
for ensuring access to medicines with her trading partners. 172 In 2007, the Congress 
reformed the existing bilateral template toward the direction of access to medicines. The 
2007 reform combines the conclusion of the 2001 Doha Declaration, 2003 Decision and 
2005 Amendment. 173 It was reflected, in the terms of the amended FTA between the 
United States and Peru, by introducing an explicit exception to the data exclusivity 
obligation for measures to protect public health in accordance with the Doha Declaration 
and the subsequent protocols for implementation. 174 The result was strengthening the 
2001 Decision and 2005 Amendment Article 31 bis and makes WHO text become the text 
171 1d. 
172 GAO, Intellectual Property: U.S. Trade Policy Guidance on WTO. Declaration on Access to Medicines 
May Need Clarification 4, Sep. 2007, available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d071198.pdf(last visited 
on Jan. 8,2009). 
173 See Staff of H. Comm. on Ways and Means, 1 10th Cong., Peru and Panama FTA Changes, at ~ III D(3) 
(Comm. Print 2007). 
174 Article 16.10.2 (e) of the US-Peru FTA reads: 
Notwithstanding subparagraphs (a), (b), and (c), a Party may take measures to protect public health in 
accordance with: 
(i) the Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health (WTlMIN(Ol)/DEC/2) (the "Declaration"); 
(ii) any waiver of any provision of the TRIPS Agreement granted by WTO Members in accordance with 
the WTO Agreement to implement the Declaration and in force between the Parties; and 
(iii) any amendment of the TRIPS Agreement to implement the Declaration that enters into force with 
respect to the Parties. 
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of trade agreements instead of recognizing those public health exception only in the side 
letters. 175 
3.4 The Domestic Case 
3.4.1 The Implementation of 2003 Decision in Canada 
On May 14, 2004 Canada amended the Patent Act and the Food and Drugs Act to 
authorize compulsory licenses for the production of generic drugs. In May 2005, Bill C-9, 
- an Act to amend the Patent Act and the Food and Drugs Act - came into force. 176 This 
act made Canada become the first country to amend its domestic law in order to fulfill the 
2003 Decision. 177 This amendment made it possible to produce the generic medicine for 
other developing countries and export to eligible developing countries, which broke the 
restrictions under 31 (f) of the TRIPS. 
The Government of Canada tried to drop the 2003 Decision in a practical way. The Bill 
sets out detailed procedures. 178 Like TRIPS, the Bill's provisions attempted to reconcile 
interests between the intellectual property and human rights. 179 As a result, on the one 
hand, it provides a formula for calculation of remuneration, and therefore it would not 
175 Abott & Reichman, supra note 78, at 964. 
176 Bill C-9, An Act to Amend the Patent Act and the Food and Drugs Act, 3rd Sess., 37th Pari., 2004, 
online: Library of the Parliament. Available at 
http://www.par1.gc.ca/common/Bills Is.asp?Parl=37&Ses=3&ls=C9#1 section21 0 I txt (last visited Jan. 8, 
2009) 
177 Jim Keon, "Editorial: Canada first to pass legislation on delivering generic medicines to developing 
countries" (2004) 1:4 Journal of Generic Medicines 292 at 292, available at 
http://www.who.int/intellectualproperty/events/CG P Apaper.pdf. ( last visited Jan. 8, 2009) 
178 Fanni (Faina) Weitsman, Eliminating Barriers to the Export of Generic Versions of Patented Drugs to 
Developing Countries - from Doha to Bill C-9, 6 Asper Rev. Int'l Bus. & Trade L. 103, 137 (2005). 
179 
/d, at 118-122. 
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impose economic burden on the developing countries. ISO On the other hand, it limited the 
list of pharmaceuticals eligible to be subject to compulsory licenses, and therefore the 
compulsory license would still be an exceptional case of patented drugs. lSI The stated 
purpose of the legislation is "to facilitat[ e] access to pharmaceutical products to address 
public health problems afflicting many developing and least-developed countries, 
especially those resulting from HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, malaria and other epidemics."Is2 
This Act received the support ofNGOs, civil society groups, and even the pharmaceutical 
industry. 183 Nevertheless, there were widespread criticisms within these same groups. 
They complained that the bill's flaws may prevent it from achieving its goal of improving 
access to life-saving medicines. 184 Until October 2007, Canada is first to notify 
compulsory license to export generic drug, and in the same year Rwanda informed the 
WTO that it intends to import TriA vir made in Canada. 185 It raised a bigger question that 
whether a restrictive compUlsory license scheme is a solution for the access to medicine, 
since there is only few cases after the new WTO scheme was built. ls6 
180 Id, at 113. 
181 Id at 132. 
182 Canadian Bill C-9, Section 21.01. 
183 Jennifer A. Lazo, NOTE: The Life-Saving Medicines Export Act: Why the Proposed U.S. Compulsory 
Licensing Scheme will Fail to Export Any Medicines or Save Any Lives, 33 Brooklyn 1. Int'l L. 237, 255 
(2007). 
184 Id at 264. 
185 Canada is first to notify compulsory license to export generic drug, avail at 
h!!p://www.wto.org/engJish/newse/news07e/tripshealthllotifoct07e.htm (last visited on Jan. 8, 
2009). 
186 
Lazo, supra note 183, at 275-276. 
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3.4.2 The Case of the Non-Commercial Use in Thailand 
In 2007, the government of Thailand issued compulsory licenses on three patented 
pharmaceutical products on grounds of governmental use. Two are ARV treatments, and 
the third one is a medicine used for the treatment of coronary disease, patented in 
Thailand by Sanofi-Aventis. Immediately, it raised a debate as to whether the government 
can issue a compulsory license for medicines of chronic deceases. 187 The Thai authorities 
reasoned that the 'government use' licenses issued for its public health sector would not 
be used to supply the comparatively small segment of the 'private' commercial 
pharmaceuticals market, where products are sold at the patentee's prices. 188 Thus, Thai 
authority asserted this grant is fair non-commercial use. Opponents such as the EU and 
US argued that the chronic diseases do not meet any requirement of issuing compulsory 
license. 189 
3.5 Conclusion 
The concept of data protection is established through multilateral, regional, bilateral and 
domestic law. However, reviewing the existing legal regimes, we found the exceptions 
for data protections are incomplete. This incompleteness, no doubt, would delay access to 
generic medicines and even would paralysis the entire compulsory license by rejecting 
the marketing approval during patent term. 
187 Brent Savoie, Thailand's Test: Compulsory Licensing In An Era of Epidemiologic Transition, 48 Va. 1. 
Int'J L. 211 (2007). 
188 Abott & Reichman, supra note 79, at 952-955. 
189 Abott & Reichman, supra note 79, at 955. 
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The development of a patented drug is long journey. After a chemical is patented, the 
process of developing of new drugs has just begun. The entire process will be governed 
by patent and pharmaceutical law. The goal of patent is to provide incentives for 
innovation, while the goal of health regulations is to guarantee a safe and effective 
medicine. Surely, the protection of pharmaceutical test data and patent could encourage 
the developing of new drugs. Yet, these two laws are not designed to control the market 
price of medicine. 
The 2006 WHO survey showed that still more than half of world population does not 
have access to essential medicines. The high price is the main factor affecting public 
access to medicines in the developing countries. As a result, the developing countries 
need more flexible legal framework for the protection of pharmaceuticals in order to 
affordably access essential medicines. This question was addressed in the 2001 WTO 
Doha Declaration. The 2003 Decision and 2005 Amendment were attempts from the 
WTO members to adopt flexible measures to reach the goal of accessing medicines. This, 
position, arguably, would be favored, when establishing a flexible framework for the data 
protection in the future. 
Globally, Article 39.3 provides two grounds to exclude data protection; that is the 
measure is necessary to protect public, and the other is fair use. However, due to the 
ambiguities of these two terms the actual application of the exceptions became worthless. 
Although, article 7 and 8, determine the objective of the TRIPS, and this should have 
provided guidance in the application of the exceptions, the WTO Dispute Panel cases 
proved to be useless. This attitude discourages the developing countries to use flexible 
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measures to implement intellectual property. But this restrictive viewpoint may be 
challenged if the 2005 Amendment passed. Once the 2005 Amendment passed, the 
exceptions for the data protection would be easily established in certain circumstances, in 
particular on the ground of public health. 
The compulsory license is powerful tool for access to medicines. In the past, most 
discussions were focused on the authorization of patent holders. However, the 
compulsory license may be granted in a package, including the authorization of use of 
pharmaceutical data. Some scholars suggest that the authorization of use of 
pharmaceutical data under the compulsory license scheme is a fair use but the 
compensation should calculate the use of data. It is noted that the authorization of the use 
of pharmaceutical data should be incorporated in the compulsory scheme. Otherwise, the 
aims of compulsory license would be defeated. 
In the regional level, the bilateral and regional trade agreements present a higher level of 
protection of intellectual property. Those restrictive measures negate the flexibility of 
TRIPS and make it harder for state members to those agreements to apply the public 
health related exceptions. Fortunately, states are aware of these drawbacks and, therefore 
reformed the bilateral agreements. The new trade FT A incorporated the WTO related 
public health official document. This trend would be effective for establishing exceptions 
framework for the data protection. 
Domestically, the case of Canada amended the Patent Act in order to fulfill the goal of 
the 2003 Decision. The Canadian law attempts to establish a framework for the 
compulsory license scheme in order to import the medicines. It is good attempt to 
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increase the access to medicine in the developing countries. Although some scholars were 
in a hurry to criticize that law because in their views the law erected other legal barriers, 
it is still too early to discuss the impact of this scheme. Another case in Thailand showed 
the different aspects of compulsory license scheme. The Thai government uses this 
scheme to provide medicines for the heart disease patients. This action raised questions as 
to whether the country may suspend its obligation based on the public health exception 
and under what circumstances the states may apply those exceptions. 
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4. The Human Right to Medicines-Jurisprudence and Implementation 
4.1 Introduction 
The adoption of TRIPS establishes a universal protective scheme to pharmaceutical 
innovations; in particular, it obliges WTO members to provide patent protection to cover 
all forms of technology, including pharmaceuticals. This uniformed protection scheme, 
though, diminishes cross borders trade disputes; it brings two significant human rights 
concerns in relation to the right to health. 1 The first concern is that such scheme cannot 
provide human rights protection to the traditional knowledge, such as the traditional 
medicine.2 The second one is that current intellectual property implementation of the 
TRIPS might conflict with states' obligation to implement the right to health. This 
outcome results from the historical separation of the intellectual property law and human 
rights law.3 
A consideration of the operating aspects of intellectual property with respect to access to 
medicines is that access to essential medicines is a human right. However, the impact of 
implementing TRIPS had not raised the human rights concerns until the several WHO 
reports evidently pointed out the extreme disparities in access to life-saving medicines.4 
These disparities could not be relieved even though WHO implemented Medicines 
I Laurence R. Helfer, Human Rights and Intellectual Property: Coriflict or Coexistence?, 5 Minn. Intel!. 
Prop. Rev. 47, 51-52 (2003). 
2 The issue of protection of the traditional medicine will be discussed in the next chapter. 
3 
Helfer, supra note 1, at 51. 
4 WHO Medicine Strategy 2004-2007, Geneva, World Health Organization (hereinafter WHO Medicine 
Strategy), 2004 (WHO/EDM/2004.5), available at 
http://whglibdoc.who.int/hgI2004/WHO EDM 2004.S.pdf (last visited Feb, 1,2009) 
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Strategies for years. The HIV I AIDS epidemic opened the eyes of the international 
community and showed some of the negative impacts of TRIPS on access to medicines.5 
The HIV/AIDS cases, though, have been treated as treatable-like chronic disease since 
1996 and patients can live longer at length of 5-10 years than the first time since the 
beginning of this epidemic.6 The story is still different in the developing countries even a 
decade after the first recognized cases of AIDS. In 2006, the WHO reported that an 
estimated 40 million people were living with HIV I AIDS in the developing countries and 
30 % of those were in Africa. The WHO further pointed out only a small portion of them 
in developing countries had access to antiretroviral medicine (ARVs).7 The absence of 
adequate HIV treatment in developing countries is a result of the lack of public health 
infrastructure, weak domestic regulations, and shortages of medical professionals etc.8 
However, partially to blame, in this crisis is the intellectual property system, which 
curtailed the production of generic medicines. 
The adoption of TRIPS restricted. the manufacture, export and import of genenc 
medicines.9 The WTO members, seemingly, were not aware of this negative impact until 
the South Africa and the Brazil were sued when they tried to grant compulsory licenses 
for public health purpose. Members, who support these two countries, argue that even 
5 Kevin Outterson, Pharmaceutical Arbitrage: Balancing Access and Innovation in International 
Prescription Drug Markets, 5 Yale J. Health Pol'y L. & Ethics 193,255-257 (2005). 
6 WHO medicine strategy, supra note 4. 
7 Id. 
9 
See Chapter 3. 
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international trade treaty such as TRIPS should not derogate state's right to protect public 
health, because the right to health is a fundamental human right. 
States that adhere to this view find comfort in the views expressed by the UN human 
rights organs. In 2000, in its first ever scrutiny of the TRIPS agreement, the UN Sub-
Commission on Human Rights has questioned the balance of rights between those 
promoted by the TRIPS agreement and the broader human rights of individuals. lo The 
Sub-Commission was of the view that intellectual property rights or economic polices 
should not supersede human rights. Indeed, such an opinion is always welcomed by the 
developing countries. 
One the other side, the pharmaceutical companies' argument that higher prices and 
protection are needed has some legitimacy to promote the medical innovation. Given that 
the effectiveness and efficiency of the current intellectual property regime, this argument 
was still working for them. 
A recent research showed that drugs makers do not spend their money to further 
innovation and discovering new drugs; rather they spend the money in advertising, 
marketing and administrative fees. I I What they spend in these sectors is much higher than 
what is devoted to research and development of new drugs. 12 In addition, protection of 
10 See Someshwar Sing, Trips Regime At Odds With Human Rights Law, Says Un Body, at 
http://www.twnsic!e.org.sg/title/oc!c!s.htm (last accessed January 26,2009). 
II Luke Timmerman, Demand, marketing bolster sky-high price o/new biotech drugs, The Seattle Times, 
Apr. 28, 2002. also available at 




material interests drives pharmaceutical innovation toward "profitable" diseases, but not 
prevalent diseases in the developing countries. 13 Since the rewards of material interests 
are not directed towards necessary pharmaceutical research and developments as such, 
the intellectual property should not focus heavily on promoting private material interests. 
Today, as a result of the human rights movements, the incorporation of the right to 
medicines in all the regional human rights treaties, as well as domestic laws, and the 
integration of human rights language into trade treaties, it is evident that the right to 
medicines occupies a high place among human rights. In fact, since the last decade, the 
United Nation has integrated the right into most international HIV/AIDS strategies, and 
polices, including the flexible implantations of intellectual properties for 
pharmaceuticals. 14 Yet, states made less or no efforts in implementing these strategies, 
because states viewed them as policy statements. Until General Comment 14 was 
elaborated by Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, states' misconception 
in relation to the implementation of the right to health started to take a different attitude. 15 
The one of significant achievements of the Comment is to establish core obligations of 
the right to health. At the same time, the Comment also connects the concept of essential 
medicines with the WHO's Model List of Essential medicines. Such incorporation, 
13 Arrigo Schieppati, Giuseppe Remuzzi, Silvio Garattini, Modulating the Profit Motive to Meet Needs of 
the less-developed world, The Lancet, Vol. 358 Iss. 9293, 1638-1641 (2001). 
14 W orId Health Organization, Handbook for Legislators on HIV / AIDS, Law and Human Rights Action to 
Combat HIV/AIDS in View of Its Devastating Human, Economic and Social Impact 25 (1999); see also 
Homester, at 170. 
15 U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council, Comm. on Econ., Soc. & Cultural Rts. [hereinafter, CESCR], General 
Comment No. 14: The Right to the Highest Attainable Standard of Health, U.N. Doc. E/C.l2/2000/4 (Aug. 
11,2000) [hereinafter General Comment 14]. 
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besides clarifying state's obligation with regard to the right to medicines, strengthened 
the functions of the WHO. 
In the past, it was not only that states have failed to live up to their obligation to protect 
the right to medicines, The truth is, even the WHO, the UN default agency mandated with 
the protection of the right, neglected it is obligations. For years, most of this agency's 
achievements in relation to the right to medicines remained in the stages of either 
providing information or technical supports. Even among these achievements, perhaps 
the adoption of Model List of Essential medicine, the 2005 Reform of International 
Health Law and implementations of Prequalification Program, remain the most 
noticeable ones. 
Another institution, indirectly implicated in the debate concerning the right to medicines 
and the protection of pharmaceutical innovations is the WTO. Though, the primary 
function of WTO is to deal with trade issues rather than human rights issues. In any 
event, by adoption of the TRIPS, WTO's jurisdiction extends the scope of trade related 
disputes to intellectual property area. In this regard, as the institution overseeing the 
implementation of TRIPS, the WTO cannot avoid resolving the problems resulting form 
the implementations of the intellectual property. Thus, when more than 80 WTO 
members in 2001 Doha Meeting pointed out that they had accepted the obligation to 
protect public health and such obligation should not be derogated by TRIPS' other 
provisions, the WTO was aware its duty to settle the this issue. 16 This position resulted in 
the emergence of the 2001 Doha Declaration, 2003 Decision and 2005 Amendment. 
16 See chapter 3. 
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The WTO's approach to resolve the issue of access to medicines in TRIPS attempts to 
develop a framework to reconcile trade and the right to health in the international level. 
Despite of some shortcomings in these initiatives, 17 it was appreciated attempt to 
reconcile these divergent interests and broaden access to medicines. Many options have 
been proposed by scholars to increase the access to medicines based on the decisions of 
Doha Declarations. 18 This position the WTO took is to strike an adequate balance 
between intellectual property and states parties' obligations in relation to the right to 
health. 19 
The previous chapters have discussed the concept of protection of pharmaceutical data 
and exceptions to exclude the protections. Several exceptions, to maximize access to 
medicines were presented. All exceptions that we pointed out indeed in one way or 
another will loosen the protection that pharmaceutical companies traditionally enjoyed, or 
minimize the scope of data protection. This chapter discusses why the right to medicines 
can be an additional external limitation on pharmaceutical data protection. In the 
beginning of this chapter, we define and examine the scope and the content of the right, 
the right to health as provided for in the various human rights instruments. Part of this 
discussion is focused on the state obligation to help its citizenry realize their right to 
medicines. This chapter also discusses the actions of major international organizations 
17 Frederick M. Abbott & Jerome H. Reichman, The Doha Round's Public Health Legacy: Strategies for 
the Production and Diffusion of Patented Medicines under the Amended TRIPS Provisions, 10 J. Int'l Econ. 
L. 921,935-949 (2009). 
18 Sisiule F. Musungu & Cecila Oh, The Use ofFlexibilities in TRIPS by Developing Countries: Can They 
Promote Access to Medicines? (South Center, 2006); see also Abbott & Reichman, supra note 17. 
19 See infra text 4.4.2. 
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with respect to this issue, such as the WHO and WTO. The final part will discuss how to 
reconcile trade and the right to medicines. 
4.2 The Right to Health and the Right to Medicines 
The term "right to health" is spelled out in international and regional human rights 
instruments as well as domestic laws, but the language in all these legal instruments does 
not go far as to say "right to access medicines" the way we using it here. Lack of express 
language, however does not mean that this right is non-existent or insignificant. To the 
contrary, this right is recognized as a fundamental human right, since states' obligation of 
the right to health is guaranteed by implementing the right to medicines. Indeed, after all, 
the right to health can easily be interpreted to contain a right to medicines by implication. 
Thus, the right being implicit in the broader right to health does not relegate it to a lower 
rank. This view is further reaffirmed by the CESCR's General Comment 14.20 
The term "right to health" first appeared in the Constitution of the World Health 
Organization (WHO) in 1948. The preamble of WHO Constitution proclaims: "the 
enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of health is one of the fundamental rights of 
every human being without distinction of race, religion, and political belief, economic or 
social condition.,,21 This statement is complete enough to spell out the status of right to 
health in human rights law, but a general opinion about this statement is not legally 
binding.22 In any event, in the same year the Universal Declaration of Human Rights was 
20 The General Comment 14, supra note 15 and see also infra text 4.2.1.2. 
21 WHO Constitution, preamble. 
22 Holger P. Hestermeyer, Access to Medications as a Human Right, Max Planck UNYB8, page 145 (2004). 
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adopted and the legal status of the "right to health" was further concretized.23 Since then, 
this right is replicated in a serious of international, regional and domestic laws.24 
4.2.1 Scope and Content of the Right to Medicines 
4.2.1.1 Overview of International Human Right Instruments 
Human rights recognition can be dated back to Hammurabi Codes of ancient Babylon,25 
but the UN Charter remains the first, legal instrument to declare human rights in the 
international leve1.26 This recognition is the beginning of the development of modem 
human rights. In 1948, the United Nations General Assembly adopted the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights.27 The Declaration incorporated not only the traditional 
civil and political rights but also further recognized a series of economic and social 
rights. 28 These recognized human rights later were incorporated in two important 
international human rights instruments; the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights (ICCPRi9 and International Covenants on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
23 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., U.N. Doc. A/SlO (194S). 
24 See infra text 4.2.1 and 4.2.2. 
25 The Basis of Human Righ~ http://www.udhr.org/historv/overview.htm#Above%20Picture (last visited Feb. 1, 
20(9). 
26 The UN Charter, Preamble, art 55, art. 56 and art. 6S. see also the history of human right, 
http://\Vww.udhr.orglhistory/default.htm (Last visited Feb. 1,2(09) 
27 Universal Declaration of Human Rights [hereinafter UDHR], G.A. Res. 217 A, at 71, U.N. GAOR, 3d 
Sess. 1st plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/SIO (Dec. 12, I94S) 
28 Peter Bailey, The Creation a/the Universal Declaration a/Human Rights, available at 
http://www.universalrights.netlmain/creation.htm (last visited Feb. 1,2009). 
29 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights [hereinafter ICCPR], G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), Dec. 
16,1966,21 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 52, U.N. Doc. AI63I6 (1966). 
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(ICESCR).30 These two documents together with the UDHR architected the basis of 
modern human rights law. 
With respect to the right to health, Article 25.1 of UDHR,31 in broad language proclaims 
that: "Everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate for the health and well-
being of himself and of his family, including food, clothing, housing and medical care 
and necessary.,,32 Article 12.1 of the ICESCR elaborates more on this right and defines 
what the essence of the phrase "adequate health living." In accordance with Article 
12.1/3 the right to health contains three elements. First of all, it is a matter of a right to 
enjoy the highest attainable health standard; second, this right is to be exercised without 
discrimination or whatsoever preferences as regards sex, color, nationality, political, 
social status, etc.; and third, the right to health includes two areas, physical and mental 
health. Article 12.2 of the ICESCR further establishes correlative governmental 
30 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights [hereinafter ICESCR]., opened for 
signature Dec. 16, 1966, art. 12.1,993 U.N.T.S. 3, 8 (entered into force Jan. 3, 1976) 
31 Although UNDR is solely a resolution of the General Assembly of the United Nations, a general opinion 
recognizes that UDHR is binding or at least has obtained some legal effect. See Hestermeyer, supra note, 
at 156; also Hurst Hannum, The Status of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in National and 
International Law, 25 Ga. J. Int'l & Compo L. 287 (1995/96). 
32 Article 25 of the UDHR reads: 
Everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate for the health and well-being of himself and of his 
family, including food, clothing, housing and medical care and necessary social services, and the right to 
security in the event of unemployment, sickness, disability, widowhood, old age or other lack of livelihood 
in circumstances beyond his control. 
Motherhood and childhood are entitled to special care and assistance. All children, whether born in or out 
of wedlock, shall enjoy the same social protection. 
33 Article 12.1 ofICESCR reads: 
The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the right of everyone to the enjoyment of the highest 
attainable standard of physical and mental health. 
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obligations to protect this right. 34 In order to assist states to achieve this end, Article 12.2 
provides guidance for governments to follow when implementing the right to health. This 
guidance contains several necessary steps that must be followed in order to protect this 
right. First, it requires states to take measures to reduce the stillbirth-rate and of infant 
mortality as well as guarantee for the development of the child. Second, it obligates states 
to improve all aspects of environmental and industrial hygiene. Third, it mandates states 
to prevent, control epidemic, endemic, occupational and other diseases and provide 
treatment for such diseases. Fourth, it instructs states to create conditions, which would 
assure to all, medical service and medical attention in the event of sickness. 
Article 12 of the I CSER completes a structure for the protection of the right to health. 
Subsequent international human rights instruments focus on vulnerable groups 
strengthened the importance of this right and addressed this right in various ways.35 For 
example, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) recognizes an 
inherent right to life.36 As the Committee has explained, in its authoritative Comment No 
6 on article 6 of the ICCPR, the use of the word "inherent" in the ICCPR signifies that 
34 Article 12.2 ofICESCR reads: 
The steps to be taken by the States Parties to the present Covenant to achieve the full 
realization of this right shall include those necessary for: 
(a) The provision for the reduction of the stillbirth-rate and of infant mortality and for the 
healthy development of the child; 
(b) The improvement of all aspects of environmental and industrial hygiene; 
(c) The prevention, treatment and control of epidemic, endemic, occupational and other 
diseases; 
(d) The creation of conditions which would assure to all medical service and medical 
attention in the event of sickness. 
35 Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, The Right to Health, Fact Sheet No. 
31, page 9-10 (2008), available at www.ohchr.orgiDocllments!Pllbl ications/Factsheet31.pdf (last visited 
Feb. 1,2009) 
36 ICCPR, art 6. 
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states must take measures to ensure effective protection of the right to life. Indeed, one 
kind of protection is through providing medicines.37 The Human Rights Committee, 
which monitors compliance with the ICCPR, further strengthens this right and explains 
this right imposes on states an obligation to undertake measures to eliminate epidemics.38 
The 1965 International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
Discrimination (lCERD) against racial discrimination obliges states to take further steps 
to prohibit and eliminate racial discrimination in all its forms and to guarantee the right of 
everyone, without distinction as to race, colour, national or ethnic origin, the enjoyment 
of the right to public health and medical care.39 The 1979 Convention on the Elimination 
of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) 40 requires states to take all 
appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination against women in the field of health 
care.41 The CEDA W provides a comprehensive scheme for states to ensure women's 
equality of access to health care services. 42 Such scheme mandates states to adopt 
37 Human Rights Committee, General Comment 6, Article 6, (Sixteenth session, 1982), Compilation of 
General Comments and General Recommendations Adopted by Human Rights Treaty Bodies, U.N. Doc. 
HRIIGENIl/Rev.l at 6 (1994) [hereinafter General Comment No.6]. 
38 See Audrey R. Chapman, The Human Rights Implications of Intellectual Property Protection, 5 J. Int'l 
Econ. L. 861, 873-875. 
39 Article 5 (e) (iv) of the International Convention for the Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
Discrimination, opened for signature Mar. 7, 1966, art. 5, S. Exec. Doc. C, 95-2, at 4 (1978), 660 U.N.T.S. 
195, 220-21 (entered into force Jan. 4, 1969). 
40 Articlesll(l) f, 12 and 14 (2) b of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination 
Against Women [hereinafter CEDA W], GA Res 341180, UN GAOR, 34th Sess, Supp No 46, UN Doc 
A/34/46 (1980), reprinted in 19 ILM 33 (1980), entered into force 3 September 1981. 
41 Article 12.1 of CEDA W reads: States Parties shall take all appropriate measures to eliminate 
discrimination against women in the field of health care in order to ensure, on a basis of equality of men 
and women, access to health care services, including those related to family planning. 
42 Article 12.2 ofCEADW reads: Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph I of this article, States 
Parties shall ensure to women appropriate services in connection with pregnancy, confinement and the 
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measures related to family planning, pregnancy, confinement, and the post-natal period, 
granting free services where necessary. In the area of child protection, the 1996 
Convention on the Rights of the Child (eRC) extends scope of the right to health 
established in ICESCR;43 it instructs states to take appropriate measures to diminish 
infant and child mortality, ensures the provision of necessary medical assistance and 
health care to all children with emphasis on the development of primary care, combat 
disease and malnutrition, provide clean drinking water, and combat the dangers and risks 
of environmental pollution.44 
post-natal period, granting free services where necessary, as well as adequate nutrition during pregnancy 
and lactation. 
43 Art 24, Convention on the Rights of the Child [hereinafter CRC], GA Res 25 (XLIV), UN GAOR, 44th 
Sess, Supp No 49, UN Doc AlRES/44/25 (1989), reprinted in 28 ILM 1448 (1989). 
44 Article 24 of CRC reads: 
1. States Parties recognize the right of the child to the enjoyment of the highest attainable 
standard of health and to facilities for the treatment of illness and rehabilitation of health. 
States Parties shall strive to ensure that no child is deprived of his or her right of access to 
such health care services. 
2. States Parties shall pursue full implementation of this right and, in particular, shall take 
appropriate measures: 
(a) To diminish infant and child mortality; 
(b) To ensure the provision of necessary medical assistance and health care to all children 
with emphasis on the development of primary health care; 
(c) To combat disease and malnutrition, including within the framework of primary health 
care, through, inter alia, the application of readily available technology and through the 
provision of adequate nutritious foods and clean drinking-water, taking into consideration 
the dangers and risks of environmental pollution; 
(d) To ensure appropriate pre-natal and post-natal health care for mothers; 
(e) To ensure that all segments of society, in particular parents and children, are informed, 
have access to education and are supported in the use of basic knowledge of child health 
and nutrition, the advantages of breastfeeding, hygiene and environmental sanitation and 
the prevention of accidents; 
(t) To develop preventive health care, guidance for parents and family planning education 
and services. 
3. States Parties shall take all effective and appropriate measures with a view to abolishing 
traditional practices prejudicial to the health of children. 
4. States Parties undertake to promote and encourage international co-operation with a 
view to achieving progressively the full realization of the right recognized in the present 
article. In this regard, particular account shall be taken of the needs of developing 
countries. 
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The international human rights instruments mentioned above refer to what the right to 
health should be and take account of the different needs of specific groups. However, 
ambiguous languages in these instruments rendered the right to health as merely 
inspirational statements rather than an enforceable individual right.45 These deficient has 
the enforceability of this individual right being challenged since the adoption of these 
treaties. These general critics include the lack of guidance as to the scope of states' 
obligations, the definition of "highest attainable standard" and specifying entitlements of 
the individual right to health.46 
4.2.1.2 States' Obligation to Ensure the Right to Health; General Comment 14 
In 2000, the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (Committee) attempted 
to resolve the issue of the deficient of workable standard in the implementation of the 
right to health by the adoption of the noted General Comment 14.47 This Comment no 
doubt overcomes some barriers in the area of implementing the right to health. The first 
remarkable achievement is to establish criteria for states to evaluate the enforcement of 
right to health. These four important criteria are 1) availability, 2) accessibility, 3) 
acceptability, and 4) quality.48 It further provides how states approach these four 
criteria.49 The "availability" is used to evaluate whether the quantity of functioning public 
45 Tony Evans, A Human Right to Health, 23 Third World Q. 197, 199-203 (2002); 
46 Benjamin Mason Meier, Employing Health Rights for Global Justice: The Promise of Public Health in 
Response to the Insalubrious Ramifications of Globalization, 39 Cornell Int'I LJ. 711, 733-35 (2006). 
47 General Comment 14, supra note 15. 
g h General Comment 14, supra note 15, at paragrap 12. 
49 Id and see also The Right to Health, Fact Sheet No. 31, supra note 36. 
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health and health-care facilities, goods and services is sufficient. The accessibility is a 
standard to evaluate whether members can access to health facilities, goods and services 
without discrimination, within the jurisdiction of their states. The criteria of acceptability 
concerns whether all health facilities, goods, and services are complied with medical 
ethics and cultural norms. The last requirement is quality, which addresses the parallel 
need for health facilities, goods and services to be scientifically and medically 
appropriate and of good quality. 
Another significant achievement of General Comment 14 is the specification of the core 
obligations of the right to health.5o The core obligation with respect to general obligations 
imposed different degree of obligations on signatory states parties of ICESCR. The 
general obligations require states to give effect the human rights announced by the 
ICESCR within their jurisdictions. In accordance with Article 2 (1) of ICESCR, states 
have obligations to "progressively achieve the full realization of the right under ICESCR 
through all appropriate means, including particularly the adoption of legislative 
measures.,,51 Under the general obligation, it is recognized that states have resources 
constraints and therefore this obligation solely requires states to makes efforts within 
available resource to protect and promote the rights under the Covenant. 52 This means 
within these available resources states should strive to enable their citizens to realize the 
right to health in accordance with the guidance provided in the Comment. For example, 
even poor states that can barely afford to offer medical services cannot discriminate, on 
50 General Comment 14, paragraphs 43-45. 
51 ICESCR, art. 2 (1). 
52 The Right to Health, Fact Sheet No. 31, supra note 36, at 23-24. 
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whatsoever basis when providing such services. 
By contrast, the core obligation reqUIres a higher degree of compliance than those 
imposed by under article 2 of ICESCR. In accordance with General Comment 3, the 
Committee states that core obligation is applicable for all states regardless of their level 
of development, the availability of resource, or any other social, economic factors and 
difficulties. 53 In other words, core obligations are the minimum level to each of rights 
under ICESCR; therefore states cannot justify a failure to realize the right because of a 
lack of resources. In this context, the right to access essential drugs is specified by 
General Comment 14 as one of core obligation of states. 54 This notion requires states to 
ensure the right to access essential medicines to the maximum of their available resources, 
even if they lack availability of resource. 55 
In this respect, states' obligations in relation to the right to health and medicines can 
broadly be categorized in three main obligations; namely, the obligation to respect, 
protect and fulfill. 56 The obligation to respect requires states to avoid interfering so as to 
violate the right to health directly or indirectly. In accordance with General Comment 14, 
the violation of obligations to respect occurs when States' actions, policies or laws 
contravene the standards set out in article 12 of the ICESCR; and such violation likely 
results in bodily harm, unnecessary morbidity and preventable mortality. Two scenarios 
53 U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council, Comm. on Econ., Soc. & Cultural Rts., General Comment No.3: The Nature 
of States Parties Obligations, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/1990/8 (Dec. 14, 1990) [hereinafter General Comment 3] 
54 Id, at 37. 
55 Id, at 5. 
56 General Comment 14, paragraph 50-52. 
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provided by General Comment 14 are directly in relation to the right to access to 
medicines. The first scenario occurs when states suspend legislations or adopt laws or 
policies that interfere with the enjoyment of any of the components of the right to health. 
The second one occurs when states fail to take into account their legal obligations 
regarding the right to health when entering into bilateral or multilateral agreements with 
other states, international organizations and other entities, such as multinational 
corporations. 
The obligation to protect under General Comment 14 requires states to prevent third 
parties form violating the right to health. This further requires states to take all necessary 
measures to safeguard persons within their jurisdiction from infringements of the right to 
health by third parties. 
Finally, a state's obligation to fulfill requires a state to adopt every appropriate measure 
to fully realize the right to health, such as legislative, administrative, budgetary and 
judicial measures. 57 A violation of the obligation of fulfill occurs when a state party fails 
to take all necessary steps to ensure the realization of the right to health. 
In sum, with respect to right to access to medicines, states will meet their obligations, if 
they met the following obligations: 
(1) States cannot enter a regional or bilateral agreement which would impede the 
access to medicines. 
(2) States should police the infringement of right to access to medicines by private 
sectors within its jurisdiction. 
(3) States should establish a legal frame word to promote the access to medicines. 
57 The Right to Health, Fact Sheet, supra note 36, at 27. 
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4.2.2 Regional Human Right Instruments 
There are several regional instruments recognize the right to health, such as American 
Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man (ADRD),ss and European Social Charter 
(ESC)59 and American Convention on Human Rights: Additional Protocol (ACHR AP) 60 
as well as African Chapter on Human and Peoples' Rights (AfCHPR).61 Those provide a 
similar definition of the right to health in article 12.1 ofICESCR. 
Article 11 of the ADRD states that, "Every person has the right to the preservation of his 
health through sanitary and social measures relating to food, clothing, housing and 
medical care, to the extent permitted by public and community resources.,,62 The access 
to "essential" medicines is not exemplified in this article, but it is a measure permitted by 
public and community resources under Article 11 of ADRD. Article 10 of the ACHR AP 
provides a definition and also provides applicable measures that states may take to ensure 
the right to health.63 Article 16 of AfCHPR also provides for the right in similar terms to 
58 American Declaration on the Rights and Duties of Man, O.A.S. Res. XXX (1948), reprinted in Basic 
Documents Pertaining to Human Rights in the Inter-American System, OEA/Ser.L.VIII.82, doc. 6, rev. 1, 
at 17 (1992) 
59 European Social Charter (Revised), May 3, 1996, 36I.L.M. 31, European Social Charter, Oct. 18, 1961, 
519 V.N.T.S. 89. 
60 Additional Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 17, 1988,28 I.L.M. 156. 
61 African Charter of Human and People's Rights, June 27,1981, 211.L.M. 58 (1982). 
62 ADRD, art. 11. 
63 Article 10 of the ACHR AP reads: 
I.Everyone shall have the right to health, understood to mean the enjoyment of the highest level of 
physical, mental and social well-being. 
2. In order to ensure the exercise of the right to health, the States Parties agree to recognize health as a 
public good and, particularly, to adopt the following measures to ensure that right: 
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that ofthe UDHR and the ICESCR. It states the right to health is a right "to enjoy the best 
attainable state of physical and mental health".64 
ESC Part 1(11) recognizes that the right to benefit from any measures to enjoy the 
highest possible standard of health attainable.65 Further, ESC Part 2, article 11 mandates 
states undertake, either directly or in co-operation with public or private organizations to 
take appropriate measures to ensure the effective exercise of the right to protection of 
health. 66 Regarding the enforcement of the right to health, ESC Committee of 
Independent Experts pointed out states may be considered as the fulfilling its obligation 
to ensure the right to health if national and health systems passed the following 
a. Primary health care, that is, essential health care made available to all individuals and families in the 
community; 
h. Extension of the benefits of health services to all individuals subject to the State's jurisdiction; 
c. Universal immunization against the principal infectious diseases; 
d. Prevention and treatment of endemic, occupational and other diseases; 
e. Education of the population on the prevention and treatment of health problems, and 
f. Satisfaction ofthe health needs of the highest risk groups and of those whose poverty makes them the 
most vulnerable. 
64 Article 16 of AfCHPR reads: 
1. Every individual shall have the right to enjoy the best attainable state of physical and mental health. 
2. States parties to the present Charter shall take the necessary measures to protect the health of their people 
and to ensure that they receive medical attention when they are sick. 
65 ESC, Part I (11). 
66 ESC, Part II, article 11. 
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standards: 67 
(1) whether medical, paramedical professional and adequate medical equipments 
are available; 
(4) whether medical care ensures for the whole population, the prevention and 
diagnosis of disease; 
(5) whether states provide special measures to protect the vulnerable groups, such 
as mother, children and senior adults; 
(6) whether states provide healthy environment; 
(7) whether there is a system of health education in place; 
(8) whether states take adequate measures or provide means to combat epidemic 
and endemic diseases; and 
(9) whether the cost of health service is equally divided. 
Unlike General Comment 14, ESC Committee attempts to set up a more stringent 
standard to evaluate whether an European state has fulfilled her obligations to ensure the 
right to health. This EU standard is higher than the internationally recognized standard 
established by the Comment 14. In addition, this EU system is much more 
comprehensive and sophisticated. Therefore, even if a European state does not meet the 
obligations under the ESC or the EU human right treaty, but still this state may likely not 
be delinquent under the ICCPR or the ICESCR. 
4.2.3 Domestic Law 
As of December 2008, more than 160 countries have adopted the ICESR and more than 
this number of states adopted regional human rights instruments; thus, either way, most 
67 ESC Committee ofIndependent Experts, Conclusions 1,59 quoted from Nihal Jayawickrama, The 
Judicial Application of Human Right Law, National, Regional and International Jurisprudence, page 884 
(2003). 
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countries have recognized the right to health.68 At least, 115 countries have recognized 
the right to health care in their constitutions. 69 In addition, more than six other 
constitutions impose on governments a duty in relation to health.7o The domestication of 
the right to health left the states with obligation to take actions to realize or fulfill the 
right to health. This indeed will require states to strive to realize the right regardless of 
the issue of resources. The adoption of General Comment 14 galvanized this issue and 
now it is well settled that states bear an obligation to enable their citizens to fully realize 
this right. 
In addition, a recent research showed that states practices in this area are encouraging. 
The research shows that states are willing to enforce this right regardless of how many 
68 Hans V Hogerzeil et. aI., Is access to essential medicines as part of the fulfilment of the right to health 
enforceable through the courts? The Lancet, Vol. 368, Iss. 9532, p305-31I (2006). 
69 The Right to Health, Fact Sheet, supra note 36, at 10. 
70 Jd at 10-11. 
Chapter II, Section 27: Health care, food, water and social security of Constitution of South Africa (1996): 
(1) Everyone has the right to have access toa. health-care services, including reproductive 
health care;b. sufficient food and water; [ ... ] 
(2) The State must take reasonable legislative and other measures, within its available 
resources, to achieve the progressive realization of each of these rights. 
(3) No one may be refused emergency medical treatment." 
Constitution ofIndia (1950):Part IV, art. 47, articulates a duty of the State to raise the level 
of nutrition and the standard of living and to improve public health: "The State shall regard 
the raising of the level of nutrition and the standard ofliving of its people and the 
improvement of public health as among its primary duties ... " 
Chapter IV: Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, art. 42 of Constitution of Ecuador (1998): 
"The State guarantees the right to health, its promotion and protection, through the 
development of food security, the provision of drinking water and basic sanitation, the 
promotion of a healthy family, work and community environment, and the possibility of 
permanent and uninterrupted access to health services, in conformity with the principles of 
equity, universality, solidarity, quality and efficiency." 
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resources they hold.7l In addition, it identifies and analyzes 71 court cases from 12 low 
and middle-income countries. In these cases, individuals or groups claimed they have a 
right to access essential medicines on the basis of human right treaties signed by their 
state. The results showed that 59 cases won and 12 cases lost. Half of those cases have 
dealt with HIV / AIDS cases; other cases with leukemia, diabetes, and renal dialysis. The 
research also found that 93% of successful cases from Latin America and the rest of them 
are from India, South Africa, and Nigeria. 
In this research, several important findings can be discovered. First, 66% of 59 successful 
cases rulings concern life-saving medicines. Second, the successful cases are often 
supported by Constitutional provisions, which were drawn from human rights treaties. 
The cases link the right to health to the right to life. The way which these cases was 
advocated was that since the right to life requires the state to take positive measures to 
protect this right, the right to medicines, is the first step to save the right to life. Third, the 
limits in social security cannot be a defense for the right to health. Fourth, government 
policies can successfully be challenged in court if state's national medicine policy72 is 
lacking. The significance of these cases is that the right to health is not an abstract; it is 
rather enforceable right. This is rather extremely significant, since all these cases were 
decided in developing countries' courts. 
71 Hogerzeil et.a!., supra note 74. 
72 According to the WHO, a national medicine policy (NMP) is a commitment to national pharmaceutical 
goals. In addition, regardless of country specific circumstances, a comprehensive national medicine policy 
should take into account all components of the pharmaceutical sector and all relevant stakeholders. See 
WHO, Essential Medicines and Pharmaceutical Policies, available at 
http://www.cmro.who.int/cmp/medicinespolicy.htm (last visited Feb. 10,2009). 
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4.3 WHO's Implementation of the Right to Access to Medicines 
4.3.1 Introduction 
The WHO is the first established U.N. agency in 1948. Under the WHO's constitution, it 
has responsibilities to reach the goal of attainment of "the highest possible level of 
health.,,73 Unfortunately, this agency did not meet this high expectation since it was 
established.74 One scholar even criticized that most of WHO's policies are based on 
political concerns rather than reflection of the needs of their member states, in particular, 
neglecting the interests of developing countries.75 
By law, the WHO can be developed as a powerful normative agency, but the current 
situation goes to opposite way.76 In accordance with WHO's constitution, the WHO has 
extensive normative powers to adopt conventions,77 promulgate binding regulations,78 
73 WHO Constitution, Preamble. 
74 Lawrence O. Gostin, A Proposal for a Framework Convention on Global Health, 10 J. Int'I Econ. L. 989, 
993-994 (2007). 
75Id. 
76 Id; Allyn L. Taylor, Making the World Health Organization Work: Universal Access to the Conditions 
for Health, 18 Am. J.L. & Med. 301 (1992) 
77 Article 19 of WHO Constitution reads: 
The Health Assembly shall have authority to adopt conventions or agreements with respect 
to any matter within the competence of the Organization. 
A two-thirds vote of the Health Assembly shall be required for the adoption of such 
conventions or agreements, which shall come into force for each Member when accepted 
by it in accordance with its constitutional processes. The Health Assembly shall have 
authority to make recommendations to Members with respect to any matter within the 
competence of the Organization. 
Article 20 of WHO Constitution reads: 
Each Member undertakes that it will, within eighteen months after the adoption by the 
Health Assembly of a convention or agreement, take action relative to the acceptance of 
such convention or agreement. Each Member shall notify the Director-General of the 
action taken, and if it does not accept such convention or agreement within the time limit, it 
173 
make recommendations,79 and monitor national health legislation. 80 Through these 
legislative power, the WHO can adopt binding conventions or agreements which, 
affirmatively require States to 'take action' through submitting the convention for 
ratification and notifying the Director General of the action taken. 81 In addition, WHO's 
broad authorities can adopt any regulations related to health topics. 82 That is to say once 
World Health Assembly (WHA) adopted a regulation within its scope of tasks, such as 
standards of safety, potency and advertising of biological and pharmaceuticals, the 
will furnish a statement of the reasons for non-acceptance. In case of acceptance, each 
Member agrees to make an annual report to the Director-General in accordance with 
Chapter XIV. 
In accordance with Article 19 and 20 of WHO Constitution, The World Health Assembly, 
by a two-thirds vote, may adopt conventions or agreements, while such conventions or 
agreements are not binding until accepted. In addition, member states must 'take action' 
within 18 months, even if its delegation voted against the convention. See Gostin, supra 
note 74, at 994. 
78 Article 21 of WHO Constitution reads: 
The Health Assembly shaH have authority to adopt regulations concerning: 
(a) sanitary and quarantine requirements and other procedures designed to prevent the 
international spread of disease; 
(b) nomenclatures with respect to diseases, causes of death and public health practices; 
(c) standards with respect to diagnostic procedures for international use; 
(d) standards with respect to the safety, purity and potency of biological, pharmaceutical 
and similar products moving in international commerce; 
(e) advertising and labelling of biological, pharmaceutical and similar products moving in 
international commerce. 
79 Article 23 of WHO Constitution reads: 
The Health Assembly shaH have authority to make recommendations to Members with 
respect to any matter within the competence of the Organization. 
80 Article 63 of WHO Constitution reads: 
Each Member shall communicate promptly to the Organization important laws, regulations, 
official reports and statistics pertaining to health which have been published in the State 
concerned. 
81 Gostein, supra note 74, at 994. 
82 ld. 
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regulations would be applicable to all WHO member countries III most of 
circumstances.83 
It is incontestable that the WHO's impressive normative powers are sufficient to establish 
an efficient international legal scheme to enforce the right to health. However, the WHO 
has exercised its normative power only twice in its existence; that is the adoption of two 
significant laws, Nomenclature with Respect to Disease and Clauses of Death84 and 
International Health Regulation (IHR).85 These initiatives indeed have more impacts on 
technical support rather than normative value. 86 The Nomenclature Rule is the first 
international health law adopted by the WHO. It sets a completed technical classification 
of disease. Yet, this Rule has no normative value. It recommends states to do such 
classification rather than impose obligation on states. Another noted WHO regulation, 
International Health Regulations (IHR), focuses on the issue of cross-broader effects of 
infectious diseases. Before the revision of 2005, the IHR applied only to cholera, plague, 
and yellow fever. 87 Many critics were disappointed because the old IHR's scope was 
83 Only in a circumstance where the government specifically notifies WHO that it rejects the regulation or 
accepts it with reservations, member states are not bound to regulation. Otherwise even those that voted 
against it, they are bounded by such law adopted by WHA. 
84 World Health Organization, History of the International Classification of Diseases (lCD), available at 
http:// www.who.int/classifications/icd/en/ (last visited Jan. 20 2009). 
85 World Health Assembly, Third Report of Committee A, A58/55 (May 23, 2005),(hereinafter IHRs 2005), 
available at http://www.who.int/gb/ebwhalpdffiles/WHA58/A5855-en.pdf(lastvisitedFeb.12.2009).In 
this report, the World Health Assembly officially adopted the IHRs 2005 and included its provisions in the 
document. 
86 Gostin, supra note 74, at 994. 
87 Eric Mack, Comment, The World Health Organization's New International Health Regulations: Incursion 
on State Sovereignty and Ill-fated Response to Global Health Issues, 7 Chi. J. Int'l L. 365, 367-368 (2006). 
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... 
same as in the 1889 international sanitary conference.88 The WHO's passive attitude was 
not adjusted until the SARS outbreak in 2001.89 It is the first time that the WHO, actively, 
took action.9o It issued the controversial travel advisory over the economic interests of 
member states, because the prevention of the spread of the SARS was the priority for the 
WHO at that time. 
Overall, with respect to the WHO's work in relation to the right to access medicines, the 
Agency only has had a limited contribution in legal framework. Nevertheless, within this 
limited normative framework, there are some significant contributions that cannot be 
overlooked when making an analysis of the global health governance. These initiatives 
have had an impact, at least in the rhetorical level, on the issue of medicines accessibility. 
These features can be summarized in: 
(1) the adoption of Model List of Essential Medicine; 
(2) defining the global health by the revising the 2005 IHP; 
(3) the adoption of Pre qualification Program. 
These three initiatives, if taken seriously, have the potential of increasing access to 
medicines and alleviate the impacts of the implementation of TRIPS and other trade 
agreements.91 The Model List of Essential Medicines linked with the national drug policy 
and allows states to determine which medicines they should cover in their health care. 
88 See id and Gostin, supra note 74. 
89 
Mack, supra note 93, at 365-366. 
90 David P. Fidler, Developments involving SARS, International Law, and Infectious Disease Control at the 
Fifty-Sixth Meeting of the World Health Assembly, June 2003, ASIL Insights, also avail at 
http://www.asil.org/insigh 1 OS.cfm (Last visited Feb 10,2009). 
91 The impacts of TRIPS and bilateral agreements on access to medicines have been discussed in Chapter 
2.2 and 2.3. 
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This means that a given country can customize a plan that fits the health realities in that 
country. The International Health Regulation provides a measure to determine what 
health emergency is in global level. The Prequalification Project, to some degree, 
suspends the issue of protection of pharmaceutical data. 
4.3.2 Equitable Access to Essential Medicines 
4.3.2.1 The Concept of Essential Medicines and Core Obligation 
In 1975, WHO introduced the concept of Essential Medicine by the adoption of the WHA 
28.66.92 The concept was built up for the need of developing countries to determine what 
kind of medicines should be covered by their health care and insurance programs. The 
first WHO Model List of Essential Drugs was prepared by a WHO Expert Committee in 
1977. The List is updated every 2 years following the first Model List. By the end of 
2003, 156 Member States used this Model List to develop national official essential 
medicines lists.93 
So basically the concept of essential medicines as the WHO points out is established to 
satisfy the priority health care needs of the population. 94 They are intended to be 
available within the context of functioning health systems at all times, in adequate 
92 By the resolution WHA 28.66, Assembly requested the Director-General to assist member States by 
"advising on the selection and procurement, at reasonable cost, of essential drugs of established quality 
corresponding to their national health needs" (Resolution WHA28.66), Handbook of resolutions and 
decisions of the World Health Assembly and Executive Board, Volume II, 1973-1984. Geneva, World 
Health Organization, 1985: 129. 
93 WTO, Essential Medicines List and WHO Model Formulary, available at , 
http://www.who.int/selection medicines/list/en/ (last visited Feb. 10,2009) 
94 The World Health Organization ("WHO") defines "essential medicines" as "those that address the 
priority health care requirements of a given population." 
http://www.who.int/mcdiacentre/factsheets/fs325/en/index.html(last visited Feb 10,2009). 
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amounts, III the appropriate dosage forms, with assured quality, and at a pnce the 
individual and the community can afford.95 When WHO Model List of Essential Drugs 
was prepared in 1977, this concept did not connect to the right to health.96 The WHO for 
years overlooked the connection between the essential medicines and the right to health 
and left this concept in a contentious and uncertain status.97 Until the adoption of General 
Comment 14, this gap was sealed. 
General Comment 14 highlighted the right of access to essential medicines as a core 
obligation of the right to heath. This linkage imposes on states an obligation to ensure the 
access to essential medicines with it maximum efforts by any appropriate means. Since 
the core obligation is the minimum level states should attain, states apparently can no 
longer raise any financial defense to relive thi~ obligation. Such unalienable obligation 
also provides states justified grounds to apply exceptions to exclude the protection of 
intellectual property if states lack access to essential medicines. 
4.2.3.2 The Application of the Model List of Essential Medicines 
The General Comment 14 highlighted states have obligations to ensure the access to 
essential medicines regardless of how many resources they have. Still in reality, the 
realization of this obligation will rely on how many available resources states have. The 
concept of the essential medicines helps states to set priorities for all aspects of the 
95 WHO, Equitable Access to Essential Medicines: A Framework for Collective Action, Mar, 2004 
http://whqlibdoc.who.int/hq/2004/WHO EDM 2004.4.pdf (last visited Feb. 10,2009). 
96 WHO, The WHO Essential Medicines List (EML): 30th anniversary, 
http://www.who.int/medicines/events/fsien/index.html (last visited Feb 10,2009). 
97 Jonathan D Quick & Hans V Hogerzeil. Ten best readings in . .. essential medicines, Health Policy and 
Planning. Mar 2003. Vol. 18, Iss. 1, p. 119. 
178 
pharmaceutical system and use essential medicines appropriately. Through careful 
selection of an appropriate range of essential medicines, states may allocate their 
available resource to provide a "higher quality of care, better management of medicines 
(including improved quality of prescribed medicines), and more cost-effective use of 
health resources. ,,98 
According to the WHO, the concept of essential medicine can be applied in the following 
areas:99 
(1) Basic and in-service training of health care providers 
(2) Public-sector procurement and distribution 
(3) Medicine benefits as part of health insurance 
(4) Drug donations and international aid 
(5) Monitoring systems on availability and pricing 
(6) Public education. 
Apparently, the Model List is designed to assist states to formulate their national health 
polices. Yet, the research showed that it could help in breaking down the price of 
medicines. toO The Model List provides developing countries as a reference to establish its 
national essential list and require their health institutions and health care scheme to cover 
the drugs under the lists. Thus, the Model List though is not binding, but it is a powerful 
98 WHO, WHO Medicines Strategy Revised Procedure for Updating WHO's Model List of Essential Drugs 
Report by the Secretariat, EXECUTIVE BOARD 109th Session, EBI09/S, page 1 (Dec. 72001), 
http://www.who.intlselection medicines/committees/subcommittee/2/eeb 1 09S%5b 1 %5d.pdf (last visited 
Feb 12,2009) 
99 WHO, The Selection of Essential Medicines, WHO Policy Perspectives on Medicines, Issue No.4, June 
2002, page 2, http://whqlibdoc.who.intlhq/2002/WHO EDM 2002.2.pdf (last visited on Feb 12,2009) 
100 John D. Pinzone, Note, The Affordable Prescription Drug Act: A Solution for Today's High Prescription 
Drug Prices, 16 J.L. & Health 145, 167 (2001). 
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tool to reduce the price of medicines than other price control too1. 101 Currently, the 
concept of essential medicine has become a basis that developed countries develop an 
optimal compulsory licensing system to implement the 2003 WTO Decision. In 
accordance with this Decision, the developed countries can grant compulsory license to 
manufacture life-saving medicines for export to developing countries, such as 2006 US 
Life-Saving Medicines Export Act102 and the 2004 Canadian Pledge to Africa Act. 103 
Therefore, once a medicine selected to be placed in the Model List, then the price will be 
predictably reduced to the price of the comparative generic medicine. In this manner the 
longer the list of essential medicines the more capable individuals will have access to 
medicines. 
Expanding the Model List could provide more access to medicines provided that the 
selection of essential medicines can include all new medicine without limitations. Yet, 
this is not realistic. The adequate selection of essential medicines should be based on 
factors such as disease prevalence, evidence on efficacy and safety, and comparative 
cost-effectiveness. In such way, the protection of the right to health can strike a balance 
with the promotion of the pharmaceutical research as well as effective protection of 
material interests of innovators. Nevertheless, how to select essential medicines to meet 
the goals set by the WHO is a real challenging. 
In practice, many human right advocates criticized the WHO's selection criteria of Model 
101 Jennifer A. Lazo, NOTE: The Life-Saving Medicines Export Act: Why The Proposed U.S. Compulsory 
Licensing Scheme will Fail To Export any Medicines or Save any Livesname: 33 Brooklyn 1. Int'l L. 237, 
2007. 
102 See 152 CONGo REC. S233-01, S5245 (daily ed. May 25,2006) (statement of Sen. Leahy). 
103 See The Jean Chretien Pledge to Africa Act, 2004 S.C., ch. 23 (Can.). 
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List based mainly on the cost of medicines rather the effectives of drugs. 104 They argued 
that the Model List of Essential Medicines supposed to be a list of medicines to save 
human lives, but the selection criteria excludes some expensive newer treatments that 
remain covered by patents. Many critics even derided the Model List is not essential and 
pointed out that it is not a list of all life-saving medicines. 105 The WHO's expert 
countered this argument by saying that the selection criteria expanded after 2002, the 
current selection criteria was not limited on the patent status and prices of medicines 
alone. However, WHOs' explanations are not persuasive, because ninety-eight percent of 
drugs in the Model List are off-patent products in the US. 106 Moreover, 11 are patented 
antiretroviral drugs used for the treatment of AIDS and only three patented drugs on the 
ED. 107 In this regard the scope of essential medicines should be revised at concerns of 
cost-effectiveness, as it claimed. The essential medicines should be considered to list the 
patent medicines if they are deemed to be "essential"; that is no other comparative 
generic drugs provide same "significant" effective treatment. 
4.3.3 The Definition of Health Emergency and Compulsory License Scheme 
The International Health Regulations, adopted in 1969 were primarily intended to 
monitor and control six serious infectious diseases: cholera, plague, yellow fever, 
104 David W. Opderbeck, Patents, Essential Medicines, and the Innovation Game, 58 Vand. L. Rev. 501 
(2005) 
105 Amy Kapczynski et aI., Addressing Global Health Inequities: An Open Licensing Approach for 
University Innovations, 20 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 1031, 1047-49 (2005). 
106 James Packard Love, Letter asking WHO review of the Essential Drugs List (EDL) as it relates to 
patented products, Dec. 2006, also available at 
http://www.cptech.org/blogs/ipdisputesinmedicine!2006/12/Ietter-asking-who-review-of-essential.html(last 
visited Feb. 12, 2009) 
107 !d. 
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smallpox, relapsing fever and typhUS. 108 It was revised in 2005 and its scope was 
broadened. 109 The main function of current IHR establishes a cooperative scheme that 
countries can work together to save lives and livelihoods caused by the international 
spread of diseases and other health risks without interference of trade and travel. This set 
of rules includes instructions for states to determine a health emergency in international 
level. According to the IHR, a "public health emergency of international concern" is 
defined as "an extraordinary event which is determined (i) to constitute a public health 
risk to other member states through the international spread of disease and (ii) to 
potentially require a coordinated international response.,,110 The WHO Director further 
added; "the health emergency shall be determined, on the basis of the information 
received . . . whether an event constitutes a public health emergency of international 
concern in accordance with the criteria and the procedure set out in these Regulations.,,111 
The 2005 IHRs provides an instruction for WHO members to identify what mayor may 
not constitute a public health emergency of international concern. The instruction has 
members go through the questions under Annex 2 of the 2005 IHRs. 112 If there are more 
than two "yes" answers to any of the following four questions in a given event or risk, 
108 The former set of international health regulations, adopted in 1969, applied only to cholera, plague, and 
yellow fever. See, WHO, Frequently Asked Questions about the International Health Regulations, No 1, 
available at http://www.who.int/csr/ihrlhowtheyworklfaq/enlindex.html (visited Feb 10,2009). 
109 World Health Assembly, Third Report of Committee A, AS8/SS at art 2 (May 23, 200S), available at 
http://www.who.intlgb/ebwha/pdC files/WHAS8/AS8_SS-en.pdf (last visited Feb. 10,2009) (hereinafter 
IHRs 200S). In this report, the World Health Assembly officially adopted the IHRs 200S and included its 
provisions in the document. 
110 IHR, art. 1. 
III IHR, art. 12.1. 
112 IHR, art. 12.4. 
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health risk or event in question potentially may be indentified as a public health 
emergency of international concern. Then, members must report that emergency to the 
WHO for final determination. The four identification questions are listed as follows: 113 
(1) "Is the public health impact of the event serious?"; 
(2) "Is the event unusual or unexpected?"; 
(3) "Is there a significant risk of international spread?"; and 
(4) "Is there a significant risk of international travel or trade restrictions?" 
The IHRs 2005 provides guidance as to how to indentify a "public health emergency of 
international concern" through the criteria mentioned above. The new revision is no 
longer using a rigid standard to indentify an internal emergency. Instead, this revision 
provides a more responsive way to indentify the international emergency. This means 
that a public health emergency is not only an outbreak under a list of communicable 
diseases. It may cover more situations, such as an outbreak of new infectious disease not 
in the list. It is true that the regulations is not the best way for states to determine what 
"public heath emergency" is, because some may argue the measures are too broad and 
procedure will take long time to run. 1 14 Yet, still this procedure is helpful to resolve the 
issues raised by TRIPS, when it comes to declaring health emergency. liS 
As noted in the previous chapter, in case of a health emergency, the definition of health 
emergency results in a significant legal effect in TRIPS. Article 31 of TRIPS provides 
members a ground to grant authorization of use of patent without permission of patent 
113 Mack, supra note 93, at 374-375. 
114 Id. 
115 See our discussion of this aspect in chapter three 
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holders, if states raised the health emergency defense. In such an authorization, the 
government can waive the negotiating process with patent holders. Moreover, states may 
use TRIPS flexibilities to increase the access to medicines, when they are under the 
circumstance of health emergency. Thus, the definition of public health emergency of 
international concern provides a basis as to how to evaluate the situation as an emergency. 
The standards set out by the IHR do not only provide states with a framework to 
determine whether an international health crisis exists; it also guides states as to how to 
respond to such a crisis. Moreover, once an event reaches a level of a health emergency, 
states, can, no doubt grant the compulsory license if the availability of necessary 
medicines is in question. The typical situation was the bird-flu case in Asia, 116 and the 
200 1 anthrax cases in North American. 117 
4.3.4 WHO's Prequalification Project and Data Protection 
The Prequalification Program is a procedure that provided by the WHO to evaluate the 
quality, safety and efficacy of generic medicines to facilitate access to HIV / AIDS, 
malaria and tuberculosis medicines. 118 The idea of this program is to establish a 
international pharmaceutical marketing approval scheme to increase to access to 
medicines in the disease-plagued, African nations. 119 The function of WHO in this 
116 Kathrin Hille, Taiwan licenses Tamiflu for local companies, Financial Times, (London UK), Nov 26, 
2005. p. 4. 
117 See chapter 3. 
118 WHO, The WHO prequalification project, 2004, http://www.who.intimediacentre/factsheets/fs278/en/ 
(last visited Feb. 10, 2009). 
119 David W. Childs, The World Health Organization's Prequalization Program and Its Potential Effect on 
Data Exclusivity Laws, 60 Food & Drug LJ. 79, at 79-80 (2005). 
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program is similar to the US Food and Drug Administration (FDA) to grant a marketing 
approval for drugs, in particular generic drugs. 
The procedure includes two types; 120 one is for approving generics and another is for new 
chemicals. In case of approving products containing new active pharmaceutical 
ingredients, pharmaceutical innovators generally must submit a complete data set. Those 
data can be approved by anyone of the regulatory authorities in the International 
Conference on Harmonization (ICH)121 region and associated countries including among 
others the EU, Japan and the USA 122 Thus, the standard for the approval of new 
chemical in Prequalification Program is based on the same standard of the ICH. When the 
product submitted for prequalification is a generic product, the applicant should provide 
only a summary of pharmaceutical data. A copy of summary usually includes 
toxicological, pharmacological and clinical information on each of the Active 
Pharmaceutical ingredients. 123 Currently, 150 medicines have been approved through 
this program and only several medicines are patented. 124 
120 Guide on Submission of Documentation for Prequalification of innovator Finished Pharmaceutical 
Products (FPPs) used in the treatment of HIV / AIDS, malaria and tuberculosis and approved by Drug 
Regulatory Authorities (DRAs) in the International Conference on Harmonization (ICH) region and 
associated countries, including among others the EU, Japan and USA, http://healthtech.who.intlpq! (last 
visited Feb. 10, 2009). 
121 The International Conference on Harmonization of Technical Requirements for Registration of 
Pharmaceuticals for Human Use (ICH) is a unique project that brings together the regulatory authorities of 
Europe, Japan and the United States and experts from the pharmaceutical industry in the three regions to 
discuss scientific and technical aspects of product registration. 
122 Childs, supra note 119, at 79-80 (2005). 
123 Guideline on Submission of Documentation for Prequalification of Multi-source (Generic) Finished 
Pharmaceutical Products (FPPs), Used in the Treatment ofHIV/AIDS, Malaria and Tuberculosis, 
http://healthtech.who.intlpq/ ( last visited Feb. 10, 2009) 
124 !d. 
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The Prequalification Project can increase access to medicines because it avoids having 
generic drug manufacturers submit existing pharmaceutical data. The examiner of the 
project requires the applicant only to show that the generic product has the same effect 
and as safe as the brand-name product it purports to copy.125 To prove such effect, the 
applicant for approving generic products must offer data on the active pharmaceutical 
ingredients, the specifications, the product formula, the manufacturing method, stability, 
and interchangeability, but no clinical trials are required for the approval. 126 The active 
pharmaceutical ingredient, specifications and interchangeability information guarantees 
the effect of products is the same as the brand-name product. In addition, the 
manufacturer is required to meet the WHO Good Manufacturing Practices (GMPs). 
Under the GMP system, pharmaceutical products can be ensured that they are 
"consistently produced and controlled according to quality standards appropriate to their 
intended use and as required by the product specification.,,127 
The Prequalification Program is a service, to provide the examination of the safety and 
efficacy of drugs used to fight diseases plaguing Africa. 128 The aim of the program is to 
select a list of products, which comply with the international quality standard. As WHO 
proclaims: 
"The Prequalification project is part of these activities and mandate. It does 
125 Childs, supra note 119. 
126 !d. 
127 WHO, Good Manufacturing Practice, available at 
http://www.who.jnt/medicines/areas/gualjtysafety/gualjtyassurance/production!en!jndex.html. (last 
visited Feb 10, 2009) 
128 Childs, supra note 119. 
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not intend to replace national regulatory authorities or national authorization 
systems for importation of medicines. PrequaIification draws from the 
expertise of some of the best national regulatory authorities to provide a list of 
prequalified products that comply with unified international standards.,,129 
From a legal perspective, the Project has the potential effect of alleviating impacts of data 
exclusivity because no clinical trials are required for obtaining WHO's approval. 
Assuming that, WHO could establish itself as the principal internationally-recognized 
authority on the safety and efficacy of generic pharmaceutical products in developing 
countries, the generic medicines can rely on such reference without waiting the expiry of 
data protection. 130 In this way, the WHO can become the gateway for distributing generic 
pharmaceutical products to the developing countries, or other necessary countries. This 
may be an alternative way to resolve some difficulties relating to the implementation of 
compulsory licenses and other mechanisms to increase access to medicines. 
4.4 Recent WTO Developments Relating to the Implementation of the Right to 
Medicines 
4.4.1 The Relationship between Human Rights and Intellectual Property 
There is no doubt that the implementing of TRIPS raises the cost of protection of 
intellectual properties for all states, but in particular, developing countries are hardly hit. 
Because of this, the developing countries argued that strict intellectual property laws is 
the reason that they can no longer afford basic human needs, such as healthcare, food, 
and educational materials. The tension between the protection of human rights and the 
implementation of TRIPS draw the attention of the U.N. Sub-Commission on the 
129 WHO, The WHO prequalification project, 2004 http://www.who.int/mediacentre!factsheetsifs278/en! 
(last visited Mar 2, 2009). 
130 Childs, supra note 119, at 97 
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Promotion and Protection of Human Rights (the Sub-Commission) in 2000. On August 
17,2000, the Sub-Commission adopted Resolution 200017, entitled "Intellectual Property 
Rights and Human Rights."l3l The Resolution attempts to reduce intellectual property 
rights by asserting the priority of human rights over economic policy. The Sub-
Commission's stated that international intellectual property laws were not adequately 
accounting for human rights norms. 132 Further, Resolution 200017 also called on U.N. 
Member States, intergovernmental bodies, and various U.N. entities to reaffirm their 
commitments towards of human rights, adopt a human rights approach to the 
development of international intellectual property regimes, and further study the 
interaction between intellectual property protection and human rights. The resolution; 
though not binging, its language firmly supports the position that human rights must not 
be compromised. 
4.4.2 The Implementation of TRIPS flexibilities to Access to Medicines 
In previous chapter, we have discussed Doha Declaration, subsequent Decision and 
Amendment. This serious of events showed WTO"s efforts to increase access to 
medicines by providing a framework for the implementation of intellectual property in a 
contemporary sense; that is balancing other social interests. The framework is established 
based on the expanding the flexibilities in TRIPS to increase the access to medicines. 133 
131 UN ESCOR: Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, 52nd Sess, UN Doc 
E/CNA/Sub.2IRES/200017 (2000) ("Resolution 200017"). 
132 David Weissbrodt & KeII Schoff, Human Rights Approach to Intellectual Property Protection: The 
Genesis and Application of Sub-Commission Resolution 200017,5 Minn. Intel\. Prop. Rev. 1 (2003). 
133 Musungu & Oh, supra note 18 .. 
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These flexibilities at least include several measures as follows: 134 
(1) Least Developed Countries should suspend the operation of their patent, test 
data protection and market exclusivity with respect to medicines until 2016. 135 
(2) To ensure the widest possible use of compulsory license, the countries should 
incorporate within their patent law and other related regulations to grant 
compulsory licenses. 
(3) In order to raise the exception of governmental use (Public and non-
commercial Use), states should incorporate within domestic regulation to allow 
governmental uses. 
(4) Countries should avail themselves of the widest scope in terms of parallel 
imports and incorporate explicit provisions to put into effect an international 
exhaustion regime in their nation patent law. 
(5) Expand the exceptions of patent right under Article 30. 
(6) Exclude the new use of know product or process from patentability. 
(7) Limits on the Protection of Pharmaceutical Data. 
The WTO members expected that implementing TRIPs flexibilities through the adoption 
of the Doha Declarations would efficiently increase access to medicines. However, a 
research in 2006 revealed that these expectations were misplaced. The research found 
only few developing countries availed themselves from the TRIPS flexibilities. 136 In 
these countries, "governmental use" and compulsory licenses are the only ways state use 
to increase access to medicines. It is obvious that this outcome was likely a result of 
restrictions as to how to use the flexibilities and the lack of knowledge of using other 
flexibilities. In either case, the majority of states who are in bad need to expand access to 
134 Jd, at 12-72. 
135 See, The TRIPS Countcil's Decision of June 27, 2002, WTO Document IP/C/W/25. 
136 Musungu & Oh, supra note 18, at exclusive summary. 
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medicines were not able to. Moreover, it is likely that developing countries are afraid to 
use the flexibilities because such a move would likely move foreign investments to other 
countries. The best example is Thailand. The grant of compulsory license to the 
manufactures of heart disease or AIDS resulted in withdrawal of foreign pharmaceutical 
investment in Thailand in 2007. 
4.5 Reconciling Trade-Intellectual Property with the Right to Medicines 
Why intellectual property regime should be reconciled with the Right to Medicine? The 
first question to be asked is that why countries protect intangible rights? In the answer to 
this question lies the first clue, which the key to understanding the function of protection 
in different parts of the world is. While the developed countries protect intellectual 
property in order to promote research and develop technology, developing countries 
protect them, mainly, to secure good trade relations and keep or attract foreign 
investments. 137 It is true that many factors affect the direct foreign investment, but strong, 
protective intellectual property system is the determinant factor for multinational 
corporations to consider technology transfer and investment. 138 This situation provides 
developing countries the first strong ground to adopt the strong intellectual property 
policy. The need to enter bilateral or regional trade agreements is another ground, 
perhaps the most important one, to force the developing countries to adopt the strict 
intellectual property laws. 
To enter the bilateral agreement or regional agreement, the developing countries are 
137 Robert Bird and Daniel R. Cahoy, The Impact of Compulsory Licensing on Foreign Direct Investment: 
A Collective Bargaining Approach, 45 Am. Bus. L. 1. 283, at 285-286. 
138 !d. 
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required to adopt the same level of protection of intellectual property in their trade 
partners, such as the US or the EU. The developing countries need to sell their agriculture 
products or other goods in the developed countries as well as obtain foreign investments 
and technology transfer, while the developed countries hope to sell their technology 
products in developing counties. The profit the developed countries expect is relied on 
the protection of technology. Such profit cannot be secured if the developing countries 
cannot provide the same level of protection as the US or the EU. Once the developing 
countries enter into regional or bilateral agreements, they may attract the foreign 
investments but they lose their freedom to decide what kind of intellectual property 
system they should adopt. Hence, they find themselves adopting a system that goes 
against their own interest and against their understanding of intellectual property rights. 
According to Article 15 paragraph 1 (c) of the I CESCR, the right of to benefit from the 
protection of the moral and material interests resulting from any scientific, literary or 
artistic production of which he is the author, is a human right. In General Comment 17, 
the Committee pointed out that the human right recognized in Article 15 paragraph 1 (c) 
of the ICESCR safeguards the personal link between authors and their creations as well 
as their basic material interests, which are necessary to enable authors to enjoy an 
adequate standard of living. That is states are obligated to protect intellectual property to 
ensure authors or inventors to enjoy an adequate standard of living under ICESCR 139 
139 In fact, in General Comment 17, the Committee distinguished the human right recognized the in article 
15, paragraph 1 (c) from the intellectual property rights in two aspects. First, it pointed out the intellectual 
property rights are generally of a temporary nature, and can be revoked, licensed or assigned to someone 
else, while human rights are timeless expressions of fundamental entitlements of the human person. 
The second difference between them is human right recognized in article 15, paragraph 1 (c) safeguards the 
personal link between authors and their creations and between peoples, communities, or other groups and 
their collective cultural heritage, as well as their basic material interests which are necessary to enable 
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Apparently, it is not legally wrong to protect the intellectual property, but the protection 
is not absolute. The General Comment 17 clarified that the protection of material interests 
resulting from one's scientific productions should constitute no impediment to states' 
ability to comply with their core obligations in relation to the rights to health. Further, it 
tells us that intellectual property is a social product and has a social function; thus when 
States parties protect the material interests of authors or creators, they have a duty to 
prevent unreasonably high costs for access to essential medicines. This reasoning echoes 
the underlying philosophy of General Comment 14. General Comment 14 requires states 
to make the maximum efforts to ensure access to essential medicines; this obligation 
cannot be absolved regardless of whether states have sufficient resources. Consequently, 
the right to access medicines and the right to protect the material interests of authors or 
creators to provide basic living standard are equally important. On one hand, through the 
realization of the right to access medicines, the goal of right to protect the material 
interests can be attained; on the other hand, the realization of the right to protect material 
interests can ensure the right to access to medicines. In this way both rights are reconciled. 
4.5.2 Approaches to Reconcile Trade-Intellectual Property and Access to 
Medicines 
4.5.2.1 New Development, Introduction to the Medical Research and 
Development Treaty 
authors to enjoy an adequate standard of living, while intellectual property regimes primarily protect 
business and corporate interests and investments. In this sense, the protection of intellectual property can be 
a human right if its protections are only to enable authors to enjoy an adequate standard of living; then it is 
the human right. Therefore, the difference between intellectual property regime and the human right of 15 
(c) is the level of protection but not the essence of the rights. 
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The Medical Research and Development Treaty (MRDT)140 was submitted to WHO by 
more than 150 NGOs, public heath experts, economists, and legal scholars in February 
2005. 141 The treaty aims to establish a new legal framework to promote research and 
development for pharmaceuticals and other medical treatments. In particular, this treaty, 
for the first time incorporates the right to essential medicines into an intellectual property 
treaty. It recognizes human rights and the goal of all sharing in the benefits of scientific 
advancement. 
Taking the human right approach, this treaty attempts to reshape the protection of 
pharmaceutical patent and data protection under the TRIPS and other regional or bilateral 
agreements. The drafter argued that expansive intellectual property protection rules in the 
TRIPS and other bilateral, regional agreements made it hard to use TRIPS flexibilities, 
which harm the right to access essential medicines. Further, they argued that the 
expansion of protection of intellectual property only formed the commercially oriented 
pharmaceutical researches. Thus, the pharmaceutical companies manufacture costly and 
wasteful marketing of drugs and medical products because they are profitable. In addition, 
the economic incentive intellectual property scheme drives the pharmaceutical companies 
toward developing the profitable medicines rather than the necessary medicines that can 
treat individuals throughout the developing countries. 142 By contrast, this treaty is highly 
140 Treaty on Medical Research and Development [hereinafter MDRT, 2005 Draft], available at 
http://www.cptech.org/workingdraftsimdtreatv4.pdf (last visited Feb. 12, 2009). 
141 Proposal for Treaty on Medical Research and Development (Feb. 2005), available at 
http://www.cptech.org/workingdrafts/rndtreaty.html(last visited Feb. 12, 2009) 
142 Helfer, supra note 1, at 1007-1009. 
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focused on balancing the right to access medicines in the following aspects: 143 
(1 ) promoting medical investments to meet greatest global need; 
(2) fairly allocating the costs of such innovation among governments, and sharing 
the benefits of medical innovation; 
(3) promoting equitable access to new medical technologies; and 
(4) enhancing the transfer of technological knowledge. 
There are two distinctive features of MRDT from the current intellectual property 
scheme. 144 First, the treaty adopts the concept of public good; which takes some fields of 
medicines out of the protection of patents. It means that all governments develop the 
medicines in these fields together and share the benefits of research. In this way, the 
research can be focused on medicines for neglected diseases rather than only profitable 
1432.1 Objective of Treaty (MRDT, 2005 Draft) reads: Members seek to promote a sustainable system of 
medical innovation that will: 
i. ensure adequate and predictable sources of finance for medical research and 
development, 
ii. allocate fairly the costs of supporting medical research and development, 
iii. identify priority areas of research and development, 
iv. encourage the broad dissemination of information and sharing of 
knowledge, and access to useful medical inventions, 
v. enable medical researchers to build upon the work of others, 
vi. support diversity and competition, 
vii. utilize cost effective incentives to invest in promising and successful research projects 
that address health care needs, 
viii. enhance the transfer of technological knowledge and capacity in a manner conducive 
to social and economic welfare and development, and 
ix. promote equitable access to new medical technologies, so that all share in the benefits 
of scientific advancement. 
1442.2 Mechanisms to Support Research and Development reads (MDRT, 2005 Draft): The treaty will 
provide: 
i. Obligations for minimum levels of investment in medical research and development, 
ii. Processes for priority setting, 
iii. Obligations and Incentives to support 
a. Medical research and development, including priority research and development, 
b. broader dissemination of scientific information and knowledge, 
c. enhanced transfer of technology and capacity for research and development in 
developing countries, and 
iv. Obligations and standards for transparency, including mechanisms to report, measure 
and understand the nature of the scientific, economic and 
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diseases. In order to enforce this treaty without restrictions of other agreements, this 
treaty requires all the signatories to agree "to forgo dispute resolution cases" that concern 
(1) the TRIPS provisions protecting patents and undisclosed test data, or (2) the "pricing 
of medicines." 
The treaty is the fruit of reconciling related interests, including the intellectual property, 
human rights and the promotion of technology. As the letter to WHO proclaimed, it was 
"One that seeks to provide the flexibility to reconcile different policy objectives, 
including the promotion of both innovation and access, consistent with human 
rights and the promotion of science in the public interest. The draft treaty 
provides new obligations and economic incentives to invest in priority research 
projects, and addresses several other important topics." 
Its emergence demonstrates that the need of new element to the current intellectual 
property. Although treaty's provisions and underlying philosophy are arguable, it is 
incontestable that the readjustment of current intellectual property scheme is necessary. 
4.5.2.2 ANew Limit of Intellectual Property Regime 
Because the treaty might take a long time to be adopted, people should explore other 
possibilities to reconcile Intellectual property and human rights. In this regard, General 
Comments 14 and 17 might give an insight on how to achieve this end. Through the 
overall analysis of General Comment 14 and General Comment 17, it is recognized that 
states' obligations to ensure the right to access essential medicines and states' obligations 
to protect the material interests of creator are compatible. Indeed, the access to medicines 
should be a new limit of implementing intellectual property law. This limit is 
incorporated in Article 7 of TRIPS, which identifies the need to balance rights with 
obligations. However, neither Article 7 nor TRIPS provide guidance on how to strike this 
balance. The lack of guidance, in tum, has confused members as to how they use the 
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flexibilities in accordance with its own objectives. This shortage results in some disputes 
in the late 1990s when states implemented the TRIPS flexibilities. The Doha Declaration 
tried to clarify the ambiguous flexibilities in the TRIPS, but a research in 2006 showed 
the measures that states adopt limited on the compulsory license and governmental use. 
The result has been predicted by 2001 Report of the High Commissioner on the impact of 
the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights on human rights 
(2001 Expert Report). In the Expert Report, it was pointed out that "although the TRIPS 
provides sufficient flexibilities to ensure the right to access to medicines, the prevention 
of anti-competitive practices and the abuse of rights, the promotion of technology transfer, 
special and differential treatment for least developed countries are merely referred to, the 
TRIPS does not establish the content of these responsibilities, or how they should be 
implemented." 145 It suggested that states should use these flexibilities to establish an 
intellectual property scheme to reconcile the right to medicines, by observing the 
followings: 146 
(1) The scope ofIP systems should not be too broad to block future medical 
research. For example, the patent of "me-too" drugs147 should be prohibited, 
because they are similar to the existing patent but no significant difference. 
(2) The promotion of the right to health. 
(3) The prevention of the abuse ofIPRs. For example, Articles 8 and 40 ofthe 
TRIPS prohibit anti-competitive practices. Thus, the use of patent or 
pharmaceutical data block further medical research and development efforts 
145 Report of the High Commissioner on the impact of the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of 
Intellectual Property Rights on human rights, E/CNAISub.2/2001113, 27 June 2001. 
146 Id. 
147 A drug that is structurally very similar to already known drugs, with only minor differences. 
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can be restricted. 
(4) The promotion of access to affordable essential drugs. Using TRIPS flexibility 
increase the access to affordable essential drugs, such as the grant of 
compulsory licenses for patents grounds on Article 31 of TRIPS, parallel 
importation of patented pharmaceuticals. 
Basically, the 2001 Expert's Report develops a new theory for states to build up an ideal 
intellectual property system. That is adding the new element into the current intellectual 
property regime. By adding this new element, the access to medicines, becomes a limit to 
the unlimited expansion of intellectual property from up to down. That is to say, the 
scope of exclusive rights, exceptions of exclusive rights, anti-competitive practice, patent 
misuse, eligibilities of parallel importation, compulsory license scheme and all measures 
consistence with the TRIPS should be considered from the perspective of the right to 
access to essential medicines. 
4.6 Conclusion 
Since the international community, as far as the late 1990s is aware of the potential 
conflict between the implementation of TRIPS Agreement and the realization of the 
rights to health, series of actions were taken. These actions attempted to resolve any 
possible conflict that might affect the right to health and medicines. The approach was 
that this issue must be resolved in a way that does not overstate the importance of the 
right to health or the protection of pharmaceutical innovation, but rather that to reconcile 
these two interests step by step. The process of reconciliation can be summarized in three 
historical stages; namely the Pre-Doha, the Doha Round, and after Doha era. These three 
stages is the key to understand the recent developments relating to both, the right to 
medicines and the protection of pharmaceutical products. In each of these stages, it was 
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obvious that states attempted to develop normative framework, guidelines and 
instructions that preserve the integrity of the current intellectual property regime but also 
respond to the recurrent shortcomings of the global health system. 
The Pre-Doha stage is the initial process of the reconciliation. This stage began from the 
late 1990s until the adoption of the Doha Declaration in 2001. In this stage, it was 
apparent that the international community is aware of the impact of implementing the 
TRIPS on the right to health or the right to medicines. Their awareness became the 
underlying incentive for a movement that, in depth, explored the right to health and 
clarified states' obligation to protect this right. Indeed, the term right to health has been 
incorporated into the various global and regional human rights instruments since World 
War II. These human rights instruments, though in theory guarantee the individual's right 
to health, in reality this right remains just a lofty ideal for many. One of the factors that 
contributed to the right being unrealizable for many was that, the right's content and 
scope were not clear. In fact the jurisprudence relating to the right to health and the 
requirements to fulfill this right were not established, not until the adoption of General 
Comment 14. In this respect, perhaps the adoption of the Comment remains the most 
significant achievement of this stage. The Comment clarifies several things about the 
right to medicines and gives clear instructions for states as to how to enforce this right. It 
adopted the concept of essential medicines and Model List of Essential Medicine, which 
were introduced by the WHO in 1977. By adoption ofthese two concepts, the Committee 
successfully connected the WHO's functions with human right and this made the WHO 
regulation binding on states. More importantly, it clearly states that the right to health, 
including the right to essential medicines is a fundamental "human right." The states have 
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obligation to protect this right with maximum efforts to ensure the access to essential 
medicines. Therefore, states realized that national policies, in every aspect, should take 
account of the right to access essential medicines, and this consideration, in turn, 
impacted the intellectual property law. 
In the second stage, 2001-2005, namely the Doha Round stage, states recognized their 
obligation to protect the right to health and to ensure access to essential medicines. The 
jurisprudence, established by General Comment 14 and subsequent intellectual property 
and human rights debates made by the UN Sub-Commission on Human Rights, namely 
resolution 2001121 have greatly influenced this era. These initiatives coupled with the 
mounting international concern from NGOs and developing countries called on WTO 
members to implement the right to access medicines. After prolonged negotiations, the 
WTO completed the 200 1 Doha Declaration, 2003 Decision and 2005 Amendment. 
These documents attempted to strike a balance between the intellectual property and the 
access to medicines. Indeed, these three documents regardless of how much positive 
impact they had on the implementation of the right to medicines, they began a new , 
relationship between intellectual property and human rights. The WHO as the default UN 
agency to promote the right to health also has a few contributions on access to medicines. 
By adoption of the International Health Regulation, it defined the term "health 
emergency', which provides WTO member states a standard to trigger the health 
emergency exception to exclude patent or data exclusivity in TRIPS. Meanwhile, the 
adoption of Prequalification of Program also alleviates the impact of implementing data 
exclusivity on access to medicines. In sum, this stage successfully introduced the human 
right element-the right to health into the intellectual property regime. 
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The third stage, namely After-Doha Round is after the emergence of the 2005 
Amendment until toda~. This stage is evolving. By the introduction of the new element 
into the intellectual property, i.e., human rights, the international community began to 
design various strategies to meet the goals set out in the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS 
Agreement and Public Health. Not long after the emergency of the 2001 Doha 
Declaration and 2005 Amendment of TRIPS, their influence began to appear. In the 
global level, in 2008, the WHO adopted the Global Strategy and Plan of Action on public 
health, innovation and intellectual property, which is focused on access to essential 
medicines for diseases specifically found in developing countries. 148 Unlike human rights 
instruments, the Strategy does not use the human rights' inspirational and lofty language, 
it is rather quite practical. It specifies every task, itemizes every action and distinguishes 
the obligations of states, WHO, and international organizations. In the regional level, the 
US trade policy incorporated the Doha Declaration, recognized the flexible interpretation 
of TRIPS and confirmed to use the flexibilities in TRIPS to increase the access to 
medicines. In the domestic level, at least the US, and Canada have adopted new 
compulsory license scheme in order to provide medicines which are needed in the 
developing countries. 
The main underlying idea of the Doha Declaration is based on the reform of the current 
compulsory license scheme and mitigating the impact of some hardships that was existed 
6: 
b~cause of the rigid requirements of the exceptions that was originally allowed by 
148 The Intergovernmental Working Group (lGWG) on Intellectual Property (lP), Innovation and Health 
was established under the World Health Assembly (WHA) Resolution 59.24 and completed Global strategy 
and plan of action on public health, innovation and intellectual property on WHA61.21, May 2008, 
available at http://www.who.intlgb/ebwha/pdf files/ A61 / A61 R21-en.pdf (last visited Feb. 10,2009). 
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intellectual property law. This approach seems to be the best the international community 
can do right now. The rest, i.e., the implementation, the international community through 
international cooperation, can achieve it. In fact the fruit of this new Amendment of the 
TRIPS, though not binding,149 began to appear immediately; in 2007 according to this 
new compulsory license scheme Canada exported generic medicines to Rwanda. 150 Not 
only this, but there seems to be an expansion of the flexible compulsory license scheme, 
because this very scheme was used to provide essential medicines and medicines for the 
treatment of chronic diseases. 
While it is true that this new scheme is still evolving, it is predicted that it will likely to 
become a powerful measure to resolve, if not ease the tension between the right to 
medicines in the developing countries and the protection of pharmaceutical innovations. 
However, in the long run, the intellectual property in relation to the pharmaceutical 
products, in particular in the area of essential medicines, should be adjusted. In 2005 
public health experts, economists, legal scholars and more than 150 NGO, with the 
support of developing countries, submitted to the WHO the Medical Research and 
Development Treaty (MRDT). The MRDT attempts to establish a new legal framework 
to promote research and development for pharmaceuticals and other medical treatments. 
The treaty adopts the concept of public good, which takes some fields of medicines out of 
the protection of patent law. Although the fate of the treaty is not yet clear, but the 
proposal of such a treaty per se is indicative of how things might, or should go in the 
149 Currently, WTO members are not bound to the 2005 Amendment to the TRIPS, because it has not been 
ratified by two thirds of members. 
150 S d' .. Ch 3 ee ISCUSSlon In apter. 
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future. 
Apparently, access to medicines will be the new element or factor that shapes and defines 
intellectual property law. How knows, perhaps the right to medicines will be the new 
frontier of the intellectual property law. If this should be the case, in the near future, from 
button to top, the whole intellectual property system is likely to be adjusted and 
accommodated to conform to this new development. This means any measure favors the 
expansion of access to medicines such as limitation of scope of pharmaceutical patents or 
pharmaceutical data, the prohibition of anti-competitive practice, the exceptions of 
exclusive right, including patent and pharmaceutical data, would likely be widely used to 
broaden access to medicines. 
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5 A Case Study of Taiwan's Pharmaceutical Patent & Data Protection and Access to 
Medicines 
5.1 Introduction 
It is uncontestable that the right to access medicines is successfully realized in Taiwan 
through the implementation of National Health Insurance, which covers 99 % of the 
island population. 1 The total health spending for this high coverage rate is about 6% of 
the GDP in 2008, less than 13.0 % in the US, 9.2 % in Canada, and 7.1 % in the United 
Kingdom, respectively.2 The modest expenditure even provides the highest average 
number of outpatient visit per capita in the world3 and low fee around $1.5-5 for an 
outpatient visit. 4 Amazingly, this high success does not trade off the protection of 
pharmaceutical innovation. To the contrary, the protection of pharmaceutical patent and 
data adopts the same standards as the US. This made it more significant to study the 
Taiwanese case to understand how a developing country implements the protection of 
intellectual property without prejudicing the right to medicines. 
1 Ma Kang-Yao, The Achievement o/National Health Insurance The Achievement o/National Health, 
Insurance, Jan. 8, 2006, also available at 
http://www.nhi.gov.tw!cnglish!wcbdata.asp.?mcllu-II &mCl111 id~ '98&wcbclata id-19 J 9 (last visited Feb. 
20,2009) 
2 Tammy Chang et. al., How Taiwan Does It: Seeing More Patient/or Less, Physican Excutive, 
July/August 2005, page 38. 
3 DOH, Co-Payment Rate, available at 
hltp://www.nhi.gov.tw/webdata!webdata.asp?menu=1 &menu id=6&webdata id=384& WD 10= (last 
visited Feb. 25, 2009). 
4Nicole Huang, Winne Yip, Yiing Chou and Pen-Jem Wang, The Distribution o/Net Benefits under the 
National Health Insurance Programme in Taiwan, Health Policy and Planning Issue 22, 49-59 at 5 I 
(2007). 
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In the previous chapters, we have explored the potential conflicts between the protection 
of TRIPS and access to medicines. It is also noted that these two interests should be 
reconciled because both of them are equally important for states. This chapter is a case 
study of Taiwan. Picking Taiwan was not a coincidence; it is a rather deliberate attempt 
to show how a developing country adopts TRIPS to protect pharmaceutical innovation in 
one hand and realize the right to medicines on the other hand; i.e., the reconciliation 
objective we want to attain. In order to analyze Taiwan case, this chapter overviews the 
pharmaceutical industry in Taiwan, demonstrate pharmaceutical patent and data 
protection, discuss the implementation of national health insurance. 
Learning from Taiwan case will give some lessons as to how a country, on one hand 
cannot but adopt the US sty Ie protection for pharmaceutical and on the other hand, meets 
its obligation to ensure the right to heath. Additionally, the case of Taiwan also shows 
that the protection of pharmaceutical innovations can be reconciled with the right to 
medicines even in a country, like Taiwan that has limited pharmaceutical manufacturing 
capabilities. 
5.1 An Overview of Pharmaceutical Industry in Taiwan 
According to the 2008 Taiwan Pharmaceuticals and Healthcare Report, the total Taiwan's 
pharmaceutical market is $4.29 billion.s This amount is less than 1 percent of global 
pharmaceutical market ($735-745 billion in 2007).6 The small market though is not favor 
5 Taiwan Pharmaceuticals and Healthcare Report Q4 2008, at summary (Business Monitor, 2008) 
6 IMS Health Predicts 5 to 6 Percent Growth for Global Phannaceutical Market in 2008, According to 
Annual Forecast, available at 
!mp://W\\W .imsheaith.col1liportaJisitc/il1lshcaith/l1lcnuitem.a46c6d4d tJdb4b3d88f611 0194i8c12a1'.'vgncxto 
~2ddb I d3bc7a29il OVgnVCM 1 0000071812ca2RCRD&vgncxtfl1lt--dcfault (last visited Feb. 25, 2(09) 
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to develop a research oriented pharmaceutical market. However this small market 
supplied half of the country's medicines in Taiwan. Another half is imported from 
developed countries, such as Germany, the US, England, etc.7 
The certain features with regard to Taiwan's pharmaceutical industry distinguish it from 
the pharmaceutical industries in Research and Developed (R&D) oriented countries. The 
first of these features is foreign R&D technology. The pharmaceutical industry in Taiwan 
normally produces products licensed by foreign manufacturers. The marketing 
pharmaceuticals manufactured in Taiwan only comprised about 77%. Nevertheless, 80% 
sale of medicines in Taiwan is produced by foreign pharmaceutical companies.8 The 
Taiwanese Pharmaceutical companies though did some genetic related research and 
developed certain biotechnological products; they do not have capability to develop 
patent drugs. Realizing this fact, Taiwanese government had to provide higher standard 
of protections of pharmaceutical innovations than that offered by other developing 
countries in order to attract foreign investments and exchange technology transfer. 
The second important feature is that local based pharmaceutical compames that are 
capable of manufacturing are small in terms of size and capital Due to high cost of 
developing a new drug, these local companies do not have sufficient fund to do that kind 
of R&D. The Taiwanese government was aware about this weakness. Thus, the 
7 Industry Technology & Intelligence Service (IT IS), g~~~~~~2005 [Pharmaceutical Industry 2005 
Report] page 219-210, http://www.itis.org.tw/FrccPDF/25604155/tif.!4·~~ii:*HWE()L.pdf (last visited on 
Feb. 25, 2009) 
8 ITIS, tlt~fljfflii~I~IHf~iiH!;J1Ei¥J~~~1f~~~m~ [The Taiwanese Strategy and Strengthens in 
Developing New Drug for New Use] available at http://www.itis.org.tw!FreePDF!61100450/{XI!·x:lfIJJlJ1l) 
~~M7:t(;ffiJtijJ!!iij1JEiJ"Jff JH~@t &'W·%OBllilll'6-,t¥i:r\:.pdf, (last visited on Feb. 25, 2009) 
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development strategy of pharmaceutical is focused on two aspects. With respect to R&D, 
governmental research centers and public universities will transfer the local 
pharmaceutical manufactures at low price.9 With respect to manufacturing, the focus is 
on strengthening the ability of clinical trials and raising quality of manufacturing instead 
of the capability of developing new drugs. In 2003, there are 243 qualified Good 
Manufacturing Practice (GMP) pharmaceutical companies in Taiwan. This approach has 
at least two benefits for Taiwan. First, the government can decide the research focus on 
the medicines, which are necessary to citizens. Second, the government can build up the 
capability of local pharmaceutical companies to supply generic medicines. 
Apparently, lack of capability of pharmaceutical R&D is the weakness of Taiwanese 
pharmaceutical industry. Therefore, boosting international technology transfer from 
multinational corporations to domestic corporations becomes the most important strategy 
to build up local capability of pharmaceutical manufacturing in Taiwan. In 2002, the 
Taiwanese Government adopted the national plan for the Development of Biotech and 
New Pharmaceuticals IndustrylO and further passed the Biotech and New Pharmaceutical 
Development Act in 2007. 11 This Act containing thirteen articles to develop biotech, 
9 Mei-Yu Wang, The Impact of Information Cultures on Managing Knowledge, a Double Case Study of 
Pharmaceutical Manufactures in Taiwan, Library Review; 2006; 55, %; Research Library Core, pg. 29. See 
also, R&D http://www.bpipo.org.tw/en/rd.html(last visited on Feb. 25, 2009). 
10 The Biotechnology & Pharmaceutical Industries Office (hereinafter BPIO), Biotech Policy and 
Promotion Status in Taiwan, http://bpipo.moeaidb.gov.tvv/en/policy.html(last visited Feb. 9,2009) 
11 Annie Huang, Legislature Passes Biotech Act, June 09, 2007. See also Taiwan Development Center for 
Biotechnology (DCB), The Overview of Biotechnology: Taiwan, Sep 8, 2008, available at 
h!1p://www.bionetasiapacific.com/bnap/ovcrvicw/laiwan.pdf (last visited on Feb. 25,2009). 
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attempts to strengthen technology transfer. 12 In order to establish a friendly investment 
environment of biotech industry, the Taiwanese government provides many incentives, 
such as preferential taxes, low interests loan, preferential location with low rent, and 
special governmental subsides program for forging direct investments. 13 
With respect to the legal framework, Taiwanese government has built a legal 
environment to protect the foreign investments through strengthening the protection of 
intellectual property rights of biotechnology. The entire structure for pharmaceutical 
innovations is based on the intellectual property law and pharmaceutical law. The related 
laws with respect to the intellectual property include Patent Act, Trademark, Copyright 
Act, and Trade Secret Act etc. 14 The related pharmaceutical law and regulations includes 
1993 Regulation of local clinical trial requirements, the Pharmaceutical Affairs Law, 
Orphan Drug Law, Good Manufacturing Practice for Medical Devices, Clinical Good 
Manufacturing Practice (cGMP) for Pharmaceutical Drugs, and Good Manufacturing 
Practice for Pharmaceuticals. 15 
5.2 Pharmaceutical Patent 
Taiwan joined World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2002. Before acceSSIOn, the 
Taiwanese government set being a WTO member state as the top priority of policy not 
12 The Biotech and New Pharmaceutical Development Act (Taiwan), passed lun 15,2007, available at 
http://lis.ly.gov.tw/npl/fastl028l4/9606l4.htm (last visited Feb. 20, 2009). 
13 BPIO, The Biotechnology Industry Investment Incentives in Taiwan 2007 - 2008, available at 
h!tp:llwww.biopharm.org.tw/en/download.html(last visited Feb. 25, 2009). 
14 BPIO, Laws and Regulation regarding Taiwan's Biotech Industry, available at 
!l.ttp:llwww.bpipo.org.tw/en/laws.html(last visited Feb. 25, 2009) 
15 I d. 
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only for economIC reasons but also political considerations. Prior to accession, the 
Taiwanese government took several steps to remove a wide variety of tariff and non-tariff 
barriers, including the reform and the protections of Intellectual Property Rights (IPR). In 
the WTO accession agreement, the Taiwanese government promised to amend its IPR 
protection regime to conform the TRIPS. 16 Thus, the current protection of pharmaceutical 
patent meets the standards of the TRIPS. In the protection of pharmaceutical innovation, 
Taiwan government is obligated to enforce Article 27 and pertinent provisions, which 
require states to grant the patent to pharmaceutical products. In addition, the US laws 
have significant influence on Taiwanese Intellectual Property system, in particular patent 
law. Like US, a Taiwanese patentee has twenty years from the grant of the patent and has 
right to restore the patent term if it is pharmaceutical product. 
5.2.1 The Recent Reform of Patent Act 
The Patent Act was enacted in 1944.17 Since then, it has been amended several times. The 
recent important reform of the Act resulted from the accession to the WTO. This reform 
appeared in the Amendments of 1997, which adjusted the existing patent act to comply 
with TRIPS standards. 18 The 1997 reform includes the right of priority, 19 deregulation of 
16 Report of the Working Report of the Working Party on the Accession on the Separate Customs Territory 
of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu submitted to Ministerial Conference, Fourth Session, Doha, 9-13 
November 2001, by Chinese Taipei, II November 2001, WTO document WT/MIN(01)/4, also available at 
h!tp://\Vww.wto.org/ensdish/theWTO e,'acc e/completeacc e.htmlo'lpkm (last visited Feb. 25, 2009). 
17 The History of Patent Act, available at http://www.tipo.gov.tw/ch/AlllnOne Show.aspx'Jsw id-098527fc-
4dac-473c-9b83-11 dd6b9bc66')&lang~zh-tw&path=379 (last visited Feb. 25, 2009). 
18 Part of Patent Act Articles Amended in May 1997 (for WTO), available at 
http://www.tipo.goy.tw/en ! A IllnOne Show.aspx'?guid=4 7862cc7 -7a88-4b8e-968b-
QJ 958500 15bd&lanL(=en-us&path= 1450 (last visited Feb. 25, 2009). 
19 Before the accession of WTO, the Taiwanese government has recognized the patent right of other 
countries through bilateral agreements, such agreements with Spain, Phillips, Austria, France, Costa Rica, 
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the pre-requisites of microorganism patent for foreigners,2o restoration of patent term for 
pharmaceutical-related or agrochemical-related patents, and extending new design patent 
term to 12-year, amending provisions concerning patent marking requirements, grounds 
of unauthorized use, etc. 21 
The current patent system affects pharmaceutical industry in three aspects: First it 
determines the subject matters of the patent; second, it deals with restoration of patent 
terms; and third, with respect to the right to medicines, it governs the application of the 
exceptions to exclude the patent protection under emergency situations. These three 
aspects are pretty much the legal framework by which the government protects 
pharmaceutical products and strikes a balance between this protection and other social 
interests, including the right to medicines. 
5.2.2 Patentable Subject Matter 
In Taiwan, patent are granted to three types of innovations: 22 
Chile, England, Germany and the US etc., available at 
http://WWW.lipo.gOY.lw i ch/AIII11011(; Show .aspx')path~ 3 54&guid~21 f49b4b-4542-44c(;-b6b 1-
bcf4b55cO 199&lal1£ -zh-tw (last visited Feb. 25, 2009). 
20 See Taiwan Intellectual Property Office (hereinafter TIPO) comment regarding the patent of 
microorganism (Document TIPO No. 09100(2350) available at 
http://www.tipo.goY.tw/ch/ All InOne Sh()w.aspx'?path~ I 676&guicl-c dac84 723-0tbc-46fa-a5f5-
4103d591 cl320&lan~-zh-tv, (last visited Feb. 25, 2009). 
21 TIPO, Q&A about Patent, available at http://olclweb.tipo.gov.tw/engho\\toiprocedures-p l.aspi:l2 (last 
visited Feb. 25, 2(09). 
22 Article 2 of the Patent reads: 
The term "patent" referred to in this Act is classified into the following three categories: 
l.1nvention patents; 
2.Utility model patents; and 
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(1 )Invention patents; 
(2)Utility model patents; and 
(3)Design patents. 
The invention patent is granted for any creation of technical concepts by utilizing the 
rules of nature?3 The utility model patent is available for the creation of any form, 
formation or apparatus of a structure created by technical concepts by utilizing the acts of 
nature, while the design patent is not required to make by technical concepts by utilizing 
the acts of nature. 24 The design patent is distinguished from the utility patent because it is 
only available for any creation of the shape, pattern, color, or combination thereof of an 
article through eye appea1.25 
In 2002, the Taiwanese Intellectual Property Office published an official comment 
(document no. 91 TIPO 09100041340) to distinguish these three types of patents. 26 
3.Design patents. 
23 Article 21 of the Patent Act reads: 
The term "invention" as used herein refers to any creation of technical concepts by utilizing the rules of 
nature . 
.;' 24 Article 93 of the Patent Act reads: 
The tenn " utility model" shall refer to any creation of technical concepts by utilizing the acts of nature, in 
respect of the form, construction or installation of an article. 
25 Article 109 of the Patent Act reads: 
The tenn " design" shall refer to any creation made in respect of the shape, pattern, color, or combination 
thereof of an article through eye appeal. 
The tenn "associated design" as used herein refers to a creation made by the same person, which is 
originated from and similar to hislher original design. 
26 TIPO, Document No 09100041340, availa at 
h!tp: !/www.tipo.gov.lw/ch/A IllnOne Show.aspx'?palh~ 1675&gLlid~a50940ar-2db9-41 eO-aOn-
~fd611 a9868&lang-zh-tw (last visited Feb. 25, 2009). 
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According to this comment, the subject maters of invention patent can be a physical 
object or a method. A physical object includes material and physical formation. The 
material contains chemical, pharmaceuticals, eatable object, and bacterial. Thus, the 
pharmaceutical inventions are protected under the invention patent. 
The protection of patent is not absolute under the Taiwanese Patent Act. Patent Act 
excludes certain areas to grant invention patent, utility patent and design patent. With 
respect to the invention patent, three areas are excluded as follows: 27 
(1 )Animals, plants, and essentially biological processes; 
(2)Diagnostic, therapeutic or surgical operation methods; and 
(3)An invention is contrary to public order, morality or public health. 
This limitation is introduced at the time of accession to the WTO, therefore the scope of 
this provision, essentially is same as that of Article 27.3 of TRIPS. 
In the utility patent, the Patent Act excludes the inventions contrary to public order, 
morality or public health to be protected. In design patents, the invented item can be 
rejected under any of the five enumerated grounds:28 
(1 )The design is solely dictated by the function of the said article; 
(2)the design only contains art meaning; 
(3)the design is a layout of integrated circuits and electronic circuits; 
(4)the design is contrary to public order or public health; and 
(5)the shape is identical or similar to the symbols or service marks used by nations, 
27 Patent Act, art. 24 (Taiwan). 
28 Patent Act, art. 97 (Taiwan). 
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political party. 
In accordance with the definition of invention patent, the pharmaceutical product is 
patentable subject matter in Taiwan. It can be granted a patent, if the new product can 
meet three requirements: being novel,29 being non-obvious3o and being useful.3l 
5.2.3 The Patent Term and Restoration Patent Term 
The Restoration Patent Term strikes a balance between the regulations of pharmaceutical 
products and protection of patent. The US began to extend the patent term in 1984. The 
purpose to extend the patent term for another five years is considered that the effective 
pharmaceutical patent life is frequently less than 20 years because pharmaceutical patents 
only make profits after pharmaceutical products were actually marketed. According to 
Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA) and the Public Health Service Act, 
applicants for the approval of new human drug should undergo extensive testing in 
animals and humans to show that the drugs are both safe and effective. 32 These 
requirements shortened the patent life of pharmaceuticals. Thus, in order to stimulate the 
development and innovation of pharmaceutical product, the US Congress in 1984 passed 
the Title II of the Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act to extend 
pharmaceutical patent life to compensate patent holders for the lost of marketing time 
29 The requirement of utility can be read in Article 22.1, 94.1 and 110.1 of Patent Act. 
30 The requirement of novelty can be read in Article 22.1, 23, 94, 95, llO and III of Patent Act. 
31 The requirement of being non-obvious can be read in Article 22.4, 94.4 and 110.4. 
32 FDA, Frequently Asked Questions on the Patent Term Restoration Program, Question 1, available at, 
http://www.fda.gov/CDERIabout/smallbizipatenttenn.htm (last visited Feb. 25, 2009). 
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while developing the pharmaceutical product and awaiting health agency approval. 33 The 
Act in the beginning applied to patent only holders whose patents claim a human drug 
product, medical device, food additive or color additive could recoup some of the lost 
patent time. In 1988, Congress extended the scope of patent restoration to animal drug 
products.34 
The basis for patent extension is to compensate the lost of time due to pharmaceutical 
regulatory review.35 Basically, a regulatory review period contains two parts: a testing 
phase, and an approval phase. 36 The testing phase is a period from the date of an 
Investigational New Drug Application) to submission of Drug Application. The approval 
phase is a period from the submission to obtain the marketing approval. Under the Drug 
Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act, the restoration of patent can be 
granted for five years because of the delay of regulatory review. In addition, the Congress 
limited on total patent life for the product with a cap that the patent extension cannot 
exceed 14 years from the product's approval date. 37 In this sense, if the pharmaceutical 
products after approval still can market 14 or more years, then patent extension is not 
applicable for them. 
33 John R. Thomas, Pharmaceutical Patent Law, page 293-299 (2005). 
34 See Generic Animal Drug and Patent Term Restoration Act (Public Law 100-670) . 
35 FDA, supra note 32, at Question 8. 
36 !d. 
37 Id at Question 3. 
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Normally, in Taiwan, the patent term is 20 years from the date of filing for invention 
patent, 10 yeas for utility model patent and 12 years for design patents respectively. 38 The 
Taiwan Patent Act also provides the patent tern extortion for the pharmaceuticals.39 
Article 55 of the Patent Act grants a period of 2-5 years to restore the pharmaceutical 
patent.40 This extension is restricted to exceed the actual period of regulatory review. This 
38 The Patent Act, art 51 III (Taiwan), states "The term of an invention patent right shall ends with twenty 
(20) years from the filing date of the patent application." 
The Patent Act, art. 101 III (Taiwan), states "The duration of a utility model patent right shall be ten (10) 
years from the filing date of the patent application." 
The Patent Act, art. 113 III (Taiwan), states "The duration of a design patent right shall be twelve (12) 
years from the filing date of the patent application; and the duration of an associated design patent right 
shall expire simultaneously with the duration of the original design patent right." 
39 Article 52 of Patent Act (Taiwan) reads: 
In the case of invention patents covering pharmaceuticals, agrichemicals, or processes for preparing the 
same, a patentee may apply for an extension ofhislher patent term for two (2) to five (5) years, if, pursuant 
to other acts or regulations, a prior government approval must be secured to practice such patents, for 
which the processing exceeds two (2) years after the publication of the patents. Only one such extension 
shall be permitted provided, however, that the patent term extended shall not exceed the length of time 
required for obtaining an approval from the central government authority in charge of end enterprises. In 
case the length of time required for obtaining an approval exceeds five (5) years, the term of extension shall 
still be limited to five (5) years. 
Any application for an extension of the term of a patent right must be filed with the Patent Authority by 
submitting a written application together with supporting evidence within three (3) months from the date of 
the first government approval involved provided, however, that no extension application shall be filed 
within six (6) months prior to the expiration of the original patent term. 
To determine the term of extension of a patent under the preceding Paragraph, the Competent Authority 
shall take into consideration the impact of the extension on the health of nationals in general and shall 
prescribe the approving rules in conjunction with the central government authority in charge of the end 
enterprises concerned. 
Article 53 of Patent Act (Taiwan) reads: 
The Patent Authority shall designate examiner(s) to examine an invention patent extension application and 
shall make written decision which shall be served on the patentee or his/her patent attorney. 
40 Article 55 of Patent Act (Taiwan) reads: 
In the case of invention patents covering pharmaceuticals, agrichemicals, or processes for preparing the 
same, a patentee may apply for an extension of hislher patent term for two (2) to five (5) years, if, pursuant 
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means that the extension might be less than 2 years if the period of actual regulatory 
review is less than 2 years. Unlike the US law, the patent extension is only applicable to 
pharmaceuticals and agrichemicals.41 
To be eligible for the restoration, the applicant should submit the application before six 
months prior to the expiration of the original patent term.42 The extension is revocable if 
any person files a complaint against the extension on the following grounds:43 
(l)if it is not necessary to obtain a government approval for practicing the patented 
invention at issue; 
(2)if the patentee or hislher licensee has not obtained a government approval as 
required; 
(3)if the approved term of extension exceeds the length of time in which the patented 
invention can not be practiced; 
(4) if the patent extension application is filed by a person other than the patentee; 
to other acts or regulations, a prior government approval must be secured to practice such patents, for 
which the processing exceeds two (2) years after the publication of the patents. Only one such extension 
shall be permitted provided, however, that the patent term extended shall not exceed the length of time 
required for obtaining an approval from the central government authority in charge of end enterprises. In 
case the length of time required for obtaining an approval exceeds five (5) years, the term of extension shal1 
still be limited to five (5) years. 
Any application for an extension of the term of a patent right must be filed with the Patent Authority by 
submitting a written application together with supporting evidence within three (3) months from the date of 
the first government approval involved provided, however, that no extension application shall be filed 
within six (6) months prior to the expiration of the original patent term. 
To determine the term of extension of a patent under the preceding Paragraph, the Competent Authority 
shall take into consideration the impact of the extension on the health of nationals in general and shall 
prescribe the approving rules in conjunction with the central government authority in charge of the end 
enterprises concerned. 
41 Patent Act, art. 55 (Taiwan). 
42 Patent Act, art. 52 (Taiwan). 
43 The Patent Act, art. 54 (Taiwan). 
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(5) if the patent right is jointly owned by two or more persons, and the extension 
application is not filed in the name of all co-owners; 
(6)in case the application for extension was based on the time spent in conducting 
experiments or testing in a foreign country, the extended term allowed by the Patent 
Authority exceeds the duration recognized by the patent authority of such foreign 
country; or 
(7) the time required for obtaining an approval is less than two years. 
5.2.4 The Grounds to Exclude Patent 
In accordance with Article 1 of Patent Act, the aim of patent is to encourage, protect and 
utilize inventions and creations so as to promote the development of industries. However, 
Article 76 of the Patent Act provides several grounds to exclude protection of patent to 
strike a balance of public interests.44 The Chinese term " !f,f~q:'j!f:om" used in Article 76 
44 Article 76 of Patent Act reads: 
I. In order to cope with the national emergencies, or to make non-profit-seeking use of a patent for 
enhancement of public welfare, or in the case of an applicant's failure to reach a licensing agreement with 
the patentee concerned under reasonable commercial terms and conditions within a considerable period of 
time, the Patent Authority may, upon an application, grant a right of compulsory licensing to the applicant 
to put the patented invention into practice; provided that such practicing shall be restricted mainly to the 
purpose of satisfying the requirements of the domestic market. However, if the application for compulsory 
licensing of a patent right covers semiconductor technology, such application may be allowed only if the 
proposed practicing is purposed for a non-profit-seeking use contemplated to enhance the public welfare. 
II. In the absence of the conditions set forth in the preceding Paragraph, the Patent Authority still may, 
upon an application, grant to the applicant a compulsory license to practice the patented invention in the 
event that the patentee has imposed restrictions on competition or has committed unfair competition, as 
confirmed by a judgment given by a court or a disposition made by the Fair Trade Commission of the 
Executive Yuan. 
III. Upon receipt of a written application for such compulsory licensing, the Patent Authority shall send a 
duplicate copy thereof to the patentee, requesting that a response be filed within three (3) months. Ifno 
response is filed within the specified time limit, the Patent Authority may decide the matter at its own 
discretion. 
IVThe right of compulsory licensing shall not preclude other persons from obtaining the right to practice 
the same patented invention. 
The grantee of the compulsory license shall pay to the patentee an appropriate compensation. In the case of 
dispute over the amount of such compensation, the amount shall be decided by the Patent Authority. 
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refers to a "special permission for third party to enforce patent right." This term is 
borrowed from the Japanese Law, 13 *!f,f~f¥!.45 The special permission for third party 
required the third party to apply a permission to enforce the patent without permission of 
patent holders. It created the same legal effect as the compulsory license (Chinese term 
5~H!JiJ~fi) , but it is a bit different in Chinese meaning. The term "5m#JiJt~fi" means 
that the government grants a license to third party against the patentee's will and more 
like a government contract. The English translated Patent Act did not distinguish these 
two terms precisely in Article 76, which used "compulsory license" rather than special 
permission for third party to enforce patent right." Indeed, the term "un-authorization 
use" in Article 31 of TRIPS can be used because it is a precise English term, and that it 
captures the meaning Article 76 intended to convey. 
Under Article 76, there are four grounds to exclude the patent: 
(1) The government can grant a compulsory license for non-commercial use 
grounds on the national emergency 
(2) A compulsory license for non-commercial use grounds on the protections 
for public interests. 
(3) The third party may apply a special permission against patentee if he/she 
cannot enter a voluntary agreement with reasonable conditions within 
reasonable time of negotiation. 
(4) If the anti-competitive practice is confirmed by a judgment given by a 
court or a disposition made by the Fair Trade Commission of the 
The compulsory license shall be transacted together with the business pertaining to the compulsorily 
licensing for assignment, trust, inheritance, licensing or pledge creation. 
Upon extinguishment of the cause of compulsory licensing, the Patent Authority may terminate the 
compulsory license upon an application. 
45 See ~fljy!m-t;+t\{~:s'z:Y!lJ.1E [The Legislatve History of Article 76 of Patent Act]. 
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Executive Yuan. 
Article 76.5 requires the third party to pay an appropriate compensation to the patentee. 
In the case of dispute over how much the compensation that the patentee should pay to 
the patent owner, the amount will be decided by the Taiwan Intellectual Property Office. 
This way would drive the patentee to enter a voluntary license within reasonable time and 
prohibit the unreasonable delay of the entry of generic products. 
Compared to the grounds to exclude patent under Article 31 (b) of the TRIPS, the grounds 
under Article 76.1 are essentially the same. In accordance with Article 31(b) and (f) of 
the TRIPS, without the authorization of the right holder under Article 31 can be applied 
in any circumstance but should meet three requirements: (1) the use for public interests, 
(2) the user has made efforts to obtain authorization from the right holder on reasonable 
commercial terms and conditions and that such efforts have not been successful within a 
reasonable period of time, and (3) use shall be authorized predominantly for the supply of 
the domestic market of the Member authorizing such use. 
The second requirement in Article 31 of TRIPS can be waived if the in the case of a 
national emergency or other circumstances of extreme urgency or in cases of public non-
commercial use. Likewise, in accordance with Article 76.1 of Patent Act, applicants in 
the cases of national emergency and non commercial use, are not required to make efforts 
to obtain permission from the right holder on reasonable commercial terms and 
conditions within a reasonable period of time. This is the same rationale of Article 31 (b) 
of TRIPS. 
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Beside the cases other than national emergency and non-commercial use, Article 76.1 
allows government could grant a special permission for any purpose if the three 
requirements are satisfied. First, it requires the grant should be for public interests. 
Second, a licensee has negotiated with a licensor on reasonable commercial terms and 
conditions but they could not reach an agreement within a reasonable period of time. 
Again this arrangement is the same as the article 31 (b). With the third requirement, 
Article 76.1 also imposed the same limitation that the use should be predominately in the 
domestic market. 
Beside three requirements mentioned above, Article 76.2 provides a remedy for anti-
competitive practice, determined after judicial or administrative process, which is similar 
to the Article 31 (k). Overall, the significant difference of Article 76 from Article 31 of 
the TRIPS agreement is the introduction of a scheme to determine the reasonable 
compensation when the disputes come form the compensations. 
5.2.5 The New Draft Amendment of Patent Act 
As a member of WTO, Taiwan government made efforts to comply with the WTO's 
decisions and polices. After the Doha Declaration and the 2005 Amendment of TRIPS 
were adopted, the Taiwanese government made effort to implement the WTO's policy to 
promote access to medicines in the developing countries. 
Currently, with respect to pharmaceutical products, the Taiwanese Patent Office drafted 
the pertinent provisions and had them published to receive opinions from academia and 
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related industries. 46 The 2008 draft Amendment of Patent Act in relation to the 
pharmaceutical products is focused on several issues. The first adjustment is to reform 
current compulsory license scheme in order to produce medicines for countries lack 
manufacturing capacities. Second, it readjusted the procedure of applying patent 
extension. The third change is to add another ground to exclude patent that is the 
experimental and research exception. 
Regarding the first adjustment, the reform is focused on the waiver of the requirement 
that the unauthorized use should be provided predominantly in the domestic market.47 
The 2008 Draft of the Amendment of Patent Act attempted to insert new articles to waive 
the requirement under Article 76 of Patent Act. As mentioned above, Article 76.1 
requires the manufacturer, who has been authorized by a compulsory license, to provide 
drugs predominantly in the domestic market. Likewise, the full compliance with 
requirements of TRIPS disables the Taiwanese government to export generic medicines 
to other countries lack manufacturing capability. The reform loosens the requirements of 
the compulsory license with certain conditions. First, the qualified disease to waive these 
requirements is limited to; tuberculosis, malaria, and other infectious disease. Second, the 
importing countries are not limited to the WTO member, but they should be qualified as 
the Least Developing Countries (LDCS) under the UN's standard or developing counties 
46 Taiwan Intellectual Property Office, TIPO to sponsor public hearing for Patent Act draft amendment 
from March 7, 2008. All circles are welcome to attend, available at 
http://oldweb.tipo.gov.tw/eng/press/ne20080304.asp (last visited Feb. 25, 2009). 
47 TIPO, Reasons to Amend to Article 76 of Patent Act, 
http://www.tipo.gov.tw/ch/AlllnOne Show.aspx?path=2769&guid=45f2eged-6a50-488e-8514-
47a78e3cc320&lang=zh-tw (last visited on Feb. 25, 2009). 
220 
that are defined under the TRIPS. Third, the importing countries should complete the 
necessary notifications to the Council to TRIPS. 
The second adjustment is with respect to the patent restoration in several aspects. It 
limited the extension of patent to one time. Second, only pharmaceuticals for human use 
can be qualified for the extension, and those for animal use are excluded for the 
extension. Third, it annulled the requirement that the patent extension is applicable only 
in a case where the registration period is over 2 years. In the 2008 reform, the patent 
extension will apply to every case where the marketing approval acquired after a patent is 
granted regardless of whether the registration period is over 2 years. Finally, it attempts 
to remove the lower limit of patent term. In accordance with Article 52 of Patent Act, the 
patent term can be granted from 2 to 5 years. 48 The new reform refers to the 
contemporaneous legislations in the US, Japan and other countries and takes out verbatim 
limitations.49 The reform though, neglects to put the caps on the available patent life. This 
neglect may unreasonably extend the patent and delay the entry of generic medicines. 
The third adjustment provides an exception to exclude patent if the use is for research and 
experimental purposes. For years, Taiwan case law has recognized that the experimental 
use is permitted under the Patent Act; the 2008 reform is reaffirmed the court's opinion. 50 
48 Patent Act, art. 52 (Taiwan). 
49 TIPO, Document No. 09818600080, Feb. 28, 2009, the new update Draft Amendment of Patent Act is 
available at http://www.tipo.gov.tw/ch/News NewsContent.aspx?NewslD=3520, (last visited Mar. 1,2009) 
50 See TIPO, Patent Act Reform Forum, The Reasons to Amend the Article 57 in 2008 Draft Amendment 
of Patent Act, available at http://WWW.lipo.goV.lW/ch/AllInOne Show.aspx'?path=2769&guid=4SQeged-
§.a50-488e-8514-47a78e3cc320&lang=zh-tw (last visited on Feb. 25, 2009). 
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5.3 The Protection of Pharmaceutical Data 
The development of concept of protection of pharmaceutical data is highly related to the 
development of Taiwanese pharmaceutical industry as well as the pharmaceutical 
registering scheme. The 1993 local clinical requirement built up the local capability of 
clinical trials and initiated the protection of domestic pharmaceutical data. In 2002 when 
Taiwan jointed to the WTO, the protection of pharmaceutical data became an issue. At 
that time, Taiwan stated that the pharmaceutical data are protected under the Trade Secret 
Act and explained such protection complied with Article 39.3 of TRIPS. The 2005 reform 
of pharmaceutical law further granted a five-year term of data exclusivity for originators. 
5.3.1 The Introduction to Pharmaceutical Registering 
5.3.1.1 Western Medicines 
The history of pharmaceutical industry in Taiwan has over 60 years, but the legal regime 
for pharmaceutical industry was not established until early 1980s,.51 In 1981, the 
Taiwanese introduced the GMP standard to pharmaceutical industry and assisted local 
247 pharmaceutical companies to certify by the standard of GMP. 52 The early 
development of pharmaceutical industry is focused on how to manufacture good quality 
of generic medicines. In this stage, the Taiwanese's Department of Health (DOH)53 
51 ITIS, The Current Pharmaceutical Industry and Trend, chapter 4: Taiwanese Pharmaceutical Industry, ( 
~~J¥*gUJL5fiJ..~~.~1iJf1E), 1996, available at http://www.ilis.org.lwTrccPDF/95987870J!@;]P1ilI:Ug~ 
~;[ Jliil.i)L~> H (pdf (last visited Feb. 25, 2009). 
52 Id 
53 According to the Department of Health, its mission is to promote medical, health care, and disease 
prevention, as well as food, drugs, as well as cosmetic management and health insurance affairs. See 
Mission of DOH, available at 
http://www.doh.gov.tw/EN2006/DM/mission.aspx?class _no=392&level_ no= 1 (last visited Feb. 25, 2009). 
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concerned the inspections of medicines and supervised the manufactures. This situation is 
demonstrated in the legal regime for the protection of pharmaceutical innovation. The 
pharmaceutical registration scheme was focused on the capability of manufacturing and 
even Patent Act before its modification in 1986 protected only the "manufacturing 
process" of new drugs rather than the end products. 
In the 1990s, the protection of intellectual property became a major Issue In trade 
negotiations between the United States and Taiwan. Under the pressure of the US 
representatives, the Taiwanese government promised to amend the domestic laws to 
provide a better protection for pharmaceuticals. The first significant modification in 1993 
established new requirements for registration of drugs and at the same time initiated the 
legal regime of protection of pharmaceutical data. 54 Since then, the Taiwanese 
pharmaceutical industries strengthened the quality of manufacturing as well as devoted to 
the research and development of new drugs. With respect to pharmaceutical law, many 
guidelines regarding the clinical trials and registration of new drugs and Chinese 
Medicines are completed during the period between 1993 and 2002, but the entire reform 
of regulations of clinical trail since 1993 has not completed. The DOH further introduced 
the concept of bridging study, which deals with issues of variance of forging clinical 
trails resulting from the variance of ethnics and populations in 2000. 55 This new 
54 See infra Section 5.3.2. 
55 See infra Section 5.3.3. 
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requirement indirectly promotes the development of capability of clinical trails 
conducting in Taiwan. 56 
The accession to the WTO in 2002 initiated another legal reform in pharmaceutical law. 
In 2005, five years of data exclusivity is granted for pharmaceuticals. In the same year, 
the first new medicine (Chinese traditional medicine) passed the New Drug Application 
(NDA) and a license was issued to it in June 2005. This was the nation's first new 
medicine passing the Investigation of New Drug (IND) & NDA examination. 57 This 
indicates that the Taiwanese pharmaceutical industry would extend its antenna to the 
development of new drugs rather than the manufacturing of generic medicines. In this 
way, the protection of pharmaceutical data will be more important than ever. 
In 2008, the American Chamber of Commerce in Taipei expressed that Taiwanese 
government should provide more secured protection of pharmaceutical innovations and 
proposed three major points regarding the protection of pharmaceutical innovation: (1) 
the Implementing Separation of Dispensing from Prescribing (SDP), (2) patent linkage 
with marketing approval of new drugs; and (3) the pricing and reimbursement of new 
drugs/indications. 58 The issue of patent linkage related to the entire registration of new 
drugs and another two issues regarding the national health insurance. They are likely to 
56 ITIS, supra note 7 and 8. 
57 Committee on Chinese Medicine and Phannacy (CCMP), 2005 Achievement of the Commission on 
Chinese Medicine, http:.www.ccmp.goY.tw/en!public i public.asp?selllo=93&relllo=93&level=C (last 
visited Feb. 25,2009) 
58 Amcham, White Paper Phannaceuticals 2008, available 
http:./www.amchalll.com.tw!compoilcilt/option.com docmall!task.cat v iC'v\/g id, 163dir. 0 ESC/ordcr.datc/l1 
em id.3 77 II im it.1 ()!Jim itstart.l O!, (last visited Feb. 25, 2009). 
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be the new focus In the next stage of trade negotiations between the US and the 
government. 
5.3.1.2 Chinese Medicines 
According to 2006 Taiwan Year book, as of December 2005, there were 25 Chinese 
medicine hospitals, 2,900 Chinese medicine clinics, and 4,610 licensed doctors of 
Chinese medicine in Taiwan.59 Chinese medicine is valuable and popular in Chinese 
society. Indeed, they are enjoying a considerable respect among modern Western 
medicines. In Taiwan, Chinese herbal medicine is recognized as medicines and subject to 
the Pharmaceutical Affairs Act. Nevertheless, the approval process for marketing is 
separate from that for western medicines. The reason for using different surveillance 
system to the Traditional Chinese medicine is that they are distinguished from modern 
medicine in many aspects, such as physiological theories, etiology, diagnostics, 
therapeutics and pharmacology.6o 
There are two branch mainly responsible for the reviewing of Chinese Medicines as new 
drugs: the Committee on Chinese Medicine and Pharmacy (CCMP) and the Center for 
Drug Evaluation assists the Committee on Chinese Medicine and Pharmacy (CDE-
CCMP).61 The function of these two agencies is equal to the function of the FDA in the 
59 2006 Taiwan Year Book, chapter 16, available at http:!\vww.gio,gov,tw,taiwan:'i-
gp\earbook 16PublicHealth,htm iiTraditionalChinesel'vkdicine (last visited Feb. 25, 2009), 
60 Ruiping Fan, Modem Western Science As a Standard for Traditional Chinese Medicine: A Critical 
Appraisal, 31 J.L. Med. & Ethics 213, 213 (2003), 
61 Krishna Kaphle et. al., Herbal Medicine Research in Taiwan, eCAM 2006;3(1) 149-155 
doi: 10.1 093/ecam/nekO 16, page 151-152 (2006), also available at 
http://ecam,oxforcljournals,org'cgi i col1lCl1lifuWn 149 (last visited Feb, 25, 2009), 
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marketing approval of new drugs in the US. 62 The CCMP is responsible for 
promulgating, revising, and issuing regulations. It is also responsible for the approval, 
registration, and importation of the Chinese herbal medicines, including determination of 
the years of exclusivity, and approval of the design and protocol of the clinical trials. The 
CDE-CCMP is a technical department, which is designed to assists the CCMP in 
conducting primary and technical reviews for both INDs and NDAs. The CDE-CCMP 
also assists the CCMP in drafting related guidance. 
To regulate the Chinese Medicine, CCMP under the authorization of DOH oversees 
practices of traditional Chinese medicine. Unlike in the US, Chinese medicines are 
recognized as medicines rather than the dietary supplements in the US.63 The difference 
between the food supplement and medicines is that if the product is recognized as a 
medicine, then the marketing of Chinese Medicines should apply a permit before they 
enter the market. In this regard, the CCMP requires the Chinese Medicines to meet 
certain requirements to obtain the permit before they entered the market. 
The current regulation considered some of the Chinese Medicines have been used for 
thousands of years without adverse effects. Thus, they designed a special reviewing 
scheme to screen the safety, and quality of the Chinese medicines. This scheme classifies 
62 Fong Chi et at., From Chinese Herbal Medicine to Botanical Drug: Regulatory Requirements from 
Taiwan to a United States IND Submission (2003), 
http:!'v\ww.cde.on!.tvv·fiiellpioad!tabiename!from %20(11 inese%20 Herba 1%20M ed ic ine'%20to% JOBotan ic 
ai%JODrllg .... pdf(last visited Feb. 25, 2009). 
63 Yuan Lin ed., Drug Discovery and Traditional Chinese Medicine: Science, Regulation and Globalization, 
page 160 (2004). 
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the Traditional Chinese Medicines in three groups and determines what requirements 
should be satisfied in order to obtain marketing approval in each group.64 
In the first group, a manufacturer of a Chinese herbal medicine claims an indication based 
on the theory of traditional Chinese medicine as "defined" in five classics of Eastern 
literature. 65 In this case, the only requirement is that, manufacturing of medicines should 
comply with GMP. This group of medicines, efficacy and safety data is waived based on 
long-term human experience with the Chinese herbal medicine. 
In the second group, a manufacturer of a Chinese herbal medicine is not defined in five 
classics of Eastern literature but would like to claim an indication based on the theory of 
modern medicine. In this case, the Chinese herbal medicines are recognized as a new 
drug, thus the requirements of manufacturing, testing, and clinical trials to approve the 
Chinese Medicines are similar to new western medicine. That is to say the manufacturing 
of a Chinese herbal medicine as a new drug must comply with GMP, and the analytical 
and animal testing, such as non-clinical pharmacological and toxicological studies, must 
comply with Good Laboratory Practice (GLP) as well as Clinical trials must comply with 
Good Clinical Practice (GCP).66 
Once TCM products are permitted to enter the market, they are protected under the 
Pharmaceutical Affair Act. The permit to market is five years. 67 This permit is approved 
64 The Standards of Examination and Registration for Medicines, art. 75 (Revised on September 15, 2005) 




by two stages of processes: the so-called IND stage and the New Drug Application 
(NDA) stage. 
The same logic to decide whether the clinical trial is required is also applied in 
determining the requirement to approve Chinese herbal medicines. The current law 
determined how much data should be submitted on the basis of how much understanding 
of the safety and effectiveness of these drugs. The more understanding and experience of 
these medicines, the less data would be requested. Apparently, the authority adopts more 
flexible regulations than west medicine with respect to safety of IND applications for 
Chinese herbal medicines.68 
In accordance with Article 40-1 of Pharmaceutical Affairs Act, data submitted to the 
health agency for marketing approval are protected for five years. In this regard, if the 
marketing of Chinese Medicine, which is not defined in the five classics of Eastern 
literature, required applicants to submit data in order to obtain the approval; those data 
are protected for a five-year term from the date of approval. 
5.3.2 The 1993 Local Clinical Trial Requirement 
Article 39 of Taiwan Pharmace~tical Affairs stated that manufacturing and importing 
drugs should be permitted by the DOH.69 Further, it states that the marketing approval 
68 For example, if botanical products with little human experience or unknown safety, a full IND is required 
to start a phase 1 study. In the case of botanical products that are already on the market but where optimal 
Use for the new indication might be beyond previous human experience, or those where safety in the 
proposed therapeutic dose is not a concern, the data submitted for the approval of marketing is less than 
new drug. 
69 Article 39 of Taiwan Pharmaceutical Affairs Act [translated text is provided by Taiwan DOH website 
)reads 
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should be governed by the Criteria Governing the Review for Registration and Market 
Approval of Drugs. The Criteria incorporates two sets of procedures for western 
medicines; one is provided for the approval of new drug and another is for generic drug. 
Nevertheless, the new drugs registration scheme did not operate until 1993. Before that, 
most critics argued that the registration scheme is much like a procedure requirement 
rather than substantial reviewing of clinical trails. The major reason account for this 
result is that more than half of medicines are imported and they have been tested in other 
countries. Unless the DOH rejected the results of foreign clinical data, they did not have 
to make any further review. Consequently, the function of health agency regarding the 
pharmaceutical administration was focused on regulating pharmaceutical manufacturers 
rather than substantial reviewing pharmaceutical data. In this stage, there is no special 
protection for foreign pharmaceutical data unless the act constitutes a breach of contract 
or a tort. 
I.For the manufacturing and import of drugs, information concerning the ingredients, specifications, 
functions, summary of manufacturing process, and the specification and method of testing, as well as other 
related information and certificates, accompanied by labels and use instructions in the original and Chinese 
languages, and samples, together with the fee paid, shall be filed with the central competent health 
authority for registration and market approval. No manufacturing or importation of such drugs shall be 
allowed until a drug permit license is approved and issued. 
2.Provisions of the preceding Paragraph shall not apply to application to the central competent health 
authority for importation of raw materials for the manufacturing. Said application criteria and application 
fee shall be determined by the central competent health authority. 
3 .Only the owners of a drug permit license or their authorized persons may apply for import of drugs 
pursuant to the provisions of the first Paragraph. Application for change or transfer of registration of drug 
permit license obtained as per for registration and market approval the first Paragraph shall be conducted in 
accordance with the provisions under Article 46; the issuance of extension of registration, replacement, or 
new permit license shall be conducted in accordance with the provisions under Article 47. The application 
criteria, review procedure, approval criteria, and other matters to be complied with shall be established in 
the Criteria Governing the Review for Registration and Market Approval of Drugs by the central competent 
health authority available at 
http://www.doh.gov.tw/ufilc/Doc/200507 Phannaccutical%20Affairs%20Act.pdf, (last visited on Feb 1, 
2(09) 
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In 1993, the US trade representatives in Trade and Commerce Agreement meeting 
highlighted the poor protection of pharmaceutical innovation and required the Taiwanese 
government to provide better protections for them. 7o Under the pressure of the US 
representatives, the Taiwanese government amended the regulations of the marketing 
approval. On July 7, 1993, the DOH issued new regulations in relation to registration of 
new drug, which was so called the Seventy Seven Announcement. 71 This new regulation 
is authorized by Article 45 of the Pharmaceutical Affairs Act. The Article declares that 
the DOH can set a period of time to monitor the imported medicines and required certain 
information. 72 Under this new regulation, the DOH required that a new pharmaceutical 
product registering should be mandatory to conduct a domestic clinical trial with a 
minimum of 40 subjects, except for the submission of relevant documents in accordance 
with the existing regulations under the Pharmaceutical Affair Act; if the drug is not 
developed in Taiwan or clinical trials are not conducted in Taiwan.73 After approval, 
marketing exclusivity will be granted to the sponsor for the 7-year safety monitor period. 
70 The DOH, tt0'6-[77 Announcement], DOH document No. 08246232, issued on July 7, 1993, 
http://www.cdc.org.lw/bsc wcbsitc/report77.hlml (last visited Feb. 25, 2009). 
71 DOH, The History of 77 Announcement, Document No. 8246232, on July 7, 1993. 
hUp:I/'vvww.cdc.org.tw!bsc wcbsitc/english/background.html (last visited Feb. 25, 2009). 
72 Article 45 of Pharmaceutical Affair Acts (Taiwan): 
The central competent health authority may set a specific period of time for monitoring the safety of new 
drugs approved for manufacturing or import. 
The central competent health authority shall establish matters that the pharmaceutical dealers shall adhere 
to during the safety monitoring period referred to in the preceding Paragraph. 
73 eDE, Background of Bridge Study, available at 
http://www.cde.org.twlbse_website/englishlbackground.html. (last visited Feb. 25, 2009). 
230 
In accordance with Seventy Seven Announcement, the subsequent generic drug should 
submit the same local clinical trail data as the originator submitted if it plans to 
manufacture, import the generic version of respective brand name drug within five years 
from the first date of first registration of brand name drugs. The generic manufacturer can 
provide either local or foreign bio-equivalence data, if it registered after 5-7 years of the 
first registration of brand name drug. This regulation though is not a data exclusivity law, 
but it creates the same legal effect. Such requirements create a marketing exclusive effect 
for originators for five years, because generic manufacturers cannot enter the market 
without costly spending in producing pharmaceutical data. 
The purpose of 77 Announcement is to encourage the importation of patented drugs and 
promotion of domestic R&D through drug surveillance system. This system requires any 
medicine marketing in Taiwan, if it is not developed in Taiwan, to conduct safety 
surveillance of new drug in designated medical center within seven years from the date of 
the issuance of marketing approva1.74 In the first five year, no generic application to 
manufacture or import by a third country (other than Taiwan and the country of origin) 
will be accepted during this surveillance period unless they can submit the same reports 
of domestic clinical trials equivalent to those of the original manufacturer. From 5-7 
years after the date of issuance of approval, the generic application should submit a report 
of bioequivalence tests that have been conducted by either domestic or DOH-authorized 
foreign laboratories. 
74 See Id. 
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By July 1995, 241 chemical entities and 412 new drug formulations had been placed 
under surveillance. The DOH believed that new drug safety surveillance did detect some 
adverse side effects which previous clinical trials may have missed, and expand the 
clinical capability of local pharmaceutical industry. 
However, the adoption of 77 announcements did not stop the reform of Taiwanese 
Pharmaceutical Registration scheme. Many critics argued that the local clinical 
requirement of new drug is meaningless for two reasons.75 First, a sample size of 40 as 
required would be difficult to demonstrate significant importance clinically or 
statistically. Second, the study design of the local trial usually only repeated a study that 
has been done in foreign countries but in a smaller sample size. Therefore, this 
requirement is wasteful and has no scientific value. 
The DOH attempted to relieve the negative impacts after the implementation of July 7 
Announcement. Since its adoption, the DOH had issued five announcements regarding 
the conditions for waiving domestic clinical trials since 1998 and 2000 and these waivers 
also provide a relief to the unnecessary local clinical trial requirement by 77 
Announcement. The early announcements are focused on the waiver for the new drugs 
containing breakthrough effect and life-saving drugs.76 The rest of them include orphan 
drugs, drugs for treatment of AIDS, for use in organ transplants etc.77 
75 Mey Wang and Herng-Der Chern, Implementation of Bridging Strategy in Taiwan, available at 
h ltp:1 Iwww.cde.org.tw!() 3 center/write/book()? cll m p I em en tation%2()ot%2 0 B ri dging%20S trategy%2 Oin%2 
OTaiwan.pdf (last Feb. 25, 2009). 
76 The first announcement, effective on Mar. 30,1998 (DOH document no. 87011284), waives clinical 
trials for four types of medicines: (1) Drugs for Treatment of Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrom 
(AIDS); (2) Drugs for Organ Transplant; (3) Ethnic Incentive Cancer Drugs; and (4) no sufficient number 
of patients for human trial and no alterative medicines for that specific drug. 
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5.3.3 The Bridge Study and Waiver 
In 2000, the DOH found those waivers of July 7 cannot resolve the issue resulting from 
itself- non-meaningful repetition of local clinical trails. The DOH finally revoked the July 
7 Announcement and on December 12, 2000 DOH issued the Bridging Study 
Announcement (the Double-Twelve Announcement) to substitute for the Double-Seven 
Announcement. 78 The Double-Twelve Announcement was effective January 1,2001 and 
it granted 3 years of transition period. It attempts to avoid the repetition of the clinical 
trials, and to improve the quality of local clinical trials by introducing guidance ICH-
E5. 79 In addition, this Announcement imposed new drug applicants obligation to conduct 
bridging before submitting the application. The essence of bridge study is to evaluate the 
impact of ethnical differences on the efficacy and safety of the new drugs through 
The second announcement, effect on June, 19, 1998 (DOH document no. 87040663) waive clinical trials 
for another three types of medicine: (1) the medicines have "breakthrough" effect for the treatment of life-
threatening diseases, such as advanced cases of AIDS etc. , (2) medicine are evidently ethnic insensitive 
and breakthrough effect, (3) radio medicines for diagnosis. 
The third announcement, effected on, waived clinical trials for certain types of vaccine and medicines for 
treatment for psychiatric medicines and chronic immunity system disease, such as Rheumatoid Arthritis, 
Systemic lupus erythematosus (SLE), Schizophrenia. Such disease is conditional waive, which means the 
DOH required the register should provide data to prove ethnic insensitive to waive the domestic clinical 
trials. 
The fourth announcement is focus on the four types medicines: (1) the medicine for single use (2) the same 
therapeutic effect as the approval new combinations(3) medicines containing local tissues prepared for 
external use, such as topical skin preparations, ophthalmic preparations, ear preparations. (4) nutrition 
supplements, such as large-scale of amino acids infusion fluid. (5) Intestine Cleansers used only before the 
surgery. 
See also Ames Gross, Taiwan: New Pharmaceutical Regulatory Trends, Pacific Bridge Medical, 2000, 
http://www.paciticbridfLemedical.com/publications/html!TaiwanMarch2000.htm (last Feb. 25, 2009). 
77 /d. 
78 Hui-Po Wang, Clinical Trials in Taiwan: Regulatory Achievement and Current Status, page 6, 
http:(www.cde.org.tw i 03center\vrite/book02 a/C I in ica 1%20Trials(%20in%, IOTa iwan%E2%80%94Regulat 
oly%20Ach ievement% IOand%20Current%20Status.pdf (last Feb. 29, 2009). 
79 CDE, supra note 73. 
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studying of sets of intrinsic and extrinsic factors. 8o Results from the bridging study 
evaluation would determine whether foreign clinical trial data could be extrapolated to 
Taiwanese populations and whether further clinical trials in Taiwan could be waived. 8l In 
accordance with Double Twelve Announcement, the pharmaceutical industry had to 
submit data to prove the minimal or no ethnic difference in the efficacy and safety profile 
of the drug. If the pharmaceutical industry cannot provide evidences to clarify this query, 
a bridging study will be required to demonstrate the applicable dose regimen in Taiwan. 
The implementation of bridge study can be observed in three stages. 82 The first two-year 
transition period of Announcement began from January 1, 2001 to December 31, 2002. In 
this transition period, namely the first stage; applicants had options either to conduct a 
registration trial with a minimum of 40 cases in Taiwan or to present a bridging study 
evaluation package before new drug application (NDA) submission. Thus, the evaluation 
as to whether the bridge study is required is optional. Even if pharmaceutical company 
decided to run a bridge study evaluation in Taiwan, it is flexible to conduct either a 
bridging study to resolve the ethnic concern or a registration trial directly when the 
evaluation requires conducting the bridge study. 
In the period between January 1, 2003 and December 31, 2003, namely the second stage, 
all products should go through bridging study evaluation rigidly, unless the conditions of 
waivers existed. The objective of this stage is to educate all pharmaceutical industries in 
80 Mey Wang and Herng-Der Chern, supra note 75. 
811d. 
82 DOH, ~+ =0i5[Double Twelve Announcement,], Document No. 0890035812, available at 
http://www.cdc.oJ.!!.tw/bse wcbsitc i rcport33.hlml (last visited Feb. 25, 2009). 
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Taiwan to prepare and submit the required package for evaluation. In this stage, it is still 
flexible; applicants can choose a registration trial even after the evaluation. After 2004, 
namely the third stage, the process of bridging study evaluation remained the same. 
However, if the bridging study cannot be waived by registration trial of 40 cases, they 
have to conduct bridging study.83 The difference between the second and third stage is 
before the end of 2003, if a bridging study may not be waived, applicant has the options 
of either doing a 40-case clinical trial (following the Double-Seven Announcement) or a 
required bridging study. After January 1, 2004, however, the 40-case trial will no longer 
be accepted and the sponsor will have to do a required bridging study if not waived. 
The DOH also issued two announcements to provide ground to waive the bridge study.84 
Those grounds mainly based on the ethical consideration and risk/benefit assessment; e.g. 
major therapeutic advance for life-threatening diseases, rare diseases, etc. Moreover, due 
to the minimal concerns in ethnic sensitivity, a clinical trial can be waived in some 
categories such as topical-use drugs, which have minimal systemic exposure. For these 
drugs, the impacts of ethnic difference on efficacy and safety are expected to be 
negligible. 
5.3.4 Data Exclusivity 
5.3.4.1 The Background to Incorporate Data Exclusivity 
83 Chia-Ling Hsiao et. AI, Algorithm for Evaluation of Bridging Studies in Taiwan, 
http://www.cde.org.tw.1fileupload!tablename/Algorithm%20for'%20Evaluation%20of'?'o20Bridldng%20Stud 
ies%20il1%20Taiwal1.pdt~ (last visited Feb. 25, 2009). 
84 The DOH issued the :li:li-0'i5-[May fifth Announcement], (Document # 0930309777) to waive the 
bridge test, including, drugs for treatment of AIDS, drugs for use in organ transplants; breakthrough drugs 
that are diagnostic radio-phannaceuticals and are proven ethnically insensitive; intestine cleaner etc. also 
available at http:!·www.ccic.org.lwlbsc wcbsitc!rcport33.hlml (last visited Feb. 25, 2009). 
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The protection of foreign pharmaceutical data became an issue in 2002-2003, after a few 
papers highlighted the increasing spending in health care after the implementation of the 
National Health Insurance. 85 This spending, however, did not increase the profits of 
international pharmaceutical companies. Those multinational pharmaceutical companies, 
which provide medicines to Taiwan, found that they either sale medicines at low price or 
sale nothing. Those pharmaceutical companies considered that one reason for this result, 
perhaps, is because the Taiwanese government did not provide enough protection of 
pharmaceutical innovation, such as the grant of data exclusivity. 
In the 2003 US Commerce Association Annual Report and the EU Commerce 
Association 2002-2003 report pointed out the Taiwanese government should provide data 
exclusivity protection to comply with Article 39.3 of the TRIPS agreement. In the 2004 
Special 301 report, USTR strongly expressed that they are concerned whether Taiwan 
made the necessary changes to its relevant laws to prevent unfair commercial use of 
pharmaceutical and agricultural chemical test data.86 If not, they would consider put 
Taiwan in the Special 301 List. Under these economic threats from the US and EU, the 
Taiwanese government finally incorporated Article 40-1 of Pharmaceutical Affairs to 
grant the data exclusivity in 2005.87 
85 The Legislative History of Article 40-1 of Ph ann ace utica I Affair Act (Taiwan). 
86 The 2004 Special 301, available at 
http://www.ustr.govlDocument_Library/Press _ Releases/2005/JanuaryIUS _ Annuonces _Results _ oC IPR _ Ou 
t-of-Cycle _Reviews jor ]01_ Taiwan.html?ht= (0 
87 Article 40-20fPhannaceutical Affairs Act (Taiwan) reads: 
Upon the issuance of license for any new drug, the Central Competent Health Authority shall publicize the 
relevant patent numbers or file numbers, which are supplied by the applicants and already disclosed to the 
public. 
236 
5.3.4.2 Data Exclusivity: Terms and Conditions 
In accordance with Article 40-1.1 of Pharmaceutical Affairs Act,88 all data submitted by a 
pharmaceutical company, except that which is disclosed to the public by the 
pharmaceutical company relating to the safety and effectiveness of a drug, is kept 
confidential by the Department of Health unless they are disclosed to public for public 
health purpose. Further, Article 40-1.2 provides "data exclusivity" covering safety and 
effectiveness data submitted by a drug company. Under this law, a generic drug company 
may not obtain an approval for the same drug within 5 years from the first date of original 
approval unless it can provide the same data, namely data exclusivity right. This right 
includes several aspects, some of which even provide protection that is beyond the 
protection required by TRIPS. 
Within five years after the issuance of a license for new drug of new molecular entity, any other 
pharmaceutical firm may not apply for evaluation and registration of the same items by citing the data 
submitted by the licensee without such licensee's authorization. 
After three years of the issuance of a license for new drug of new molecular entity, other pharmaceutical 
firm may apply for registration of drugs of the same substance, the same dosage form, the same dose, and 
the same dose unit according to this Act and related laws or regulations; the drug license may be issued on 
the next day to the expiration of five years after the issuance of license to such new drug of new molecular 
entity. 
The second paragraph hereof con only be applicable with the compliance that application for registration of 
a new drug of new molecular entity shall be made to the Central Competent Health Authority within three 
years after it is first approved for marketing in any country. 
The patent right of the new drug shall not be applicable to researches, teachings, or testing prior to the 
application for registration by the pharmaceutical firms. 
88 Article of 40-1 Pharmaceutical Affairs Act (Taiwan) reads: 
For the public benefit, the Central Competent Health Authority may, if necessary, publicize the drug 
substances, package insert, or relevant information, which are supplied by pharmaceutical firms in their 
application for manufacturing or importing medicaments and thus held and kept by such Health Authority. 
The Health Authority shall keep in confidence any trade secrets in the new drugs application which are 
under evaluation before registration. 
The Central Competent Health Authority shall enact measures governing the extent and method of the 
publication authorized by the preceding Paragraph. 
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The first aspect is that this data exclusivity applies both to new drug and new use or 
dosage, which have been approved for an existing drug. 89 In accordance with Article 39.3 
of TRIPS, the protection of data is provided for the new chemical entities.90 This means 
that the new chemical entities that is a chemical that has not been used as a registered 
medicine in human history and did not contain the meaning of new use or new dosage. 
Compared to TRIPS, the scope of Article 40-2 of Pharmaceutical Affairs Act is new 
medicines, which covered more than new chemical. Article 7 of Pharmaceutical Affair 
Act stated that the term "new drugs" as used in this Act shall refer to drugs which are of 
the preparations having new compositions, new therapeutic compounds or new method of 
administration as verified and recognized by the central competent heath authority. 
The second aspect is that the adoption of data exclusivity. Article 39.3 of TRIPS also 
established the concept of data protection in international law level, but it leaves a room 
to decide a measure to protect pharmaceutical data. Apparently, Article 40-2 adopted the 
US type of data exclusivity to protect pharmaceutical data. 
The third aspect is that the adoption of waiting period in the area of protection of 
pharmaceutical data. In accordance with Article 40-1.2, the foreign originator should 
register the new drugs to be qualified for the protection of data exclusivity within three 
years of first foreign registration. After three years from the date of the first registration 
89 The Article 40-2 state the data exclusivity is applied to all new drugs, According to the article 7 of 
Pharmaceutical Affairs Act, "the term "new drugs" as used in this Act shall refer to drugs which are of the 
preparations having new compositions, new therapeutic compounds or new method of administration as 
verified and recognized by the central competent heath authority. " (the translated provisions is provided by 
the Taiwanese DOH website)Therefore, the data exclusivity can be applied to the new compositions, new 
therapeutic compounds or new methods of imitations etc. 
90 See Chapter 2.2.2.2 
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in other jurisdiction, the data exclusivity is forfeited. This is so called the waiting period 
and a reasonable restriction of the data exclusivity. 
Many researchers have appraised the adoption of waiting period in the area of data 
exclusivity for at least two reasons. First, this measure can encourage the early 
registration in the countries where the data exclusivity is granted. Second, it would not be 
unreasonable to delay the entry of the generic medicines if the originators delayed or do 
not register the new drugs in that jurisdiction. 
The fourth aspect is that the structure of exception to pharmaceutical data is incomplete 
as it should be. In accordance with Article 39.3 of TRIPS there are two basic grounds to 
exclude the protection of pharmaceutical data; one is for public welfare and the other is 
for non-commercial, fair use. Article 40-1.1 though states that the health agency can 
disclose the pharmaceutical data for public interests; it does not provide the exception 
grounds on non-commercial fair use. In this regard, for certain non-commercial uses such 
as experimental use, governmental use, and grant of compulsory license to exclude 
patent, data exclusivity cannot be excluded under the Article 40-1.1. The exceptions set 
out in Article 40-1 are lack of sufficient flexibilities to increase the access to generic 
medicines. 
Perhaps what could be considered the fifth aspect is that marketing approval is not linked 
to patent status. In accordance with Article 40-2.1 of Pharmaceutical Affair Act, an 
applicant should provide the related patent document and license agreement but the drug 
originator has essentially no recourse to the DOH to prevent approval of a generic version 
of a drug. That is the DOH does not involve itself in any patent-related issues. 
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Accordingly, the drug originator cannot take any action against any applicant for a 
generic drug submission for approval before the DOH. Nevertheless, it might be possible 
for the originator to take an action before the civil court for patent infringement arising 
from the act of filing a submission with the DOH for approval of a generic version of a 
patented drug. This practice is similar to the US FDA. 
5.3.4.3 The Exception for Data Exclusivity-The Compulsory License Scheme 
As explained in the previous section the exceptions of data protection are less than what 
they should be. For instance, the lack of exception grounds on the unfair commercial use 
makes the compulsory licensing difficult to manufacture patented medicines in the case 
of emergency. 
According to Article 76 of the Patent Act, there are four grounds to exclude patent 
protection: (1) in order to cope with the national emergencies, (2) to make non-pro fit-
seeking use of a patent for enhancement of public welfare, (3) or in the case of an 
applicant's failure to reach a licensing agreement with the patentee concerned under 
reasonable commercial terms and conditions within a considerable period of time; and (4) 
in the event that the patentee has imposed restrictions on competition or has committed 
unfair competition, as confirmed by a judgment given by a court or a disposition made by 
the Fair Trade Commission of the Executive Yuan. However, these exceptions cannot be 
used to exclude data exclusivity under Article 40-1. 
In 2005, during the outbreak of the bird flu, Taiwan's government ruled that Roche had to 
issue a license to the Department of Health for local production of Tami flu, the drug so 
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far regarded as the most promising treatment for avian influenza.91 The decision made 
Taiwan the first country to employ compulsory licensing to ensure sufficient stockpiles of 
the drug in the event of a pandemic. Without impediment of the protection of intellectual 
property, the Taiwanese Intellectual Property Office (TIPO) attached a number of 
conditions to the compulsory license.92 The first condition is that Tamiflu medicine 
should be used up, and then DOH or a local company which authorized by DOH could 
produce the medicines. The second condition is that compulsory license must be limited 
to domestic use. The third limitation is that the compulsory license would be effective 
only until the end of 2007. The fourth condition is that the Department of Health must 
pay Roche "appropriate" license fees. The final limitation is that the compulsory license 
can be revoked once the two sides reach an agreement for voluntary licensee. It is not 
surprising that this case raised the issue of whether the Taiwanese can trigger the national 
emergency ground to grant a compulsory license. However during this process there was 
no discussion as to whether such process violated the data exclusivity right. It is clear that 
the data exclusivity is not excluded by the compulsory license under the current 
Pharmaceutical Affair Act. Therefore, the only explanation for this ignorance of the issue 
of data exclusivity is that DOH took it as granted when the compulsory license is granted; 
the data exclusivity is also suspended at the same time. 
The 2008 reform Draft of Patent resolved a part of issue. It stated that if the compulsory 
license is granted on the basis of assistance to the developing countries to deal with a 
91 Kathrin Hille, Taiwan employs compulsory licensing/or Tamiflu, November 25 2005 
http:hvww.ft.com/cms/s/0/cebeb882-5dcb-llda-be9c-000077ge2340.htmI (last visit Feb. 25,2009). 
92 ld. 
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health emergency, the patent and pharmaceutical data protection are suspended. In this 
way this exception, seemingly, is applied for the grant of compulsory license for other 
needy countries. However, this exception is only applicable in cases where the Taiwanese 
government manufactures the products to export to countries that having national 
emergency rather than manufacture for local uses. 
5.5 Implementation of the Right to Medicines 
5.5.1 The Right to Medicines 
Taiwan, though separate territory and separate political and administrative unit is not a 
UN member; thus, it is not a member to all the important international originations and 
agencies. One result of this non-recognition of Taiwan is that many human rights 
instruments are not open for Taiwan to ratify. However, this does not mean that the right 
to health is not recognized in Taiwan, because Taiwan is not a member to the ICESCR. 
To the contrary, the right to heath and the right to medicines have been enforced by the 
adoption of Taiwan National Health Insurance Act. 
The legal obligation to implement national insurance scheme is based on Taiwanese 
Constitution. In accordance with Article 155 of the Taiwanese Constitution "the State, in 
order to promote social welfare, shall establish a social insurance system." Article 157 of 
the Constitution further specifies: "The State, in order to improve national health, shall 
establish extensive services for sanitation and health protection, and a system of public 
medical service." The obligation to establish a social insurance system is strengthened 
again in Article 1 0, Paragraph 5, of the Amendment of the Constitution: "The State shall 
promote national health insurance .... " According to these Constitutional provisions, the 
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Taiwanese National Health Insurance Act, was promulgated on August 9, 1994, and 
implemented on March 1, 1995. Later, this implementation was affirmed by Judicial 
Yuan interpretation No. 472, as a realization of the aforesaid provisions of the 
Constitution. 
5.4.2 Implementation of National Health Care 
Today, the National Health Insurance covers 99 percent of citizens; even some, who live 
in Mainland China. The NHI program offers comprehensive and equal benefit coverage 
to every enrollee. This universal coverage includes outpatient services in clinics and 
hospitals, inpatient hospital service, dental service, Chinese medicine, diagnosis tests and 
examinations, prescription drugs and certain over the counter drugs, preventive services, 
day care for the mentally ill and home care.93 The NHI has been proved one of best 
universal insurance in the world. Though, the framework of Taiwan National Health 
Insurance is based on Medicare of the US, it modified the whole idea of medical aid and 
removed some deficiencies. Bottom line the public health system in Taiwan became an 
ideal model of universal insurance. 
In this system premium servIce and coverage were offered, beneficiaries paid co-
payments of US$ 2.5 dollar (NT $ 80 dollar) for every clinic visit or out-patients visit to 
district hospital, $ 7 dollar (NT $240) for an outpatient visit to regional hospitals and only 
$11 dollar (NT 360) dollar for an outpatient visits to academic medical center. In every 
93 DOH, Payment Scope, available at 
http://www.nhi.gov.tw/english/webdata.asp?menu=11 &mcnu id=293&wcbdata id=1881 (last visited Feb. 
25,2009). 
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visit, an outpatient can get the necessary prescription drugs for one or two weeks without 
extra payment. 94 
The premIUm IS quite low compared to other countries. Basically, it is wage-based 
premium share by an individual or employer and the government. In the private 
enterprises, the employee paid 30%, the employer paid 60% and government 10%. The 
government will subsidize 100 % of the premiums for low-income individuals and 
veterans. In public sector, the government employee still pays 30% and the government 
will be responsible for the rest of 70%.95 The high coverage rates and the comprehensive 
benefits guaranteed to the citizen the right to medicines. 
5.4.3 The Impact of Cost Containment Stage on Pharmaceutical Expenditure 
According to DOH, the pharmaceutical spending is about one quarter of the whole 
national insurance expenditure. 96 Thus, control of pharmaceutical expenditure became the 
top priority of National Insurance Bureau. Indeed, the National Health Insurance Act 
authorizes Bureau of the National Health Insurance (BNHI) to adopt appropriate 
measures to control pharmaceutical expenditure. In accordance with Article 51 of 
NHIA,97 the Insurer, the BNHI,98 should establish the Fee Schedule for Medical Services 
94 DOH, supra note 3. 
95 Cheng, supra note 2. 
96 Lee et aI., Impact of Cost Containment Strategies on Pharmaceutical Expenditures of the National 
Insurance in Taiwna, 1996-2003, Pharmacoeconomics, Issue 24 (9), 891, 891-893 (2006) 
97 Article 51 of National Insurance Act (Taiwan) reads: 
The Fee Schedule for Medical Services and Reference List for Drugs shaH be establishedjointIy by the 
Insurer and the contracted medical care institutions and reported to the Competent Authority for approval. 
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and Reference List for Drugs. The payment to the service providers, such as hospitals and 
clinical are based on the Fee Schedule for Medical Services and Reference List for Drugs. 
99 Since the Bureau of National Health Insurance (BNHI) is the only payer to medical 
service providers, the formation of Fee Schedule and Reference List for Drugs would 
affect the choice and price of drugs. 
A research pointed out the BNHI adopted many measures to control pharmaceutical 
expenditure, including adjustment of the List Price downward, setting payment price, 
limits the payment rate for clinics, implementing the global budget,100 and conducting the 
The Fee Schedule described in the preceding paragraph shall follow the principle of "equal payment for 
same illness" and the relative points shall reflect the cost of each medical service. The International 
Classification of Diseases shall be used as the reference in deciding equal pay for the same illness. 
98 The Taiwan Health Insurance scheme is a Universal Health Insurance Program. The scheme in conducted 
by a single payer financed through the combination of premiums and taxes. 
99 Article 50 of National Health Insurance Act (Taiwan) reads: 
The contracted medical care institutions shall declare to the Insurer the points of the medical services 
rendered and expense of drugs, based on the Fee Schedule for Medical Services and the Reference List for 
Drugs. 
The Insurer shall calculate the value of each point based on the budget allocated according to in the 
preceding article and the total points of medical service as reviewed by the Insurer. The Insurer shall pay 
each contracted medical care institution according to the reviewed points. 
The ambulatory care drug expenses shall be paid to the contracted medical care institutions after being 
examined by the Insurer. In case the payment of expense exceeds the total of drug expense preset according 
to the preceding article, a certain ratio of the excessive amount shall be deducted from the budget for the 
ambulatory care for the current season. In such a situation, the Reference List for Drugs shall be adjusted in 
the following fiscal year. 
The ratio of deduction described in the preceding paragraph shall be decided by the Negotiation Committee 
for Medical Expenses. The Competent Authority shall make decision at its own discretion in case the 
Negotiation Committee for Medical Expenses does not reach an agreement in time. 
Available at htlp://www.nhi.gov.tw/ellglish/webdata.asp?ll1cllu~ll &mcnu icl=295&wcbdata id= 1865 (last 
visited Feb. 25, 2009). 
100 The 2005 Taiwan Year Book, available at http://www.gio.l!ov.tw/taiwan-\.vebsite/5-
l!p/yearbook/2005/p250.htm I (last visited Feb. 25, 2009). 
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regular marketing price survey to adjust the reimbursement price of medicines. 101 These 
measures have significant impacts on pharmaceutical expenditures. 
Apparently, to adjust pharmaceutical prices this has to be based on several factors: 102 
whether the medicine is patented, whether there is a comparable generic version for 
patented medicine in the market, and whether they are the same bioequivalent medicines. 
Under such scheme, the BNHI data pointed out new product reimbursement prices in 
Taiwan have dropped from 80% of the median price (based on the prices in 10 
benchmark advanced countries) during the 1996-2002 period to only 56% of the A-I0 
median in 2006.103 The price scheme effectively controlled the pharmaceutical spending 
and reduced the total cost of national health insurance, but it created another problem. 
This problem, as another research has shown; there are only 15% of new drugs used in 
the National Health Insurance. 104 This number is lower than most of developed countries. 
Apparently, the price scheme will avoid the service providers using new drugs and this 
scheme impedes the access to new medicines, because low reimbursement rate would 
drive them to use cheaper medicines in order to ensure their profits. In addition, the 
research showed that an average delay of new medicines, compared to the US is around 
four years. The price scheme is also a reason to cause this delay. In order to list new 
101 Lee et al., Impact of Cost Containment Strategies on Pharmaceutical Expenditures of the National 
Insurance in Taiwna, 1996-2003, Pharmacoeconomics, Issue 24 (9),891,891-893 (2006). 
102 DOH, Chapter Three Principles on Drug Reimbursement Price Approval of National Health Insurance, 
available at http://www.nhi.gov.tw/engljsh!webdata.asp?l11enll~ 11 &menll id=295&webdata id=2443 (last 
visited Feb. 25, 2009). 
103 Amcham, supra note 38. 
104 Institute of Economics and Academia Sinica, Taiwan, The Drug Black Hole, lEAS Working Paper 
(2005) 
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drugs covered by the National Health Insurance, the process will take around 13-14 
months. This is another negative effect on access to new medicines. 
Finally, the pnce scheme also triggers another trade issue, the violation of national 
treatment principles in TRIPS. The EU and the US trade representatives concerned that 
the reimbursement price of medicines and cost containments unreasonably favor the local 
generic medicines. In their view, this would likely cause unfair competition. 
5.6 Conclusion 
The implementation of TRIPS raised a global issue of access to medicine, in particular in 
the developing countries. Taiwan as a member of WTO provides the protections of 
pharmaceutical innovations. This protection more or less complies with the standard of 
protection required by TRIPS. Nevertheless, the case of Taiwan is distinguished from 
other developing countries with respect to access to medicines. That is, the 
implementation of TRIPS agreement does not create severe negative impacts on the right 
to access medicines. Perhaps Taiwan is successful because its system comprised three 
areas; the pharmaceutical patent, the pharmaceutical registering and data exclusivity in 
one policy, that is, the National Health Insurance Act. 
Exploring the Patent Act, the patent is available for pharmaceutical products. The 
grounds provided under Article 76 of Patent Act to exclude patent basically comply with 
requirements of Article 31 of TRIPS, which allows states to exclude patent where there is 
(1) national emergency, (2) an anti-competitive remedy, (3) non-commercial use for 
public interests and (4) a situation that a voluntary license cannot be entered within 
reasonable time and terms. These grounds established the exceptions to ensure that the 
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right to medicines can be realized in Taiwan. A noted case applying the exception to 
grant compulsory license appeared in 2005, in which, Taiwan granted the compulsory 
license for Tim-flu. In 2008, Taiwan drafted a reform of Patent Act in order to 
incorporate the 2005 Amendment. The reform was focused on waivers of requirement 
that the use of products manufactured by the compulsory license is predominately to be 
used in domestic market. Thus, it is basically a law to resolve the issue of access to 
medicines in developing countries. 
With respect to the pharmaceutical law, the development of data exclusivity is highly 
related to the development of pharmaceutical registering scheme in Taiwan. Compared 
with the US pharmaceutical law, we found the underlying philosophy, basically the same. 
The desire to develop the pharmaceutical registering scheme in Taiwan, except for 
ensuring the safety of drugs, may contain another important goal, the promotion of local 
pharmaceutical industry and nourishing the capability of clinical trials. It is 
comprehensible why the Taiwanese government should incorporate an additional goal 
irrelevant to the safety of drugs in pharmaceutical law, if you recognized the features of 
Taiwanese pharmaceutical market. In general, there are four key features of 
pharmaceutical market: (1) small capital size, (2) highly relied on technology transfer, (3) 
half of medicines are imported; and (4) a small pharmaceutical market. These features 
ensure that the policy in pharmaceutical industry is focused on building capability of 
manufacturing and conducting clinical trials rather than the development of new drugs. 
With the strong local capabilities of manufacturing, the affordable medicines can be 
acquired easily and a competitive pharmaceutical market can be established locally. 
Under this policy, the health agency is mandated to determine what approaches the 
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pharmaceutical registering scheme follow and what degree of protection of 
pharmaceutical data should be implemented. 
Overall, the protection of pharmaceutical data has evolved in three separate stages. These 
three stages, no doubt, stay with the evolution of pharmaceutical registering scheme. The 
1993 requirement of local clinical data in pharmaceutical registering, namely the first 
stage, initiated the development of pharmaceutical clinical trials in Taiwan and also 
introduced the concept of protection of pharmaceutical data. The protection of 
pharmaceutical data in this stage is focused on the local clinical data, while the foreign 
pharmaceutical data is protected only through contracts, torts, and 1997 Trade Secret Act, 
if they are qualified. 
The second stage initiated by Double-Twelve Announcement in 2000. This 
announcement deregulated the local clinical trial requirement in 1993 and adopted the 
ICH-E5 standard to comply with the international standard. The purpose of introducing 
the new standard is to avoid unnecessary repetition of local clinical trials, which were 
required by 1993 regulation and use the bridge study as the alternative requirement. 
Apparently, the adoption of bridge test, though still on the basis of boosting the local 
capability of clinical trial is more logical way to justify the requirement of local data. The 
essence of bridge study is to deal with the Asian ethnical variance when clinical trails are 
not conducted in Taiwan. This provides a better ground for health agencies to require 
such data without violation of national treatment principle in TRIPS. However, this 
announcement provides the protection data, which covered by bridge study, while the 
foreign registering pharmaceutical data is protected under this announcement. 
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The third stage, namely data exclusivity period, began at the adoption of data exclusivity 
right in 2005. The significance of this stage is that it extended the data exclusivity right 
from local data to the foreign registering data. This adoption, also, incorporates the 
measure of waiting period to encourage the early registration of foreign medicines. This 
measure would incentive the multinational national companies to register in Taiwan 
within three years after the first foreign registering. However, this adoption lacks certain 
exception, which are provided under Article 39.3 of TRIPS; namely the fair non-
commercial use exception. This incomplete exceptional structure for data exclusivity no 
doubt will drag Taiwan to a bad position when patent is excluded but the data exclusivity 
is not. In this regard, the establishing of exceptional structure should take account of the 
exceptional grounds that provide for patent and make them consistent. Otherwise, the 
grounds provided under Article 76 of Patent Act finally will be inoperative if the data 
exclusivity is not excluded. The 2008 Draft of Patent Act Amendment, partially, took 
account of this issue. The Amendment suspended the data exclusivity when compulsory 
license is granted to enable Taiwan to export to medicines to eligible countries defined by 
the WTO. This Draft however did not resolve the issue of basic structure of exceptions of 
data exclusivity. 
The National Health Insurance Act likely is one of key reasons to ensure the citizens right 
to medicines. In accordance with this Act, BNHI has authority to regulate the 
pharmaceutical price through appropriate cost containment measures. For a decade now, 
the cost containment measures indeed had positive impacts on the control of 
pharmaceutical expenditure. However, the research showed that such control brings other 
negative impacts on access to "new" medicines. The low reimbursement prices caused 
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the medical service providers to choose the cheaper generic medicines instead of more 
effective "new medicines." On the other hand, the principles to determine reimbursement 
prices seemingly favor local medicines. This triggers another trade issue, a national 
treatment principle in TRIPS. Though, recently, the BNHI attempts to relief the issue of 
insufficient access to the "new medicine' by commitment to adjust the new drug price 
upward. So far there is no research to show the impact of this attempt. 
The case of Taiwan established an example for developing countries to enable their 
citizens to realize the right to access medicines by utilizing the flexibilities of TRIPS 
without breaching their international obligations. In other words, the implementation of 
TRIPS in flexible way and effective adoption of certain measures fully enable individuals 
to realize the right to medicines. By adopting appropriate measures into registering 
scheme, states may build up their local manufacturing capabilities of pharmaceutical 
industry. This strategy though cannot raise states' capability to the level as the R&D 
oriented countries, it should have states acquire certain manufacturing capacities and 
create a competitive pharmaceutical market. These two prominent results may resolve 
most of the issues pertinent to the right of access to medicines. The cases of South Africa 
'1 
1 
j and Brazil are good examples to demonstrate that even states with their own local , 
i • 1 
j 
i 
capabilities to manufacture generic medicines may still encounter difficulties in access to 
medicines. Nevertheless, a competitive market may force the pharmaceutical company to 
provide medicines at reasonable price. 
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6 Conclusions 
The era of TRIPS marked that the knowledge itself, though is intangible, is a commercial 
asset in international trade. It is why medicines can be sold at high price because there is 
high value of knowledge, which is protected through patent or pharmaceutical data, 
produced by the pharmaceutical companies. More than $800 million of developing cost 
and the 8-12 years of developing period provide an explanation as to why pharmaceutical 
companies sold new medicines at a high price. Nevertheless, this viewpoint is based on 
that countries have profitable and well-established pharmaceutical industry and people in 
those countries have high income to acquire the required medicines. For most of 
developing countries, medicines seem far and unreachable. In fact medicines come as a 
second priority in their list because some of these countries' citizens lack food which is 
much more essential than medicines. This harsh reality did not allow these countries to 
adopt the same legal standard of protection adopted in the US and other developed 
countries. 
This thesis began with exploring the need of data exclusivity and debate in relation to the 
protection of pharmaceutical data, discussed the concept of data exclusivity, and surveyed 
entire exceptions of the protection in current legal regimes. Moreover this thesis sought 
an answer from the underlying jurisprudence of the right to access medicines and 
provided a case study to look at how the protection operated without impending access to 
medicines. 
In chapter 1, we explained that, basically, the concept of protection pharmaceutical data, 
which originated in the US in 1984 has two main aims: (1) the advance of the entry of 
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generic medicines; and (2) compensating the lost of originators in clinical trial spending. 
By merely introducing the concept of data protection at least two urgent controversies 
had to be confronted and resolved; first, whether pharmaceutical data should be 
disclosed, and second, whether subsequent applicants for marketing approval regarding 
respective generic medicine should repeat same clinical trials. In reality, the adoption of 
data exclusivity in the US expedited the entry of generic medicine and promoted the 
R&D because the US is the typical R&D countries and more than 80 % of medicines are 
produced in the US. 1 Therefore, it was not surprising that the US takes a more stringent 
approach of protection to provide sufficient incentives to promote the industry. However, 
this same legal principle of protection seemed less suitable to address the question of 
protection in developing countries. To the contrary, the protection of pharmaceutical data 
along with the pharmaceutical patent creates un-mounted duel barriers to access generic 
medicines, in the developing countries. 
These competing interests of developed and developing countries are hardly news. A look 
at the drug market is very revealing .. Global data indicates that the US companies are 
marketing the largest of new medicines with a 47.2% share and many of them are 
important global pharmaceutical manufacturers, such as Pfizer, Merck & Co, Johnson & 
Johnson or Bristol-Myers Squibb, etc? The rest of the new drugs market share is also 
dominated by companies from powerful countries 
1 Stuart O. Schweitzer, Pharmaceutical Economics and Policy, page 170 (Oxford, 2nd ed., 2007) 
2 Id. 
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It legitimate to ask what these companies and their powerful governments behind them 
would do before the introduction of the concept of data exclusivity to protect their 
interests. Patent regulations were in place, so one may think that why cannot they keep 
protecting their interest through patent law, given the fact that patent law in early years 
provided 20 years of protection? The answer is simple, while patent protect against 
infringement it is not adequately protective tool when it comes to data protection in 
today's world. In today's world there exists group and states that have the knowledge 
and technology to use reverse engineering skills to produce any patented drug and this, 
technically would not be considered patent infringement. Also another factor that 
diminished the importance of patent as a tool of protection is that patent law is essentially 
capital market-oriented tool; thus in early years when it was developing, this law did not 
take account of other legitimate human interests, namely the human rights law. 
Accordingly, there had to be an alternative protection to the well-established patent law. 
This new alternative is data exclusivity. It keeps generic medicines out the market with 
fives years. Yet, rightly, many are not happy with new US principle of protection. 
In chapter 2, we found that; though, pharmaceutical patent has been recognized as a basic 
global standard to protect pharmaceutical products in TRIPS, there is no concession 
concerning how to protect pharmaceutical data. This creates a tension between the US 
and developing countries. The US came out victorious in this matter. The US was 
successful in convincing some countries to adopt this concept notwithstanding any other 
obligations these countries had. The US, accordingly signed treaties with these countries 
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obliging them to adopt the data exclusivity principle. Eventually the result was that the 
US was able to provide better protections. 
The attitude in TRIPs is, pretty much, neutral compared to the treaties the US made with 
other countries. These US agreements roughly formed three type of data exclusivity, from 
conceptual type to comprehensive type. The first generation is the basic type of data 
exclusivity because it only conceptualizes the term of data exclusivity. The NAFTA, the 
first regional agreement, began to adopt data exclusivity. The US- Jordan FTA, the first 
bilateral agreement duplicated the NAFTA model of data exclusivity. These two cases 
only contain basic elements of data exclusivity, terms and subject matter of protection. 
The second generation in the one hand provides clearer terms and develops 
comprehensive conditions in text through subsequent negotiations of regional and 
bilateral agreements. On the other hand it creates more barriers for generic medicines. 
Besides five years terms, this generation often removed the ambiguous terms and defined 
whether the new use is protected, whether the waiting period is applicable, whether states 
are allowed to refer data registered in other jurisdiction etc.3 Of these agreements, the 
most controversial was the generation that linked marketing approval to patent status. 
Under the limitation of patent linkage, the subsequent generic manufacturers cannot enter 
the market without the consent of the originator. One dubious result of this linkage is that 
in jurisdictions that do not put cap on application periods, the adoption of data exclusivity 
may delay the entry of the generic medicines more than 10 years. Typically if an 
originator finds a chance to delay he can apply marketing approval until the last date of 
3 See chapter 2 
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five-year term data exclusivity in other jurisdictions and began another five-year term of 
protection. This unintentionally enables the originator to lock out generic medicines for 
10 years from the first registration in the developed countries. 
Apparently, the second generation of data exclusivity extremely hindered access to 
medicines. This approach, no doubts, took few accounts of the citizen's right to access 
medicines in the developing countries. 
It is uncontestable that the WTO Doha Declaration and the subsequent Decision in 2003 
provide a channel for the US to end the proliferation of the second generation and start 
the third generation with some adjustments. In 2007, the US incorporated the essence of 
2001 WTO Doha Declaration and 2003 Decision into her trade policy. The 2007 US-Peru 
and the other two agreements incorporated the results of the Doha Declaration and 
Decision in the agreements and removed patent linkage. Such incorporation initiated new 
reform of data exclusivity, namely the third generation of data exclusivity. In this new 
generation of data exclusivity, the most distinguished change is recognition of the right to 
access medicines. Thus, depending on from what angle you look at it, right to medicines 
could be seen as a new element that defines the frontiers of data exclusivity, but also the 
opposite is true; from the other perspective, data exclusivity defines the limit of the right 
to medicines. 
In the domestic level several mechanisms are deployed to deal with the issue of data 
protection. For instance, the Indian law provides the protection of pharmaceutical data 
through trade secret law, which is another type of protection other than data exclusivity. 
The protection through trade secret law indeed is the generic type of protection under 
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Article 39.3 of TRIPS. In accordance with Article 39.1, pharmaceutical data is protected 
because it is undisclosed and it contains commercial value. Thus, it is logically possible 
to protect the pharmaceutical data and avoid the unreasonable linking with patent status. 
However, protecting pharmaceutical data through trade secrets law has its own 
repercussions. The pharmaceutical registering scheme for safety reasons require the 
disclosure of pharmaceutical data to the public in the most of the developed counties. 
This situation made it difficult to protect pharmaceutical data through the trade secrets, 
because there is no secrecy after a new drug is registered in one jurisdiction, which 
unveils the data to the pUblic. In this sense; though, theoretically, there are four types of 
protection of pharmaceutical data, adopting data exclusivity, arguably, is the reasonable 
way to go. 
Once, we recognized that the data exclusivity is the better model to protect 
pharmaceutical data; this is an explicit recognition of the policy of promotion of 
pharmaceutical industry. Then the next step we should ask what kind of elements, terms 
and conditions should be included in the data exclusivity scheme. Or put it this way, as a 
safety, any building should have a safety gate for emergency. The adoption of data 
exclusivity should be based on an assumption that there is a complete set of exceptions 
for public health purpose. Without this premise, the access to medicines, the one of 
objectives of this protection, cannot be attained. Thus, in chapter 3, we explored the 
exceptions of data exclusivity in the global, regional and domestic law level. The several 
findings regarding the exceptions of pharmaceutical patent and data exclusivity are 
unpleased. Those exceptions are not flexible as they should be. Fortunately, the Doha 
meeting initiated a serious of actions to improve this situation. 
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In the global level, the entire exceptions for patent are based on Article 7, 8, 30 and 31. It 
seems a complete set of exceptions to exclude patent. Yet, it is not. As the most basic 
form to protect pharmaceuticals, it is surprising that TRIPS does not provide effective 
grounds to exclude patents for public health purposes. Basically, the grounds to exclude 
patent are designed for the use as a goodwill purpose rather than health related purposes. 
But, most of WTO members before the late 1990s' had an illusionary image that these 
exceptions and flexibilities in the TRIPS could be used to increase the access to 
medicines when states encounter health emergencies. The result of 1997 South African 
case and 1999 Brazil cases awakened these states from this illusion. When these two 
developing countries used the default exceptions in TRIPS to resolve the issue of access 
to medicines resulting from the implementation of the TRIPS agreement, there were 
certain intellectual property infringement suits against them immediately. Soon after 
these two cases, the WTO members found another severe deficiencies in the compulsory 
license scheme. The requirements of compulsory license scheme set out in Article 31 of 
TRIPS restrict developing countries, which lack manufacturing capabilities from 
importing medicines from other counties, because the grant of compulsory license should 
provide that the generically licensed medicines should predominately be used in the 
domestic market. But the problem is countries cannot grant a compulsory license for the 
use in other countries. This inherent deficiency was unveiled at the moment TRIPS was 
adopted, because states negligently overlooked the negative impacts of implementation of 
TRIPS. Indeed, these negative impacts will affect, at least, the interests of two third of 
members, because only a small portion of countries can manufacture drugs. The profound 





1 issue. The emergency of 2001 Doha Declaration and 2003 Decision demonstrates that 
WTO devoted to a serious of action to satisfy a need to restructure or revise those 
grounds to exclude intellectual property in cases of health emergency. The results of the 
WTO actions at least are important in several aspects. 
First, the default compulsory license scheme cannot resolve the issue of access to 
medicines, in particular in developing countries, resulting from the implementation of 
TRIPS. Second, the flexibilities in TRIPS have little positive effects on resolving the 
issue of access to medicines if there is no official legal text to support them. It is clear 
that if there were no substantive grounds for states to exclude pharmaceutical patent and 
data exclusivity for public purpose, whenever states trigger any flexible measure would 
have potential risks of law suits against them. The WTO members were aware of this 
impact; therefore, developing countries attempted to incorporate new texts or new 
elements into TRIPS. The progress of integrating new text is complicate because it 
involves fundamental interests between the developing countries and developed 
countries. The 2005 Amendment of TRIPS represents the final bottom line between the 
two sides, or the final text that both sides can accept. That is why eventually the WTO 
decided to put reform in permanent way in 2005. 
Turning to the data protection, the situation seems even worst than patent. The exceptions 
under Article 39.3 of TRIPS are even less complete than patent exceptions. It provides 
two general grounds to exclude data exclusivity; (1) fair use and (2) the situations are 
necessary to suspend the protection in order to protect the public. Some researchers have 
predicted that the adoption of data exclusivity will diminish the legal effect of 
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compulsory license if data exclusivity cannot be excluded at the same time when the 
compulsory license is issued to suspend patent protection. These worries are not far from 
the truth and likely will become another barrier for the generic medicines. Indeed, many 
regional and bilateral agreements have adopted the strict data exclusivity without 
adequate exceptions as chapter 2 has pointed out. In the second generation of data 
exclusivity mentioned, it is noted that the US trade representatives attempted to secure 
the interest of pharmaceutical industry and even introduced the stricter rules than the US 
law. In this situation, the generic medicines cannot be marketed, in states that have 
granted the compulsory licenses to exclude patent, because they are protected by the data 
exclusivity under the bilateral or regional agreements. Such practice, no doubt, is legally 
questionable. 
The emergence of third generation of data exclusivity is an attempt to improve such 
negative aspects of data exclusivity and incorporates the texts of Doha Declaration and 
Decision. Assuming this Amendment can be passed, the exception to exclude the data 
exclusivity will not only include two grounds under Article 39.3 but also possible flexible 
measures inconsistent with the TRIPS as well as compulsory license scheme. It is still too 
early to judge what results these reforms will achieve, but it is true that they provide a 
better, flexible language to construe the exceptions of data exclusivity for public purpose 
and access to medicines. 
It is noted that the exiting of data protection should not be solely for the profits of 
pharmaceutical industry. Its existence should carry other social welfare objectives; 
namely, access to medicines. The question we should ask is why the protection of 
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pharmaceutical innovation should contain these two objectives. The answer lies in the 
underlying philosophy of jurisprudence of access to medicines, as demonstrated in 
chapter 4. Looking more squarely to human rights instruments that embody the right to 
health and the recent WTO and WHO policies, we found that there is a trend that 
promises to reconcile these two interests. That is a trend to reconcile the access to 
medicines and protection of pharmaceutical innovation. Such trend has been developed 
through three phases; Pre-Doha, Doha and After-Doha phases. 
In the Pre-Doha phase, from 2000-2001, we found that though the access to medicines 
has been recognized in certain human rights instruments for years, this right is not 
successfully realized. Partially, this unsuccessful realization can be attributed to the lack 
of operative indicators of health, clear definitions of the scope of the right, and effective 
evaluation. The ambiguous attitude as to how to implement the right to heath, and the 
right to access medicines affects the WTO's approach to resolve the issue between the 
protection of pharmaceutical innovations and states' obligation to implement right to 
health in the early case. In the 2000 Canada Pharmaceutical case, the WTO obviously 
took more defensive approach against states' right to protect public health and favorable 
approach to protect pharmaceutical innovations. The adoption of General Comment 14 by 
ICSCR Human Rights Committee definitely is a turning point in this stage. General 
Comment 14 furnishes a better and clearer text as to states' obligation to implement the 
right to health or the right to access medicines and connected the core obligation of this 
right with the essential medicines. The recognition of the right of "access to essential 
medicines" being the core obligation imposes on states an obligation to protect this right 
with maximum efforts to ensure access to essential medicines. This means states should 
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realize that national policies, in every aspect, should take account of the right to access 
essential medicines, and this consideration, in tum, impacted the intellectual property 
law. 
The second phase can be marked as the WTO Doha Era (2001-2005), or post Comment 
17. In this phase, under the influence of General Comment 14, the WTO members were 
devoted to reconcile the protection of pharmaceutical innovation and the access to 
medicines and completed three prominent documents in relation to the TRIPS agreement; 
(1) 2001 WTO Doha Declaration on Public Health, (2) 2003 Decision to paragraph 6 of 
Declaration and (3) 2005 Amendment. Indeed, these three documents regardless of how 
much positive impact they had on the implementation of the right to medicines, they 
began a new relationship between intellectual property law and human rights law. 
In the third phase, after the emergence of 2005 amendment, from international, regional 
to the domestic level, we found the right to access medicines became the new element of 
intellectual property as to the protection of pharmaceutical products. In the global level, 
the Medical Development and Research Treaty had been proposed by NGO and the 
developing countries to the WTO. The Treaty directly incorporated the access to 
medicines into the protection scheme. 
Finally, we chose Taiwan as a case study in chapter 5 for two reasons. First, Taiwan is a 
country, which is highly reliant on the importation of pharmaceutical products, but the 
government adopted the same protection to pharmaceutical innovations as the US does. 
The second interesting reason to choose this case is the citizens in this island are not 
suffering from the lack of access to medicines, though the adoption of high level of 
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protection to IP rights. The case of the Taiwan provides an empirical proof that states 
may realize the right to health at low cost and at the same provides a high level protection 
for pharmaceuticals. 
The Taiwanese miracle can be unveiled after exploring three areas of law: (1) 
pharmaceutical patent (2) pharmaceutical law; and (3) National Health Insurance Act. 
There are several findings in that the Taiwan government protects pharmaceutical 
innovations though include traditional objective, the promotion of technology but the 
most important aim is focused on two aspects: (1) strengthening local manufacturing 
capabilities and (2) prompting the technology transfer. The government has to provide the 
higher standard of protections for pharmaceutical innovations in order to create a 
business environment in which foreign companies would like to transfer their high 
technology and would like to invest in this industry. That is why the Taiwan government 
does not loosen the protection of pharmaceuticals 
Thus, the pharmaceutical patent is available for pharmaceutical products since 1997 
reform of Patent Act. The exceptions to exclude Patent under Article 76 of Patent Act are 
similar to Article 31 of TRIPS with little variance. It is complete enough for Taiwan. The 
manufacturing of generic medicines is not an issue in Taiwan, once the government can 
grant the compulsory licenses to exclude patent. In this regard, the 2005 Tamiflu case that 
Taiwan issued its first compulsory license to manufacture medicines for the treatment of 
bird flu proves this point. 
With respect to pharmaceutical law, the development of protection of pharmaceutical 
data is highly related to the evolution of pharmaceutical registering scheme. In the early 
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stage, 1993, the health agency requires only 40 local cases of clinical trials to register 
data, because its aim was to build up local capabilities. The second breaking point of 
pharmaceutical registering was 2002. In this stage the government deregulated the local 
clinical requirement and replaced it by the ethnical variance study, also called bridge 
study. This incorporation is complied with the standard ICH-E5. This reform provides 
more judiciable reasons to require the local clinical data. Both of these two registering 
requirements provided five years protection for pharmaceutical data under monitoring 
period. In 2005 the government, under the pressure of US representatives adopted five 
years term of data exclusivity in order to protect foreign registered data. The protection of 
pervious two local requirements is focused on the protection of local clinical data, 
whereas the 2005 data exclusivity is focused on which of pharmaceutical data in the 
foreign jurisdiction. Through, progressive protection of pharmaceutical data along with 
pharmaceutical industry policy successfully built up the local clinical and manufacturing 
ability step by step. 
The National Health Insurance scheme plays an important role in ensuring the access to 
medicines in Taiwan. As the only single payer of Insurance system, Bureau of National 
Health Insurance can bargain for the price of medicines easily. Further, the National 
Health Insurance Act authorizes the BNHI to control the price through appropriate 
measures. As a result, the pharmaceutical prices are 80-90 % less than that of the 
international median prices. The prices of generic medicines are also reasonable because 
local companies can produce generic medicines after the expiration of the patent. The 
strong capabilities of local pharmaceutical manufactures create a competitive 
pharmaceutical market, which would reduce the price. This approach avoided the 
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Taiwanese citizens to pay high price for medicines. Here, we found that the Taiwanese 
government took another approach to increase the access to medicines. By adoption of 
high-level standards of intellectual property rights, the government wants to use foreign 
business to inject new blood into the industry to remodel the old and outdated local 
pharmaceutical industry. Since the resource is constraint, the government spends in 
upgrading the local manufacturing rather than in pharmaceutical R&D competition. 
Meanwhile, the R&D will be conducted by governmental institutions or be subsidized by 
the governmental fund. This approach can direct the R&D toward the neglected disease 
not high profited disease. The entire package of health policy, including the protection of 
pharmaceutical innovation still contains some negatives aspects, in that the research 
found most of prescription drugs used in Taiwan are generic medicines rather than 
patented medicines. The Taiwanese government still makes efforts to raise the quality of 
insurance. The Taiwanese citizens are proud of their Health Policy. 
Overall, this research takes the protection of the pharmaceutical data as an example to 
explore the tension between intellectual property and access to medicines. The issue is 
not new but we found that the international community reconciled these two issues. The 
international community has recognized the issue of access to medicines is not only 
resulting from poverty, but it also would happen, inadvertently, because of other human 
reasons; such as terrorism. A legal protection for any subjects is to make sense; it must be 
read in the light of some assumed purpose. Thus, if a law merely declaring a rule, with no 
purpose or objective, this can hardly be called laws as we know it. The protection of data 
should be construed in accordance with its underlying purpose and policies. Each 




principle in question. Having this in mind, the protection of pharmaceutical is not a 
purpose in itself; it is rather the social end we want to attain from invoking such a 
protection. Accordingly, when we talk about protection this should be understood to 
mean a meaningful protection to a meaningful purpose. And there can never be more 
meaningful purpose the human being per se. 
It would be too much to expect that this research, to positively and holistically, cover the 
entire issue of access to medicines and the issues relating thereby, but it is reasonably 
expected that it, would at least, add constructively, to the discussion and the debate of this 
important issue. The lesson learned from the case of Taiwan, is that when a state with no 
bargaining power in international trade, find itself in a position like Taiwan that the state 
should use the strong protection to develop its local industry, which is another route to 
increase the access to medicines. This, indeed not a model answer, and not every state 
will succeed in following the Taiwanese model, because the answer depends on what the 
resource the state has and what kind of culture and business features it has, etc. The state 
should take account of all these factors and develop its policy accordingly. 
Therefore it is hereby submitted that the protection of pharmaceutical innovation 
inevitably raises the price of medicines, but states should also take this price as the cost of 
developing the industry. 
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